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Young v. United Parcel Service
12-1226
Ruling Below: Peggy Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 707 F.3d 437, (4th Cir. 2013), cert
granted, 134 S.Ct. 2898 (2014).
Employee brought action against her employer, alleging that she was the victim of pregnancy
discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (PDA). The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted
employer's motion for summary judgment, and employee appealed.
Question Presented: Whether, and in what circumstances, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k), requires an employer that provides work accommodations to non-pregnant
employees with work limitations to provide work accommodations to pregnant employees who
are “similar in their ability or inability to work.”

Peggy YOUNG, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., Defendant-Appellee,
and
United Parcel Service of America, Inc.; UPS Heal Program; Aetna Life Insurance
company; Aetna Disability and Absence Management, Defendants.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
Decided on January 9, 2013
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:
In 1978, Congress passed the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (the “PDA”), which
amended the definition of discrimination on
the basis of sex in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) to provide
that it included discrimination in
employment “because of or on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions.” Invoking both the PDA and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (the
“ADA”), Peggy Young (“Young”) appeals

the district court's grant of summary
judgment for her employer, United Postal
Service, Inc. (“UPS”). For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
I.
A.
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment,
we recite the facts in the light most
favorable to Young as the non-moving
party. Three UPS policies lie at the core of
this dispute. First, UPS defined among the
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essential functions for all drivers the ability
to “[l]ift, lower, push, pull, leverage and
manipulate ... packages weighing up to 70
pounds,” and to “[a]ssist in moving
packages weighing up to 150 pounds.”
Second,
the
applicable
Collective
Bargaining Agreement (the “CBA”)
provides
temporary
alternate
work
(“TAW”) to employees “unable to perform
their normal work assignments due to an onthe-job injury.” To comply with this CBA
provision, UPS offers light duty work to
those employees injured while on the job or
suffering from a permanent impairment
cognizable under the ADA. Under UPS
policy and the CBA, a pregnant employee
can continue working as long as she can
perform the essential functions of her job,
but is ineligible for light duty work for any
limitations arising solely as result of her
pregnancy.
Finally, a CBA provision requires UPS to
give an “inside job” to drivers who have lost
their certification by the Department of
Transportation (the “DOT”) because of a
failed medical exam, a lost driver's license,
or involvement in a motor vehicle accident
as long as the driver is capable of
performing such a job. Because an inside job
often involves heavy lifting, it is typically
not considered light duty work.
Against this backdrop, we turn to the facts
before us. We begin with a general
statement of facts, providing additional
information as necessary to the analysis.
Young started working for UPS in 1999, and
began driving a delivery truck in 2002. By
2006 and throughout the relevant period,

Young held a position as a part-time, early
morning driver, also known as an “air
driver,” apparently in reference to her
responsibility to pick up and deliver
packages that had arrived by air carrier the
previous night. Young worked out of a UPS
facility in Landover, Maryland known as the
“D.C. Building.” Each morning after
clocking in at the D.C. Building and
inspecting her delivery van, Young and
other air drivers would meet a shuttle from
the airport bearing letters and packages
scheduled for immediate delivery. Air
drivers were then responsible for loading
their vans and making deliveries. Young
typically finished her work responsibilities
by 9:45 or 10 in the morning, and then
proceeded to her second job at a flower
delivery company.
In July 2006, following two unsuccessful
rounds of in vitro fertilization, Young
requested a leave of absence to try a third
round. The UPS occupational health
manager, Carolyn Martin, granted Young's
request. When Young became pregnant, she
sought to extend her leave. At some point in
September 2006, she left with her supervisor
a note from Dr. Thaddeus Mamlenski
indicating that she should not lift more than
twenty pounds for the first twenty weeks of
her pregnancy and not more than ten pounds
thereafter. Young soon followed up with a
phone call to Martin saying that she was not
yet ready to return to work.
During that September 2006 call, Martin
informed Young that UPS policy would not
permit her to continue working as long as
she had the twenty-pound lifting restriction.
Young maintains that she sought to explain
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to Martin that her job rarely required her to
lift over twenty pounds, that other UPS
employees had in any case agreed to assist
her, and that she was willing to do either
light duty work or her regular job. Young
characterized the seventy-pound lifting
requirement as illusory because she rarely
had to transport large packages, and when
she did, she could use a hand truck or
request assistance from other UPS
employees.
On October 11, 2006, Young had a check-up
with midwife Cynthia Shawl. At the
conclusion of her check-up, Shawl drafted
and signed a short note on National Naval
Medical Center letterhead stating “Peggy
Sue Young is currently pregnant and due to
deliver on or about May 2, 2007. Due to her
pregnancy it is recommended that she not
lift more than 20 pounds.” (the “Shawl
note”). The Shawl note also indicated Shawl
was available to provide further information
or answer questions, and listed contact
information for her. Although Shawl did not
typically draft such notes, she did so in this
instance because Young had told her she
needed “a letter for work stating her
restrictions.”
At some point after her appointment with
Shawl, Young contacted her supervisor at
the D.C. Building and requested to return to
work. When Young informed her supervisor
of the note recommending she not lift more
than twenty pounds, her supervisor referred
Young to Martin. After speaking with
Young, Martin concluded that, based on
UPS policy, Young was unable to perform
the essential functions of her job and was
ineligible for light duty assignment. It is

undisputed that Martin
determination alone.

made

this

Young and Martin spoke by phone at the
end of October 2006. In the course of
discussing Young's lifting limitation and
eligibility for work, Martin explained to
Young that (1) UPS offered light duty for
those with on-the-job injuries, those
accommodated under the ADA, and those
who had lost DOT certification, but not for
pregnancy; (2) Young did not qualify for
short-term disability benefits because she
had presented no note stating she could not
work at all; (3) Young had exhausted her
leave under the Family and Medical Leave
Act (the “FMLA”); and (4) UPS policy did
not permit Young to continue working as an
air driver with her twenty-pound lifting
restriction. Although Martin “empathize[d]
with [Young's] situation and would have
loved to help her,” Martin believed she was
required to treat Young the same as she
would any other UPS employee who had a
lifting restriction that did not result from an
on-the-job injury or illness and who could
not perform his or her regular job.
According to Martin, she would have
allowed Young to return to work if Young
could provide a medical certification
removing her lifting restriction and stating
she could perform the essential functions of
her job.
The parties do not dispute that Martin based
her decision to disallow Young from
returning to work solely on the basis of the
lifting limitations imposed by Mamlenski
and Shawl. Martin did not believe Young
had any other restrictions, and asserts that
had she considered Young disabled within
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the meaning of the ADA, she would have
encouraged Young to apply for an
accommodation in accordance with UPS's
ADA policy. Although Young takes issue
with Martin's failure to contact Shawl and
seek more information regarding the
recommended lifting restriction, Young does
not controvert Martin's assertion.
Still seeking to return to work, Young
approached Myron Williams, the Capital
Division Manager in the D.C. Building, in
November 2006. According to Young, when
she explained her desire to return to work,
Williams told her she was “too much of a
liability” while pregnant and that she “could
not come back into the [D.C.] [B]uilding
until [she] was no longer pregnant.”
By November 2006, Young's FMLA leave
had expired. She then went on an extended
leave of absence, receiving no pay and
eventually losing her medical coverage by
the end of the year. During this extended
leave, someone—the record does not
disclose who—at UPS ascribed Young's
absence to “disability” by placing the code
for disability on her attendance chart. A UPS
employee explained at his deposition that
the disability code does not necessarily
mean that the employee is on approved
disability leave; it in some cases means only
that an employee is “not working because of
an off the job situation.”
Young gave birth on April 29, 2007, and
returned to work for UPS at some point
thereafter.
B.
Young filed a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (the

“EEOC”) on July 23, 2007, and later
amended it. She alleged discrimination on
the basis of race, sex, and pregnancy. After
the EEOC issued Young a right to sue letter
in September 2008, she filed suit in October
2008. In an amended complaint filed the
same month, Young sought damages for sex
and race discrimination under Title VII and
for disability discrimination under the ADA.
When Young sought to amend her complaint
a third time in June 2009 to add a distinct
disparate impact claim, the district court
denied her motion.
Following over eighteen months of
discovery, UPS moved for summary
judgment in July 2010. In addition to
responding in opposition to UPS's summary
judgment motion, Young also sought to
compel additional discovery, asked for a
continuance under Rule 56(d) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and moved to
dismiss voluntarily her race discrimination
claim. In an opinion issued in February
2011, the district court granted summary
judgment for UPS and denied Young's
motions for additional discovery, a
continuance, and a dismissal of her race
discrimination claim. On Young's ADA
claim, the district court reasoned that UPS
had not discriminated against Young either
by asking for a doctor's note, which it was
permitted to do under the circumstances, or
by deciding not to accommodate her.
Applying the Title VII burden shifting
analysis under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green to Young's PDA claim, the district
court concluded Young had not shown direct
evidence of discrimination; failed to
establish a prima facie case of sex
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discrimination because she could identify no
similarly situated comparator who received
more favorable treatment than she did; and
in any case could not show that UPS's nondiscriminatory rationale for its decision was
pretextual.
The district court denied Young's motion for
reconsideration in August 2011. This appeal
followed.
II.
Young challenges the district court's grant of
summary judgment on her ADA and PDA
claims. First, she claims that UPS
impermissibly regarded her as disabled
under the ADA. Second, Young contends
that UPS discriminated against her on the
basis of pregnancy in violation of the
PDA. In considering these arguments, we
review the district court's grant of summary
judgment de novo, and construe all the
documentary evidence and inferences
available therefrom in the light most
favorable to Young. Summary judgment is
appropriate if UPS establishes “that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact.”
Thus, a genuine issue of material fact, and
not simply “the mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties,”
is required to defeat UPS's motion. We turn
first to Young's ADA claim.

essential functions of her job; and (3) UPS
took an adverse action against her on
account of her disability. Young's claim fails
because she cannot establish the first of
these elements.
The ADA provides three avenues for
establishing the existence of a disability:
“(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded
as having such an impairment.” Young does
not press the argument that her pregnancy
alone establishes disability. Rather, she
contends that UPS regarded her pregnancyrelated work limitations as such.

A.

A “regarded as” disabled claim “includes the
circumstance
when
the
employer
‘mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one
or more major life activities.’ ” Thus, the
employer “must believe ... that [an
individual] has a substantially limiting
impairment when, in fact, the impairment is
not so limiting.” Major life activities are
“those activities that are of central
importance to daily life,” such as walking,
seeing, and hearing. Finally, where an
employee relies on a “regarded as” disabled
theory, we focus “on the reactions and
perceptions
of
the
employer's
decisionmakers....”

The ADA prohibits discrimination against
“a qualified individual on the basis of
disability.”
To
establish
disability
discrimination, Young must demonstrate
that (1) she had a disability as defined in the
ADA; (2) she was a “qualified individual,”
which entails being able to perform the

Young identifies three actions on Carolyn
Martin's part as evidence that UPS regarded
her as disabled: soliciting from Young a
doctor's opinion that she was no longer
under any lifting limitations; preventing
Young from working based only on the
Shawl
note
without
independently
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evaluating Young's ability to work or
contacting Shawl for more information; and
improperly relying on a mistaken belief
about Young's capacity for work. We briefly
consider each.

is disabled in the first instance. Young
presents no rationale, compelling or
otherwise, for concluding that an employer
acts inappropriately in relying on the
employee's own objective medical evidence.

The argument that Martin improperly
solicited the doctor's opinion is unclear. The
record reflects no evidence that Young
provided such an opinion to anyone. The
only doctor's notes in the record are those
from Dr. Mamlenski and midwife Cynthia
Shawl, suggesting Young lift no more than
twenty pounds. Thus, to the extent Young
either claims Martin improperly solicited the
Shawl note or takes issue with Martin's
request that Young provide medical
certification that she was no longer under
the lifting restrictions indicated in the notes
from Mamlenski and Shawl, we agree with
the district court's view that “[b]ecause UPS
possessed objective facts suggesting Young
might have lost the ability to perform central
job functions, it had a legitimate reason to
seek some verification that Young had
recovered her ability to perform those
duties.”

Finally, Young fails to marshal evidence
creating a genuine issue of material fact on
the question of whether Martin had a
mistaken belief regarding Young's capacity
for work. Young offers no evidence
indicating
Martin
believed
Young's
pregnancy substantially limited one or more
of her major life activities. The most the
record establishes is that Martin believed
Young to be pregnant and under a temporary
lifting restriction on account of her
pregnancy, based on the evidence Young
herself provided. Given the relatively
manageable weight restriction—twenty
pounds—and the short duration of the
restriction, there is no evidence that Young's
pregnancy or her attendant lifting limitation
constituted a disability within the meaning
of the ADA. Because Young points to no
more than the objective fact of her
pregnancy, and offers no evidence tending
to show that Martin subjectively believed
Young to be disabled, Young cannot adduce
evidence to raise a factual issue on her
“regarded as” claim.

Young's second contention—that UPS had a
duty to seek additional information from her
healthcare providers and independently
evaluate her ability to work—is similarly
unavailing. In Young's view, UPS should
have engaged in an interactive process to
determine whether Young was capable of
performing her job. Although the ADA does
advise an employer to initiate “an informal,
interactive process” when determining
whether an individual with a disability needs
an accommodation, no such counsel applies
to the determination of whether an employee

B.
We turn next to the heart of Young's appeal,
that UPS
violated the
Pregnancy
Discrimination Act. Although not free from
ambiguity, Young's core contention appears
to be that the UPS policy limiting light duty
work to some employees—those injured onthe-job, disabled within the meaning of the
ADA, or who have lost their DOT
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certification—but not to pregnant workers
like Young violates the PDA's command to
treat pregnant employees the same “as other
persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work.” In a similar
vein, the ACLU amicus brief argues that the
PDA requires employers like UPS to
provide pregnant workers like Young light
duty work so long as it does so for any other
workers similar in their ability or inability to
work even though it concededly does not do
so for all nonpregnant employees.
We analyze a PDA claim as a sex
discrimination claim under Title VII.
Applying the usual Title VII analytical
construct for sex discrimination claims, we
first consider whether Young has shown any
direct evidence of discrimination. In the
absence of that, we apply the familiar
burden shifting framework articulated
in McDonnell Douglas and subsequent
cases. As Young's counsel clarified at oral
argument, Young challenges the UPS policy
as both direct evidence of discrimination and
under the McDonnell Douglas framework.
Accordingly, we assess the policy in both
contexts.
1.
In
asserting
direct
evidence
of
discrimination, Young points to both the
UPS policy and to disparaging comments
from Myron Williams as indicative of UPS's
general corporate animus against pregnant
employees. Evidence is direct if it “both
reflect[s] directly the alleged discriminatory
attitude and ... bear[s] directly on the
contested employment decision.” Thus,
evidence is direct if it establishes
discriminatory motive with no need for an

inference or a presumption. We first
consider the challenge to the UPS policy.
a.
Young contends that the UPS policy that
does not provide light duty work to pregnant
workers but does for certain other
employees constitutes direct evidence of
discrimination. It is certainly true that an
explicit policy excluding pregnant workers
would violate antidiscrimination law. But no
such policy exists here. By limiting
accommodations to those employees injured
on the job, disabled as defined under the
ADA, and stripped of their DOT
certification, UPS has crafted a pregnancyblind policy, and Young does not contend
otherwise. Such a policy is at least facially a
“neutral and legitimate business practice,”
and not evidence of UPS's discriminatory
animus toward pregnant workers.
Young and the ACLU argue, however, that
UPS's policy of accommodating certain
employees but not pregnant workers who are
otherwise allegedly similar in their ability or
inability to work nonetheless runs afoul of
the PDA. In particular, the ACLU contends
that the PDA explicitly alters the traditional
sex discrimination analysis under Title VII
by restricting the basis upon which
employers may compare pregnant workers
with nonpregnant workers. At its core, this
argument posits that the PDA creates a
cause of action distinct from that of § 703(a)
by compelling employers to grant pregnant
employees a “most favored nation” status
with others based on their ability to work,
regardless of whether such status was
available to the universe—male and
female—of
nonpregnant
employees.
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Considering the history and structure of the
PDA and the consequences of interpreting it
in this way, we cannot agree.
Passed in 1978 to overrule the Supreme
Court's decision in General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, the PDA added pregnancy-related
discrimination to Title VII's general
prohibition on sex discrimination. Congress
placed the entirety of the PDA into the
“Definitions” section of Title VII:
The terms “because of sex” or “on the
basis of sex” include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employmentrelated purposes, including receipt of
benefits under fringe benefit programs,
as other persons not so affected but
similar in their ability or inability to
work....
As the Supreme Court subsequently
recognized, the PDA “makes clear that it is
discriminatory to treat pregnancy-related
conditions less favorably than other medical
conditions.”
In addition to including pregnancy-related
conditions within the definition of sex
discrimination in its first clause, the PDA's
second clause provides that “women
affected by pregnancy ... shall be treated the
same for all employment-related purposes ...
as other persons not so affected but similar
in their ability or inability to work.”
Standing alone, the second clause's plain
language is unambiguous. But the second
clause does not stand alone; it follows the
first clause. Confusion arises when trying to

reconcile language in the first clause
suggesting the PDA simply expands the
category of sex discrimination (without
otherwise altering Title VII), and language
in the second clause suggesting the statute
requires
different—perhaps
even
preferential—treatment
for
pregnant
workers.
Although the second clause can be read
broadly, we conclude that its placement in
the definitional section of Title VII, and
grounding within the confines of sex
discrimination under § 703, make clear that
it does not create a distinct and independent
cause of action. We further note the
anomalous consequences a contrary position
would cause: pregnancy would be treated
more favorably than any other basis,
including
non-pregnancy-related
sex
discrimination, covered by Title VII.
Most courts to have considered the potential
incongruence between the PDA's first and
second clauses have concluded similarly.
These courts reason that to find otherwise
would be to transform an antidiscrimination
statute into a requirement to provide
accommodation to pregnant employees,
perhaps even at the expense of other,
nonpregnant employees.
Interpreting the PDA in the manner Young
and the ACLU urge would require
employers to provide, for example,
accommodation or light duty work to a
pregnant worker whose restrictions arise
from her (off-the-job) pregnancy while
denying any such accommodation to an
employee unable to lift as a result of an offthe-job injury or illness. Under this
interpretation, a pregnant worker who, like
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Young, was placed under a lifting restriction
by her healthcare provider and could not
work could claim that the PDA requires that
she receive whatever accommodation or
benefits are accorded to an individual
accommodated under the ADA, because the
pregnant worker and the other individual are
similar in their ability or inability to work—
i.e., they both cannot work. By contrast, a
temporary lifting restriction placed on an
employee who injured his back while
picking up his infant child or on an
employee whose lifting limitation arose
from her off-the-job work as a volunteer
firefighter would be ineligible for any
accommodation. Such an interpretation does
not accord with Congress's intent in enacting
the PDA, and would thus imbue the PDA
with a preferential treatment mandate that
Congress neither intended nor enacted.
We are unpersuaded that Ensley–Gaines, on
which Young and the ACLU as amicus rely,
effects the watershed change they ascribe to
it. Although the court in Ensley–Gaines
stated the second clause “explicitly alters the
analysis to be applied in pregnancy
discrimination cases,” it analyzed the
plaintiff's challenge to the United States
Postal Service's policy—a policy akin to the
one challenged here—not as direct evidence
of sex discrimination, but as circumstantial
evidence
under
the McDonnell
Douglas framework. Moreover, given the
troubling consequences just outlined of
interpreting the PDA in this broad manner, it
is unsurprising that no other circuit has
followed Ensley–Gaines. We are similarly
compelled to disagree with its analysis.

We therefore adhere to the majority view
that where a policy treats pregnant workers
and nonpregnant workers alike, the
employer has complied with the PDA. The
UPS policy at issue is not direct evidence of
pregnancy-based sex discrimination.
b.
We next consider whether Myron Williams's
comments demonstrate “corporate animus”
on the part of UPS tantamount to direct
evidence of discrimination. Young focused
below on Williams's comments alone, but
now contends those comments amount to
evidence of UPS's “corporate animus.” The
district court rejected her previous argument
on the ground that Williams wielded no
decisionmaking power over Young. Young's
argument on appeal that Williams's
comments manifest UPS's corporate animus
towards pregnant workers finds no support
in the record; Williams's statements stand
alone as the only explicit evidence of a
pregnancy-related comment, derogatory or
otherwise. Moreover, Young's reliance on
Merritt and Staub v. Proctor Hosp., is
inapposite as those cases involved nondecisionmaker colleagues whose pervasive
animus for the plaintiff influenced the
ultimate decisionmaker. No such evidence
exists here: Williams neither possessed the
authority to make determinations about
Young's employment nor sought to
influence Martin, who did.
2.
Because Young presents no direct evidence
of pregnancy discrimination, we next
consider whether she offers evidence
sufficient to make out a prima facie case
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under the McDonnell Douglas framework.
Under this framework, Young must establish
a prima facie case of sex discrimination on
her pregnancy claim by showing “(1)
membership in a protected class; (2)
satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse
employment action; and (4) that similarlysituated employees outside the protected
class received more favorable treatment.”
Again, the focus of her challenge is the UPS
policy.
Young fell within the protected class, raised
at least a genuine issue of material fact
regarding her job performance, and suffered
an adverse employment action when she
could not continue working. Thus, the
dispute here centers on the final element of
the prima facie case: whether similarlysituated employees outside the protected
class received more favorable treatment than
Young, or more broadly, whether UPS's
decision to prevent Young from either
receiving an accommodation or returning to
work occurred “under circumstance[s]
giving rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination.” In particular, Young and
UPS sharply disagree about who constitutes
an appropriate “comparator” in this context.
At bottom Young seeks to compare herself
to employees accommodated under the
ADA, drivers who have lost their DOT
certification for medical reasons, and
employees injured on the job. As we have
already
noted,
however,
these
accommodations were created by a neutral,
pregnancy-blind policy—a policy she can
attack indirectly no more successfully than
she could directly.

Moreover, we conclude that a pregnant
worker subject to a temporary lifting
restriction is not similar in her “ability or
inability to work” to an employee disabled
within the meaning of the ADA or an
employee either prevented from operating a
vehicle as a result of losing her DOT
certification or injured on the job. Young is
dissimilar to an employee disabled under the
ADA for the same reason she herself was
not disabled: her lifting limitation was
temporary and not a significant restriction
on her ability to perform major life
activities. She is unlike employees
guaranteed an inside job or light duty under
the CBA provision for drivers who have lost
DOT certification for at least two reasons.
First, no legal obstacle stands between her
and her work. A driver who has lost his or
her DOT certification is legally disabled
from operating a vehicle; Young's physical
impairment only restricted her ability to lift.
Second, as the district court observed, “those
with DOT certification maintained the
ability to perform any number of demanding
physical tasks, while Young labored under
an apparent inability to perform tasks
involving lifting.” Finally, Young is not
similar to employees injured on the job
because, quite simply, her inability to work
does not arise from an on-the-job injury. The
CBA provision requiring UPS to
accommodate those employees injured while
carrying out job duties for the company but
not while pursuing other activities
reasonably places a heightened obligation on
UPS to accommodate the former group. The
PDA does not render this distinction
unlawful.
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We are also unpersuaded that Martin's
decision occurred under circumstances
“giving rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination.” According to Young, these
circumstances consist of (1) Martin's
solicitation of a doctor's note from Young
identifying her restrictions; (2) Martin's
statement that UPS policy did not provide
light duty for pregnant workers; and (3)
Williams's comments about Young as a
liability while pregnant. However, with the
exception of Williams's comments, which
played no role in Martin's decision, these
facts fail to demonstrate the specific animus
Young ascribes to them. Even assuming
Martin solicited a note from Young, there is
no indication that this was not done with all
employees returning from leave, or that
Martin did so because Young was pregnant.
And Martin's statement about UPS's policy
providing light duty in three instances—but
not for pregnancy—is simply one of fact.

One may characterize the UPS policy as
insufficiently charitable, but a lack of
charity does not amount to discriminatory
animus directed at a protected class of
employees.
Accordingly, we conclude that Young
cannot establish that similarly situated
employees
received
more favorable
treatment than she did, and therefore cannot
establish the fourth element of the prima
facie case for pregnancy discrimination.
While not unsympathetic to Young's
circumstances,
we
are
nevertheless
concerned about the problematic potential of
creating rights not grounded in the text and
structure of Title VII as a whole.
III.
We therefore affirm the decision of the
district court.
AFFIRMED.
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“Up Next for the Supreme Court: Pregnant Workers’ Rights”
The Washington Post
Nia-Malika Henderson
July 3, 2014
With its decision in the Hobby Lobby case,
the Supreme Court ignited a contentious
conversation about religious freedom and
reproductive rights, ensuring that women’s
health issues will once again dominate
political jockeying in an election
year. Well, next year could provide the
same sort of fodder, as the court has agreed
to hear a case involving a woman who says
that her employers discriminated against her
because she was pregnant.
At issue in the case, Peggy Young v. United
Parcel Service, is whether the company
violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(PDA) in its treatment of Young, a delivery
driver who said she was required to go on
unpaid maternity leave, rather than get a
position that was less strenuous as her
doctors advised.
Lower courts have ruled in UPS’s favor,
with the company arguing that its policies
are “pregnancy-neutral,” and governed by a
collective bargaining agreement that Young
didn’t qualify for.
The court’s decision to take the case comes
as President Obama is calling on Congress
to act on the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act,
(PWFA) and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission has filed federal
lawsuits recently
against
companies,
alleging that women were fired after their
pregnancy was revealed in violation of the
Pregnancy
Discrimination
Act, which
doesn’t expressly mandate that employees

make accommodations for pregnant women.
It also comes as lawmakers in New York are
calling on the state legislature to pass a
bill that expands on protections for pregnant
women workers.
A lawyer for Young said that the case is
particularly important for women in lowwage jobs.
“These cases often arise with nurses and
nurses assistants and women who have jobs
with a physical component. It’s a barrier to
work for women who become pregnant in
those sorts of jobs,” said Samuel Bagenstos,
a lawyer on the case. “What the PDA says is
that employees have to provide workers who
are pregnant the same accommodations that
they would provide any other worker.”
Susan Rosenberg, UPS’s public relations
director said in an e-mailed statement:
“UPS is committed to a fair workplace and
has consistent and robust policies to prevent
discrimination and adhere to our legal
obligations,” said Susan Rosenberg, UPS’s
public relations director. “We look forward
to the Court’s review of the merits of this
case.“
The
is
the
company’s
key
argument according to an opposition brief:
The collective bargaining agreement
neither requires nor authorizes UPS to
disrupt the seniority system by giving
temporary, alternative positions to
employees unable to perform their
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normal work assignments due to offthe-job injuries or conditions (unless the
resulting limitation amounts to a
cognizable disability under the ADA).
For example, a driver whose health care
provider imposed a lifting limitation
due to a back injury sustained off the
job, and which was not an ADAcognizable disability….would not be
eligible for an accommodation. Under
its collectively bargained policy, UPS
treats a lifting restriction resulting from
pregnancy in exactly the same way.
The U.S. solicitor general, Donald B.
Verrilli Jr., filed a brief arguing that the
court should pass on the case because the
EEOC is currently considering guidance that
would clarify issues related to pregnancy,
the PDA and the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).
A spokesman for the EEOC said that the
agency doesn’t have anything to announce
right now.
The proposed Pregnant Workers Fairness
Act (PWFA) seeks similar clarification, but
it has little chance of making its way out of
the Senate.
Employers would have to create “reasonable
workplace accommodations for workers
whose ability to perform the functions of a
job are limited by pregnancy, childbirth, or a

related medical condition,” according to the
text of the 12-page bill.
“The key to the Pregnant Workers Fairness
Act
is
the
phrase
‘reasonable
accommodations.’ The bill uses the same
tried and trusted standard as the bipartisan
Americans with Disabilities Act to provide
basic protections for these vulnerable
women,” Sen. Robert P. Casey Jr. (D-Pa.),
the bill’s sponsor, wrote in an e-mail to She
The People. “Some employers across the
country are stepping up but it should be
common sense to enshrine this basic
principle into law.”
Deborah Widiss, an associate law professor
at Indiana University, said she was “a little
surprised,” that the court took the case,
given that the EEOC is likely to issue
guidelines, but the court as well as Congress
are reacting to “the reality that some
pregnant women need accommodations at
work and there is no explicit law that
requires that.”
“Look at the Hobby Lobby case and some of
the issues here as well. It is about the reality
that women work and they get pregnant,”
Widiss said. “These are important issues
and it would be good to have clarity.”
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“Justices Could Clarify Pregnancy Accommodation in UPS Suit”
Law 360
Scott Flaherty
July 1, 2014
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Tuesday to
review a former UPS Inc. driver’s
pregnancy discrimination suit, a case that
gives the justices a chance to clarify
employers’ obligations to accommodate
pregnant workers and may impact Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission
guidance on the issue.
One day after the justices issued their final
rulings for the 2013-2014 term, the Supreme
Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari
filed by former UPS delivery driver Peggy
Young, who claimed the company had
violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
by refusing to put her on light duty while
she was pregnant. Young’s petition asked
the high court to review a Fourth Circuit
decision that found the PDA did not require
employers to provide more favorable
treatment to pregnant workers as compared
to other, “similarly situated,” employees.
By taking up the case, the Supreme Court
agreed to consider whether an employer that
provides accommodations to nonpregnant
workers based on disabilities or other work
limitations is also required to accommodate
pregnant workers who are “similar in their
ability or inability to work.” The case,
according to employment attorneys, gives
the justices a chance to offer employers
some clarification on what they’re required
to do under the PDA.
“They want to seek to clarify what an
employer’s obligations are,” said Joseph

Greenwald & Laake PA principal Jay
Holland, referring to the Supreme Court’s
decision to hear the Young case.
But just how much certainty the court’s
ultimate decision will give employers
remains to be seen, attorneys say.
The U.S. solicitor general had argued in an
amicus brief that the Supreme Court should
not take up the case because the EEOC is
considering new guidance to clarify its
stance on the PDA and the Americans with
Disabilities Act. So attorneys say
employers’ obligations to pregnant workers
may depend on the interaction between the
Supreme Court’s ruling and any future
EEOC guidance on the PDA.
If, for instance, the EEOC issues guidance
before the Supreme Court has ruled in the
Young case, it may contradict whatever the
justices decide, muddying the waters for
employers, according to Carrie Hoffman, a
labor and employment partner with Gardere
Wynne Sewell LLP.
“There is potential that this future ruling will
conflict with the EEOC’s guidance, when
published, on these issues,” said Hoffman.
“This will further complicate how
employers deal with the pregnancy and
accommodation issues.”
The Supreme Court may ultimately find that
the PDA does, in fact, require employers
that offer accommodations to employees
with certain work-related limitations to
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provide some form of accommodation for
pregnant employees as well. But if that
happens, the justices may set their own
standard for the types of accommodations
employers will be required to offer, or they
may leave it up to the EEOC to fill in the
details.
Either way, there’s a chance that employers’
obligations under the PDA will end up
differing from the interactive process and
reasonable accommodations called for under
the ADA says Tracy Billows, a labor and
employment partner with Seyfarth Shaw
LLP.

“It would be hard to imagine that the
Supreme Court would find totally in favor of
UPS, based upon how the law has developed
in this area,” Voluck said.
With the trend growing toward greater
accommodations in mind, Voluck added that
he would advise employers against waiting
to see what the Supreme Court decides in
Young.
“The decision could be a ways off,” he said.
“Employers should be proactive.”
Holland offered similar advice.

“This will be very interesting for employers
because it could create a whole new
obligation, separate and apart from the
[obligations under] the Americans with
Disabilities Act,” Billows said.

“Employers would have to be careful to
heed, first, the guidance of the courts in their
jurisdiction, but certainly not be blind or
ignore the EEOC’s guidance,” said Holland.
“It’s always safer to take a broader view of
your obligations as an employer.”

On the other hand, if the Supreme Court
finds against Young and rules that
employers have no obligation to provide
accommodations to pregnant employees,
attorneys say that would likely limit the
impact of any EEOC guidance on the issue.

The Supreme Court’s decision to review the
Young case comes after the Fourth Circuit
in January 2013 backed a lower court ruling
in favor of UPS. Young brought claims
under both the PDA and the ADA, but her
high court petition focused on the PDA.

“The Supreme Court is controlling,” said
Billows. “Its decision could render the
EEOC guidance null and void.”

Young, who ended up taking unpaid leave
because of restrictions on how much weight
she could lift during her pregnancy, claims
that UPS should have provided her the same
accommodations that were offered to
nonpregnant employees with similar
limitations.

But Phillip Voluck, managing partner with
Kaufman Dolowich Voluck, says it’s more
likely that the Supreme Court would, at least
in some respects, side with the argument that
pregnant workers should be afforded
accommodations. That sort of finding, he
says, would be consistent with a broader
trend in the courts toward expanding
accommodations for protected classes of
employees.

UPS, on the other hand, has maintained that
it offered accommodations to workers
injured on the job, those who qualified for
ADA accommodations and those who lost
their U.S. Department of Transportation
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certification, but that Young did not fall into
any of those categories.

The case is Young v. United Parcel Service
Inc., case number 12-1226, in the U.S.
Supreme Court.
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“Protections for Pregnant Workers Expand Before Key Supreme Court Case”
Businessweek
Josh Eidelson
July 15, 2014
Refusing to accommodate new mothers’
lactation after a pregnancy, refusing
bathroom breaks during a pregnancy, or
punishing workers for planning a future
pregnancy are now all forms of illegal
discrimination under federal rules.
New guidelines from the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, the first on
pregnancy since 1983, passed by a party-line
3-to-2 vote on Monday. The Democratic
majority found that conditions related to
pregnancy can qualify as legally protected
disabilities under federal law, that it’s
usually illegal to keep women out of certain
jobs because the working conditions could
be bad for a pregnancy, and that health-care
costs tied to a pregnancy need to be treated
like other costs under company insurance
plans.
Under President Obama, the EEOC has
issued other bold instructions. A 2012
ruling, for instance, made discrimination
against transgender workers a form of illegal
sex discrimination. “The EEOC is spending
a lot of time now prosecuting pregnancy
discrimination,” says employer-side attorney
Michael Cohen.
But the EEOC’s guidelines lack the legal
force of an act of Congress or a Supreme
Court ruling. Backed by the president,
Democrats have introduced a congressional
bill requiring employers to accommodate
pregnant workers, but there’s no reason to
think it will reach Obama’s desk this

session. And the Supreme Court agreed this
month to hear a case, Peggy Young v. United
Parcel Service, which threatens to undo
some of the EEOC’s pregnancy work.
Young, a former delivery driver, argues that
the
Pregnancy
Discrimination
Act
required UPS (UPS) to provide her with
doctor-recommended light duty just as it
accommodates workers with other medical
conditions. UPS contends it’s within its
rights to restrict accommodations to people
who are injured at work, have lost their
drivers’ certification, or have a disability
recognized by the Americans With
Disabilities
Act.
A
UPS
spokeswoman says the company will review
the new EEOC instructions and that the new
rules may not impact the Supreme Court
case.
Samuel Bagenstos, the University of
Michigan
Law
School
professor
who’s representing Young, says he sees the
EEOC vote as vindication of “the position
we’ve taken all along—that the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, by its terms, requires
employers to give pregnant workers the
same accommodations they give to other
valued employees.”
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“A Pregnant Worker’s Day in Court”
ACLU
Ariela Migdal
October, 26, 2012
A federal appeals court yesterday heard
arguments in the case of Peggy Young v.
UPS. Peggy Young was a package delivery
driver for UPS when she became pregnant
and asked UPS for a light duty assignment,
so that she could continue to work while
pregnant, even though her doctor had
recommended she not lift more than 20
pounds. Although UPS admits it routinely
grants alternative work assignments,
including light duty, to other workers –
including workers who are injured on the
job, workers eligible for accommodations
under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
and workers who lose their driver’s license it refuses to grant those same minor
adjustments to pregnant workers like Young.
UPS’s policy forces pregnant workers off
the job and leaves them without health
benefits when they give birth. This is exactly
the result that Congress intended to avoid
when
it
enacted
the
Pregnancy
Discrimination Act in 1978, a point the
ACLU and ACLU of Maryland emphasized
in a friend-of-the-court brief we filed on
behalf of more than 10 women’s rights
groups.
Before
the
Pregnancy
Discrimination Act was enacted, companies
routinely excluded pregnant workers from

benefits that they gave to other employees,
including health insurance coverage. The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act fixed this
problem by mandating that when employers
give a benefit to other workers who are
similar to a pregnant worker in their ability
or inability to work, employers must give
that same benefit to the pregnant worker.
The problem is that employers, and some
courts, including the district court in this
case, have subverted the law by letting
employers come up with “pregnancy blind”
reasons for excluding pregnant workers.
UPS argues that it has nothing against
pregnant workers; it’s just that they don’t fit
into any of its “neutral” categories of people
entitled to accommodations.
In court yesterday, Young’s lawyer
emphasized to the judges that UPS’s policy
violates both the letter and the spirit of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act. UPS offers
accommodations to just about everyone
under the sun who needs one, while
pregnant workers like Peggy Young get left
out. It’s time to end the exclusion of
pregnant workers, once and for all.
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Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama
13-895
Ruling Below: Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. The State of Alabama, 989 F.Supp.2d
1227 (M.D. Ala. 2013), cert granted, 134 S.Ct. 2695 (2014).
Black political caucus, political party, office holders, and county commissioners
of Alabama brought separate actions against state of Alabama and various state officials,
challenging redistricting plans for Alabama's Senate and House of Representatives. Actions were
consolidated and bench trial was held.
Question Presented: Whether Alabama's legislative redistricting plans unconstitutionally
classify black voters by race by intentionally packing them in districts designed to maintain
supermajority percentages produced when 2010 census data are applied to the 2001 majorityblack districts.

ALABAMA LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
The State of ALABAMA, et al., Defendants.
United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
Decided on December 20, 2013
[Excerpt, some footnotes and citations omitted]
PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
The Constitution of Alabama of 1901
requires
the Alabama Legislature
to
redistrict itself following each decennial
census of the United States, but for a half
century—from
1911
to
1961—the
Legislature failed to fulfill that duty. Then
the Supreme Court of the United States
ruled that this abdication could be tolerated
no longer, and it affirmed the judgment of
this Court that the Alabama Legislature had
to be apportioned after each census based on
the principle of one person, one vote. The
Supreme Court explained, “[T]he basic
principle of representative government

remains, and must remain, unchanged—the
weight of a citizen's vote cannot be made to
depend on where he lives. Population is, of
necessity, the starting point for consideration
and the controlling criterion for judgment
in legislative apportionment controversies.”
After the decision in Reynolds v. Sims, the
Legislature struggled to redistrict itself and
to satisfy the requirements of the federal
Constitution. When the Alabama Legislature
failed to perform its duty to redistrict itself
after the 1970 Census, this Court adopted
new district lines to protect the rights of the
voters under the Fourteenth Amendment. In
the 1980s, the Legislature successfully
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redistricted itself only after it twice failed to
obtain administrative preclearance of its first
redistricting plans, under section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, and this Court
then ordered Alabama to hold a special
election using the new districts. In the
1990s, the Legislature again failed to
redistrict itself, and new districts were
adopted instead by the Alabama judiciary.
After the 2000 and 2010 Censuses, the
Legislature finally fulfilled its responsibility
to redistrict itself without any federal or
judicial interference. Both times, the Senate
adopted a redistricting plan for itself, and the
House adopted a plan for itself. Each
chamber then, in turn, passed the plan
adopted by the other chamber. And each
time, the governor signed the redistricting
acts, and the state attorney general then
obtained administrative preclearance of the
acts as required by the Voting Rights Act.
As the Legislature complied with Reynolds
v.
Sims and
the
Voting
Rights
Act, black voters enjoyed increasing success
in electing their preferred candidates for
the Alabama Legislature. In 1970, voters
elected to the House of Representatives Fred
Gray and Thomas Reed, the first
two black legislators since Reconstruction.
After the 1980 Census, voters elected
17 black candidates to the House and
three black candidates to the Senate. After
the
1990
Census,
voters
elected
27 black candidates to the House and
8 black candidates to the Senate. After the
2000 Census, the Legislature adopted a
redistricting plan that maintained 27
majority-black House districts and 8
majority-black Senate districts. Because

most of the majority-black districts were
substantially underpopulated, the Legislature
redrew the districts by shifting more black
voters into the majority-black districts to
maintain the same relative percentages
of black voters in those districts.
Legislative redistricting regularly provokes
partisan controversies. In the 1990s,
Republicans filed lawsuits to challenge the
districts adopted by the Alabama judiciary
and favored by the Democrats, but those
lawsuits failed. After the 2000 Census, the
Democrat-controlled Legislature adopted
districts
that
favored
its
partisan
interests. Republicans again challenged the
districts in litigation, but their lawsuits
failed.
When Republicans challenged the district
lines adopted after the 2000 Census, they
targeted the systematic under-population of
the majority-black districts, but State
officials
and
Democratic
leaders
successfully defended the population
deviations as “the product of the Democratic
Legislators' partisan political objective to
design Senate and House plans that would
preserve their respective Democratic
majorities.” State officials and Democratic
leaders presented “abundant evidence ... that
black voters
and
Democratic
voters
in Alabama are highly correlated.” After the
Republicans'
complaint
of
racial
gerrymandering failed, they filed another
complaint that challenged the population
deviations as an unlawful partisan
gerrymander, but that complaint failed
because it was barred by res judicata. In a
filing in the Supreme Court of the United
States, the Democratic leadership of the
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Legislature openly touted the districts
adopted in 2001 as a lawful partisan
gerrymander that enabled black legislators
to serve in positions of unprecedented
leadership.
The partisan gerrymander that protected
Democratic control of the Legislature
collapsed in 2010 when Republicans gained
supermajority control of both houses of the
Legislature, which then adopted new
redistricting acts based on the 2010 Census.
The Republican-controlled
Legislature
adopted district lines with smaller deviations
in population equality, which upended the
partisan gerrymander adopted by the
Democrat-controlled Legislature after the
2000 Census. Not surprisingly, that result
did not sit well with the Democratic leaders
who filed these complaints. As a result, we
must be careful not to take one side in a
partisan battle masquerading as a legal
controversy; our task is to evaluate whether
the new redistricting Acts violate the
Constitution or federal law.
In these consolidated actions, Alabama has
now come full circle. In the first civil action,
several plaintiffs complain that the purpose
and effect of the new districts is to dilute
and isolate the strength of black voters, in
violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. In the second civil action,
several other plaintiffs complain that the
purpose and effect of the new districts is to
dilute the opportunities for minority voters
to participate in the political process and that
the new districts are products of racial
gerrymandering. The plaintiffs in these
actions, in contrast with the plaintiffs

in Reynolds, complain that the Legislature
redistricted itself based on too little
deviation in population equality and paid too
little attention to considerations of where
voters live based on the jurisdictional lines
of counties and other subdivisions. They
also complain that the Legislature diluted
the voting strength of black voters by
moving them into underpopulated majorityblack districts, even though the Democratic
majority of the Legislature employed the
same technique ten years earlier to maintain
the same relative percentages of black voters
in those districts.
For the reasons explained in this
memorandum opinion and order, we reject
these complaints. We DISMISS the claims
of racial gerrymandering filed by the
Democratic Conference plaintiffs because
they lack standing to maintain those claims;
in the alternative, we GRANT judgment in
favor of the State defendants on the claims
of racial gerrymandering filed by the
Democratic
Conference
plaintiffs.
We DISMISS as not justiciable the claim of
vote dilution based on the local House
delegation in Jefferson County; in the
alternative, we GRANT judgment in favor
of the State defendants on the claim of vote
dilution based on the local House delegation
in Jefferson County. We GRANT judgment
in favor of the State defendants on the
remaining claims in both actions.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
The Black Caucus plaintiffs
filed
a
complaint against the State and Beth
Chapman, in her official capacity as the
Secretary of State of Alabama. The
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complaint asserted three counts: violation of
the guarantee of one person, one vote under
the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment; dilution and
isolation of the strength of black votes in
violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the Fifteenth Amendment; and partisan
gerrymandering in violation of the First
Amendment.
The Black Caucus plaintiffs
moved for partial summary judgment and
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief
on count one of their complaint.
The State defendants filed a motion to
dismiss or, in the alternative, to stay the
action until the Attorney General
of Alabama, Luther Strange, obtained either
administrative or judicial preclearance of the
new districts under section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act… The State defendants filed an
answer to the complaint and a motion for
judgment on the pleadings with respect to all
three counts.
After a hearing on the latter motions, the
Democratic Conference plaintiffs filed a
complaint against the State; Robert Bentley,
in his official capacity as the Governor of
Alabama; and Chapman, in her official
capacity as the Secretary of State
of Alabama. The Democratic Conference
plaintiffs asserted three counts: violation
of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; racial
gerrymandering in violation of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments; and
violations of constitutional and statutory
rights under the Voting Rights Act and the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
After the Democratic Conference action was
assigned to this three-judge court, we

determined that both the Black Caucus
action and the Democratic Conference
action involve common questions of law and
fact and consolidated them...
On December 26, 2012, we denied the first
motion for a partial summary judgment filed
by the Black Caucus plaintiffs with respect
to count one, granted the motion of the State
defendants for a judgment on the pleadings
as to count one, denied the motion of the
State defendants for a judgment on the
pleadings as to count two, and dismissed
without prejudice count three of the
complaint of the Black Caucus plaintiffs.
We granted the Black Caucus plaintiffs
leave to amend their complaint “to allege
more facts and constitutional grounds to
support
[their]
claim
of
political
gerrymandering and to identify a judicial
standard by which we can adjudicate the
claim.”
On March 13, 2013, Senator Gerald Dial
and Representative Jim McClendon filed an
unopposed motion to intervene as
defendants. Senator Dial and Representative
McClendon are the Chairpersons of the
Permanent Legislative Committee
on
Reapportionment of the State of Alabama.
The Court granted the motion to intervene.
After the Black Caucus plaintiffs timely
filed an amended complaint with a new
count
three
entitled
“Partisan
Gerrymandering” and a second motion for a
partial summary judgment on that claim, we
again denied their motion… We explained
that the claim of partisan gerrymandering
filed by the Black Caucus plaintiffs failed to
identify a judicial standard by which we
could adjudicate the claim and that, under
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any
standard
of
adjudication,
the Black Caucus plaintiffs failed to explain
how they are entitled to a judgment in their
favor as a matter of law. We also explained
that the Black Caucus plaintiffs failed to
establish the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.
The State defendants then moved for a
partial summary judgment on count three,
and the Black Caucus plaintiffs filed a
motion to reconsider our denial of their
second motion for a partial summary
judgment and a motion for a permanent
injunction. At a hearing on the pending
motions,
the Black Caucus plaintiffs
announced, for the first time, that count
three encompassed two claims: an asapplied
challenge
for
partisan
gerrymandering in violation of the First
Amendment and a facial challenge to the
districts based on the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We
granted in part the motion for a partial
summary judgment and entered judgment in
favor of the State defendants on the claim of
partisan gerrymandering and dismissed the
claim under the Equal Protection Clause for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We also
explained, in the alternative, that the claim
under the Equal Protection Clause failed on
the merits. We denied the motion for
reconsideration and denied as moot the
motion for a preliminary injunction.
The State defendants filed motions for
summary judgments against the remaining
claims filed by the Black Caucus plaintiffs
and the Democratic Conference plaintiffs,
and we denied those motions. We concluded
that the State defendants had failed to

explain the absence of genuine issues of
material fact or how they were entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
On August 8, 9, 12, and 13, 2013, we
conducted a consolidated bench trial at
which the plaintiffs presented arguments and
evidence about two distinct kinds of claims.
First, the plaintiffs argued that the State
defendants had diluted the black vote
in Alabama in violation of section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. Second, the plaintiffs
argued that the State defendants had
engaged in intentional discrimination in
violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments when they drew the new
districts. During the trial, we substituted Jim
Bennett for Beth Chapman as a defendant, in
Bennett's official capacity as the new
Secretary of State of Alabama. Demetrius
Newton died after the trial.
The State defendants responded that the
redistricting plans violate neither section
2 of the Voting Rights Act nor the
Constitution. They argued that the plaintiffs
could not prove vote dilution because it is
not possible to draw another compact,
majority-black district,
and
that
the
Legislature acted with lawful motives, not
with
any
unconstitutional
racially
discriminatory
purpose.
The
State
defendants argued that the Legislature
adopted an overall deviation in population of
2 percent to comply with the requirement of
one person, one vote, under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. They also argued that the
Legislature
preserved
the
majorityblack districts with roughly the same
percentage of black voters to comply with
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the nonretrogression principle of section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act so as to obtain
preclearance from the Attorney General of
the United States.
Although the Black Caucus plaintiffs and
the Democratic Conference plaintiffs both
asserted claims under section 2, they framed
their claims differently. The Black Caucus
plaintiffs argued that the State defendants
diluted black voting strength across the State
by packing majority-black districts and
ignoring traditional districting criteria,
including the preservation of county lines.
The Black Caucus plaintiffs also asserted
claims of local vote dilution in Madison
County based on the changes to Senate
District 7 and in Jefferson County based on
the changes to the balance of members of
the local delegation. The Democratic
Conference plaintiffs asserted claims of only
local vote dilution. They argued that the
plans failed to create a majority-black House
district in Jefferson County and in
Montgomery County and a minority
opportunity Senate district in Madison
County.
The Black Caucus plaintiffs and Democratic
Conference plaintiffs also made different
arguments in support of their claims of
intentional discrimination in violation of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
The Black Caucus plaintiffs argued that the
Legislature discriminated on the basis of
race when it drew the districts to preserve
the existing percentages of blacks in the
majority-black districts and that this
discrimination could not survive strict
scrutiny after the decision of the Supreme
Court in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder.

The Democratic Conference plaintiffs
argued that the Legislature subordinated
traditional redistricting criteria to racial
criteria when it drew the majorityblack districts; that the impact of the
redistricting plans falls more heavily on
minority voters; that the Republicancontrolled Legislature had a desire to cement
its supermajority status by inadequately
representing minorities in the redistricting
plans; and that the plans were drafted by a
Republican consultant without input
from black legislators, were not provided to
the public until May, and were adopted in a
special session of the Legislature.
B. Findings of Fact
We divide our findings of fact in five parts.
In the first part, we describe the 2010
Census data and the information that it
conveyed about the population of the State
of Alabama. In the second part, we describe
the 2001 districting plans and the effects of
the population shifts on those plans. In the
third part, we describe the redistricting
process that followed the 2010 Census. In
the fourth and fifth parts, we discuss the
evidence presented at trial; we first consider
the evidence presented by the plaintiffs and
then consider the evidence presented by the
State defendants.
1. The 2010 Census Data for the State
of Alabama
Between 2000 and 2010, the overall
population of Alabama grew by 7.48
percent. Although the absolute number of
the
white
non-Hispanic
population
increased, the percentage of the population
composed of white non-Hispanic residents
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decreased by 3.3 percent. The absolute
numbers of the black and Native American
populations increased, but the percentages of
the population composed of black residents
and Native American residents remained
relatively constant. Only the absolute
number of the Hispanic population and the
percentage of the population composed of
Hispanic residents increased between 2000
and 2010. The 2010 Census reported
that Alabama had
4,779,736
residents,
including 3,204,402 white non-Hispanic
persons
(67
percent),
1,244,437 black persons
(26
percent),
25,907 Native American persons (0.5
percent), and 185,602 Hispanic or Latino
persons (3.9 percent). In 2000, Alabama had
4,447,100 residents, including 3,125,819
white non-Hispanic persons (70.3 percent),
1,155,930 black persons (26 percent),
22,430 Native American persons (0.5
percent), and 75,830 Hispanic persons (1.7
percent). The Court calculated the above
percentages using the population statistics of
the U.S. Census Bureau that the plaintiffs
provided. When available, the Court elected
to use the population data for each race that
was identified as that racial group alone.
Alabama comprises 67 counties, and three
of the most populous counties are Jefferson
County, Madison County, and Montgomery
County. According to the 2010 Census,
Jefferson County had a total population of
658,466; a white population of 349,166; and
a black population of 276,525. Between
2000 and 2010, the total population of
Jefferson County decreased by 3,581; the
white population decreased by 35,473; and
the black population increased by 15,917. In
2010, Madison County had a total

population of 334,811; a white population of
228,280; and a black population of 80,376.
Between 2000 and 2010, the total population
of Madison County increased by 58,111; the
white population increased by 28,879; and
the black population increased by 17,351. In
2010, Montgomery County had a total
population of 229,363; a white population of
90,656; and a black population of 125,477.
Between 2000 and 2010, the total population
of Montgomery County increased by 5,853;
the white population decreased by 18,524;
and the black population increased by
16,894.
The next general election will take place on
November 4, 2014. The Senate has 35
members elected by single-member voting
districts. The House of Representatives has
105 members also elected by single-member
voting districts. Based on the 2010 Census
data, the ideal Senate district would have a
total population of 136,564, and the ideal
House district would have a total population
of 45,521.
2. The 2001 Districting Plans
In this subsection, we review two aspects of
the 2001 districting plans that are relevant to
this litigation. We explain that the districts
established in 2001 were severely
malapportioned in the light of the population
data from the 2010 Census, and we describe
the systematic underpopulation of the
majority-black districts in the 2001 plans.
The new data from the 2010 Census
revealed severe malapportionment of the
House districts established in 2001 for use in
the 2002 election. The population in 80 of
the 105 districts for the Alabama House of
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Representatives deviated from the ideal
population by more than 5 percent. Of those
malapportioned districts, 22 deviated above
or below the ideal population by more than
20 percent. The most malapportioned district
was District 41, a majority-white district in
Shelby County, which was overpopulated by
60.76 percent. Two other majority-white
districts that included portions of Shelby
County—Districts 43 and 50—were
overpopulated by 23.14 percent and 21.65
percent respectively. District 50 also reached
into St. Clair County. All three of these
districts in Shelby and St. Clair Counties
were in the Birmingham metropolitan area.
Two majority-white districts in Baldwin
County near Mobile—Districts 94 and 95—
were overpopulated by 31.29 percent and
35.41 percent respectively. And Districts 6
and 25, majority-white districts in Madison
and Limestone Counties near Huntsville,
were overpopulated by 26.70 percent and
42.68 percent respectively.

population by more than 5 percent. Of those
malapportioned districts, four of the districts
deviated from the ideal population by more
than 20 percent. Like the House districts, the
most malapportioned districts included
portions of Shelby County, Limestone
County, and Madison County. The most
malapportioned district was District 2, a
majority-white district in Limestone and
Madison
Counties,
which
was
overpopulated by 31.12 percent. Districts 14
and 15, majority-white districts that included
portions of Shelby County, were
overpopulated by 23.51 percent and 17.50
percent respectively. District 17, a majoritywhite district that included portions of St.
Clair, Jefferson, and Blount Counties, was
overpopulated by 15.09 percent.

The malapportionment was especially severe
in the majority-black House districts that the
Democrat-controlled Legislature had drawn
as part of their successful partisan
gerrymander in 2001. After the 2010
Census, all of the 27 majority-black districts
in the House were underpopulated, and 25
were underpopulated by more than 5
percent, the maximum deviation used under
the 2001 plans. Nine of the majority-black
districts were underpopulated by more than
20 percent.

As with the House districts, the
malapportionment was especially severe in
the majority-black Senate districts drawn by
the Democrat-controlled Legislature as part
of their successful partisan gerrymander in
2001. All of the eight majorityblack districts were underpopulated. Seven
of the eight majority-black districts were
underpopulated by more than 10 percent,
and two of those districts were
underpopulated by more than 20 percent.
Many of these malapportioned districts were
located within the “Black Belt,” a southcentral region of the State named for
its black soil. A large black population
resides there because of a history of
agriculture and slavery.

The new census data also revealed the
malapportionment of the Senate districts.
The population in 24 of the 35 districts for
the Alabama Senate deviated from the ideal

The underpopulation of the majorityblack House and Senate districts reflected
the systematic underpopulation of those
districts in previous rounds of redistricting
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over the last twenty years. In the 1993
Reed–Buskey plans, which Democratic
legislators proposed and a state court
approved, 25 of the 27 majorityblack districts
in
the
House
of
Representatives were underpopulated, and
19 of those 25 were underpopulated by more
than 4 percent. All eight of the majorityblack districts for the Senate were
underpopulated, and six of them were
underpopulated by more than 4 percent. In
the 2001 plans, adopted by the thenDemocratic Legislature, 22 of the 27
majority-black House
districts
were
underpopulated, and 10 of those districts
were underpopulated by greater than 4
percent. Six of the eight majority-black
Senate districts were underpopulated, and
four of those districts were underpopulated
by greater than 4 percent.
In
2001,
the
Democrat-controlled
Legislature repopulated the majorityblack districts by shifting thousands
of black people into those districts to
maintain the same relative percentages of
the black population in those districts. The
following table illustrates how the
Legislature repopulated the majorityblack House districts by adding thousands of
black people to 26 of those districts.
[See page 212]
In total, the Democrat-controlled Legislature
moved 62,376 black people into the
majority-black House districts to maintain
the
same
relative
percentages
of black population in those districts. In
2001, 62,376 black people constituted 5.4
percent of the total black population
in Alabama.

The following table illustrates
Legislature repopulated the
black Senate districts by adding
of black people to all but one
districts.

that the
majoritythousands
of those

[See page 213]
In total, the Democrat-controlled Legislature
moved 55,294 black people into the
majority-black Senate districts to maintain
the
same
relative
percentages
of black population in those districts. In
2001, 55,294 black people constituted 4.8
percent of the total black population
in Alabama.
The Democratic leaders of the previous
Legislature were never shy about their
partisan strategy in redistricting. After the
adoption of the 2001 districts, the
Democratic leaders filed, as amici curiae, a
brief in the Supreme Court of the United
States that described the districts as an
example
of
a
successful
partisan
gerrymander. The brief explained that,
during the redistricting process after the
2000 Census, “the Democratic leadership
pursued a biracial strategy aimed at
safeguarding its governing majorities in both
houses of the Legislature.” The brief
bragged that the partisan strategy succeeded:
“The 2002 general election returned
Democratic candidates to 71% of the Senate
seats and 60% of the House seats, with 52%
of the statewide vote supporting Democrats
in Senate races and 51% supporting
Democrats in House races.” But this partisan
gerrymander, during a period of realignment
when Republicans won presidential and
other statewide elections with increasing
frequency, rested on a shaky foundation that
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collapsed in 2010 when Republicans won
supermajorities in both houses of the
Legislature.
3. The Redistricting Process After the
2010 Census
After
the
2010
Census,
the Alabama Legislature began the process
of redistricting itself. We describe that
process from its inception to the adoption of
the final plans by the Legislature. In so
doing, we describe the work of the
permanent legislative committee
on
reapportionment, the guidelines adopted by
the committee, and the consultant hired by
the committee to draw the new district lines.
a. The Permanent Legislative Committee
on Reapportionment
The Alabama Code
provides
for
a
Permanent Legislative Committee
on
Reapportionment to address the problems of
malapportionment that may arise after each
new census. When the Legislature is not
actively involved with the reapportionment
process, the Committee comprises six
members, three from each house of the
Legislature. During the reapportionment
process, Alabama law requires that the
Committee expand to 22 members. Those 22
members must include “[o]ne member of the
House of Representatives from each
congressional district, four members of the
House of Representatives at-large ...
appointed by the Speaker of the House and
one member of the Senate from each
congressional district, four members of the
Senate at-large ... appointed by the
Lieutenant Governor.” Senator Dial and
Representative McClendon co-chair the

Committee. All of the Republicans on the
Committee are white. Representative Ford is
the only white Democrat on the Committee;
all of the other Democrats on the Committee
are black.
The Committee is primarily charged with
the creation of each new reapportionment
plan for the State. The Committee is
required to “make a continuous study of the
reapportionment problems in Alabama”;
“make reports of its investigations,
findings[,] and recommendations to the
Legislature at any time, during any regular
or special session of the Legislature, as it
may deem necessary”; and “engage in such
activities as it deems necessary for the
preparation and formulation of a
reapportionment
plan”
for
the Alabama Legislature
and
the
congressional districts of the State…
b. Guidelines Adopted by the Committee
To guide its work, the current Committee
established written guidelines for drawing
the new district lines for members of
Congress, the State Board of Education, and
the Legislature. In these guidelines, the
Committee changed the allowable overall
deviation in population for the State Board
of Education and the Legislature from 10
percent, which had been used in the 1993
and 2001 plans, to 2 percent. The guidelines
also provided that the districts be drawn in
accordance with the Voting Rights Act, be
contiguous and reasonably compact, be
composed of as few counties as practicable,
avoid contests between incumbent members
whenever possible, and respect communities
of interest. The guidelines acknowledged
that not all of the redistricting goals could be
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accomplished and provided that, in cases of
conflict, priority would be given to the
requirement of one person, one vote and to
the requirements of the Voting Rights Act.
Senator Dial and Representative McClendon
believed that the Legislature was obligated,
under the Voting Rights Act, to preserve the
existing number of majority-black districts.
And Senator Dial personally promised the
other members of the Senate that he would
try to make sure that none of the incumbents
would have to run against each other in the
new plan.
The Committee adopted the guideline of an
overall deviation in population of 2 percent
to comply with the requirement of one
person, one vote under the Fourteenth
Amendment after a recent decision of
another district court sitting in the Eleventh
Circuit that cast doubt on the presumptive
constitutionality of a deviation of 10
percent. In Larios v. Cox, the district court
concluded that a redistricting plan in
Georgia, which had used an overall
deviation in population of 10 percent,
violated the Equal Protection Clause
because the “population deviations in the
Georgia House and Senate were not driven
by any traditional redistricting criteria such
as compactness, contiguity, and preserving
county lines,” but were the result of a
“concerted effort to allow rural and innercity Atlanta regions of the state to hold on to
their legislative influence (at the expense of
suburban Atlanta), even as the rate of
population growth in those areas was
substantially lower.” The district court also
cast doubt on the notion that an overall
deviation of 10 percent could always serve
as a “safe harbor” for a state, especially in

the light of developing technology that made
it possible to achieve substantially greater
population equality. The Supreme Court
affirmed that decision.
Many states across the country adopted an
overall deviation in population of 2 percent
or less for the redistricting of their state
legislatures after the 2010 Census. Florida
used an overall deviation of 2 percent in its
State Senate districts and an overall
deviation of 4 percent in its State House
districts. Georgia used an overall deviation
of 2 percent in both houses of its
legislature…
c. Public Hearings
At the beginning of the reapportionment
process, the Committee conducted public
hearings
at
21
locations
throughout Alabama. The Committee used
the schedule of public hearings that had
taken place during the last round of
reapportionment in 2001 as the template for
its schedule of public hearings and made
changes to the locations based only on
specific requests from members of the
Committee. Senator Dial and Representative
McClendon attended all of the hearings. The
other members of the Committee attended
some of the hearings, and other members of
the Legislature occasionally spoke at the
hearings. The first 21 meetings were held
before the Committee had completed any
draft plans. Members of the public who
attended these hearings asked the
Legislators to keep counties whole to the
extent possible, preserve communities of
interest, and allow voters to keep the
representatives and senators with whom they
were already familiar. At the public hearing
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in Dallas County, Senator Hank Sanders
(D), a black senator who represents a
majority-black district, asked Senator Dial to
use 62 percent as a minimum for the
majority-black districts because often the
population statistics for a district do not
reflect the actual voters in that district. At
the public hearing in Clarke County,
Representative Thomas Jackson (D),
a black representative of a majorityblack district, asked that his district be 62 to
65 percent black.
d. Randy Hinaman Hired as Consultant To
Draw the Redistricting Plans
Senator Dial and Representative McClendon
worked with Randy Hinaman to draw the
new districts for the Legislature. Hinaman is
a political consultant with experience
working in Alabama. He drew the
congressional districts in Alabama after the
2010 Census; worked with Democratic
leaders after the 2000 Census to draw the
congressional districts adopted by the
Legislature and precleared by the
Department
of
Justice;
and drew
congressional districts that were adopted by
another three-judge district court in 1992
and affirmed by the Supreme Court. He also
served as the campaign manager and then as
chief of staff for Alabama Congressman
Sonny Callahan during the 1980s. In 2011,
Hinaman contracted with Citizens for Fair
Representation, a nonprofit organization, to
coordinate with the Republican leadership of
the Legislature to redraw the district lines
for the Legislature after the 2010 Census.
Hinaman used a computer program known
as Maptitude to draw the plans. Maptitude
allows the user to draw districts based on the

data from the census. The program also
allows the user to load additional data into
the program to assist with the drawing of the
districts. Hinaman collected political data
from the Republican National Committee
for every election in Alabama between 2002
and 2010 and imported that data into
Maptitude. Hinaman also collected and
imported information about the residences
of incumbents from the Reapportionment
Office.
On September 22, 2011, Hinaman met with
Speaker of the House Mike Hubbard,
President Pro Tempore Del Marsh, Senator
Dial, Representative McClendon, attorney
Dorman Walker, and staff to agree upon
goals and establish a timeline for the
drawing of the new districts. The
participants understood that, under the
Voting Rights Act, the new districts could
not reduce the total number of majorityblack districts for each house and that the
new majority-black districts should reflect
as closely as possible the percentage
of black voters in the existing majority-black
districts as of the 2010 Census. Hinaman
suggested that he should begin with the
majority-black districts when he drew the
map, and all of the participants agreed. The
legislators also asked Hinaman to avoid the
placement of two incumbent members of the
Legislature in a single new district. And the
participants agreed that Hinaman should try
to maintain the characteristics of the
preexisting districts to the extent possible.
Senator Dial, Representative McClendon,
and Hinaman understood “retrogression”
under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to
mean the reduction in the number of
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majority-black districts or a significant
reduction in the percentage of blacks in the
new districts as compared to the 2001
districts with the 2010 data. Section 5
requires that a covered jurisdiction obtain
preclearance of a new voting “standard,
practice, or procedure” by either the
Attorney General of the United States or the
United States District Court for the District
of Columbia to ensure that the change “does
not have the purpose and will not have the
effect of denying or abridging the right to
vote on account of race or color.” “Whether
a voting procedure change should be
precleared depends on whether the change
would lead to a retrogression in the position
of racial minorities with respect to their
effective exercise of the electoral franchise.”
When the Attorney General evaluates
whether a new redistricting plan has a
“retrogressive” effect, the Attorney General
compares the old districts in the light of
updated census data with the new plans.
Hinaman worked alone on the new districts
during the fall of 2011. He began with the
majority-black districts. Although during
this phase Hinaman did not personally speak
with the black members of the Legislature
who represented those districts, he
incorporated proposals that he received from
Senator Dial and Representative McClendon
after they met with the representatives from
those districts. After he drafted the majorityblack districts, Hinaman started in the
southern corners of the State and worked
toward the center of the map. He provided
an initial plan to Senator Dial and
Representative McClendon around February
2012.

During the spring of 2012 while the
Legislature was in regular session, Hinaman
continued to work on the district plans and
incorporate feedback from the legislators.
Hinaman traveled to Alabama to meet in
person with many of the Republican
legislators. Although he did not meet with
Democratic legislators, he incorporated
suggestions that Senator Dial and
Representative McClendon received from
Democratic legislators. Senator Dial gave
Hinaman proposed maps for the three
majority-black Senate districts in Jefferson
County that Senator Rodger Smitherman
(D), a black legislator from Jefferson
County, had provided him. Senator Dial
instructed Hinaman to incorporate those
maps into the Senate plan to the extent
possible because they represented the wishes
of the three senators from those districts.
Hinaman drew the majority-black districts in
Jefferson County to be substantially the
same as the maps provided to him by
Senator Dial. Representative McClendon
gave Hinaman proposed maps for the
drawing of Montgomery County that
McClendon
had
been
given
by
Representative Thad McClammy (D),
a black legislator from that county. Notably,
the McClammy map proposed the move of
House District 73 from Montgomery
County. It was a consensus map among
the black Democratic representatives of
Montgomery County. House District 73 is
represented by Joe Hubbard, a white
freshman
Democrat.
Representative
McClendon told Hinaman to adopt as many
of Representative McClammy's ideas as
possible, and Hinaman followed that
instruction.
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Senator Dial and Representative McClendon
unveiled the plans to the Committee on May
9, 2012. The plan for the House of
Representatives increased the total number
of majority-black districts from 27 to 28
based on total population figures. The new
majority-black district was District 85,
which had previously been a pluralityblack district. District 85 is located in
southeast Alabama in Henry and Houston
Counties.
Because
of
the
severe
malapportionment of most of the majorityblack districts, the new plans had to
incorporate significant changes to those
districts.
e. The Six
Plaintiffs

Districts

Challenged

by

Primarily at issue in this matter are six
decisions made by Hinaman, in consultation
with members of the Legislature. In the map
for the House of Representatives, Hinaman
moved one majority-white district, House
District 73, out of Montgomery County, and
moved one majority-black district, House
District 53, out of Jefferson County. In the
map for the Senate, Hinaman reworked the
boundaries of Senate Districts 7, 11, 22, and
26.
i. House District 73
Hinaman moved House District 73, a
majority-white
House
district,
from
Montgomery County to Shelby and Bibb
Counties to avoid retrogression of the
majority-black House
districts
in
Montgomery County. The 2001 plan divided
Montgomery County into six House
districts—Districts 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, and
78—three of which were majority-white and

three of which were majority-black. The
new plan divided Montgomery County into
seven House districts—Districts 69, 74, 75,
76, 77, 78, and 90—four of which are
majority-black districts, and three of which
are majority-white districts. Although House
District 73 was a majority-white district
under the 2001 plan, its black population
had grown since 2000, and Hinaman was
able to use that population to repopulate the
majority-black districts in Montgomery
County without retrogression. Hinaman
placed the new District 73 in Shelby County,
one of the fastest growing areas of the State.
Although Hinaman had begun working on
this idea in early 2012, he refined the
concept after he received a map from
Representative McClammy that also used
the former District 73 to repopulate the
majority-black districts.
ii. House District 53
Hinaman also moved House District 53, a
majority-black district,
from
Jefferson
County to the Huntsville area in Madison
County because of the substantial
underpopulation
of
the
majorityblack districts in Jefferson County. Under
the 2001 plan, Jefferson County had nine
majority-black House districts and nine
majority-white House districts. Although
the black population in Jefferson County
increased between 2000 and 2010, that
change was not reflected in the majorityblack districts in the County. Instead, all of
the majority-black districts in Jefferson
County
were
significantly
underpopulated. Because
of
that
underpopulation, Hinaman could not comply
with the guideline for population deviation
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adopted by the Committee and maintain nine
majority-black House
districts
within
Jefferson County without significantly
reducing the percentage of black voters in
each district. To preserve the total number of
majority-black districts and avoid a problem
of retrogression under section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, Hinaman moved District
53 to Madison County and used the
population that had previously been located
within District 53 to repopulate the other
majority-black districts in Jefferson County.
Under the new plan, the same number of
House districts include a portion of Jefferson
County, but ten of those districts are
majority-white and eight of those districts
are majority-black. Although the racial
balance of the districts has changed, the
partisan balance of incumbents has not: nine
of the House districts have Republican
incumbents as residents, and nine of the
House districts have Democratic incumbents
as residents. But the majority-white district
with a Democratic incumbent might elect a
Republican, which would likely shift the
partisan balance to 10 Republicans and 8
Democrats. Jefferson County is 53.62
percent white and 42.47 percent black.
iii. Senate District 7
Hinaman reduced the population of Senate
District
7
to
accommodate
the
overpopulation of it and its neighboring
districts. District 7, a majority-white district
in Madison County with a substantial
minority population, was overpopulated by
9.04 percent. To the west, District 7 shared a
border with District 2, which was
overpopulated by 31.12 percent. To the
south, District 7 shared a border with

Districts 3 and 9, which were overpopulated
by 10.69 percent and 5.85 percent
respectively. To the east, District 7 shared a
border with District 8, which was
overpopulated by 4.07 percent. To the north,
District 7 shared a border with Tennessee.
Under the new map, Hinaman took some
residents of Limestone and Madison
Counties from District 2 and moved them
into District 1. Hinaman removed a total of
10,994 people from District 7, and 10,151 of
those people were black. He moved most of
that population into Senate District 1, which
was represented by Senator Tammy Irons
(D).
iv. Senate District 11
Hinaman significantly altered the shape of
Senate District 11, a majority-white district
formerly located in Calhoun, Talladega,
Coosa, and Elmore Counties, because of
changes to nearby districts. Hinaman
testified that the changes made to District 11
were the result of “a combination of how the
rest of those districts were moved around.”
Under the 2001 plan, Senate District 30 was
a bizarre district drawn in the shape of an
Elmo projector, with Butler, Crenshaw, and
Pike Counties forming a sturdy base for the
district, and a portion of Lowndes County
forming a thin neck to its head in Autauga
County. Under the new plan, District 30 is a
more compact district that includes all of
Autauga and Coosa Counties and portions of
Chilton and Elmore Counties. Because
District 30 now encompasses all of Coosa
County, the district shares a border with the
new District 11, which includes portions of
St.
Clair,
Shelby,
and
Talladega
Counties. The former District 11 was 62.59
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percent white and 33.95 percent black. The
new District 11 is 81.66 percent white and
14.96 percent black. The incumbent senator
from District 11, Jerry Fielding, switched
from the Democratic Party to the Republican
Party after the Legislature approved the new
districts.
v. Senate District 22
Although
Senate
District
22
in
southwest Alabama was not malapportioned
in 2010, Hinaman redrew its borders to
accommodate shifts in population from
neighboring districts that were significantly
malapportioned. In 2010, three of the Senate
districts in Mobile County—Districts 33, 34,
and 35—were underpopulated by a total of
15,656 people. Senate District 32, which
was located in Baldwin County on the
eastern shore of Mobile Bay, was
overpopulated by 19,055. Baldwin County is
bordered on the east by Florida, the south by
the Gulf of Mexico, and the west by Mobile
Bay and Mobile County. Mobile County is
bordered on the west by Mississippi, the
south by the Gulf of Mexico, and the east by
Mobile Bay and Baldwin County. Senate
District 22, which included portions of
Washington, Clarke, Choctaw, Escambia,
Monroe, and Conecuh Counties, bordered
District 34 on the north, and extended down
into a strip of land in Mobile and Baldwin
Counties between Districts 33 and 34 on the
west and District 32 on the east. Senate
Districts 23 and 24 bordered Senate District
22 on the north and both were majorityblack districts
with
significant
underpopulation.
Hinaman
considered
moving District 35 across Mobile Bay to
gain some of the overpopulation from

Baldwin County, but Senator Trip Pittman
(R) of District 32 objected to that proposal.
Hinaman decided instead to repopulate
District 35 by taking population from
District 34; to transfer population from a
portion of District 22 in Mobile County to
District 34; to move northern portions of
District 32 in Baldwin County into District
22; and to repopulate Districts 23 and 24
with some of the portions of District 22. As
a result, District 22 crossed into all of the
same counties as in the 2001 plan, but the
District included smaller portions of Mobile,
Choctaw, and Washington Counties. The
new map divided the MOWA Band of
Choctaw Indians, a small Native American
tribe not recognized by the federal
government, between District 22 and
District 34.
vi. Senate District 26
Hinaman substantially decreased the land
size of Senate District 26, a majority-black
district in Montgomery County. Under the
2001 plan, Senate District 26 included the
majority of Montgomery County, following
the county lines. In 2010, the total
population
of
District
26
was
underpopulated by 11.64 percent and was
22.03 percent white and 72.75 percent black.
To comply with the guideline of an overall
deviation in population of 2 percent,
Hinaman moved some of the densely
populated precincts in the City of
Montgomery into Senate District 26. Under
the 2001 plan, Senate District 25 was
located primarily in Elmore County to the
northeast of Senate District 26. To maintain
contiguous districts and as a result of
moving other districts, Hinaman created a
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land bridge through Montgomery County to
connect District 25 with Crenshaw County
to the south. This land bridge removed a
large geographic portion of District 26,
although it did not significantly reduce the
population of the district. Under Act 603,
the new redistricting plan for the Senate,
Senate District 26 maintains much of its
former shape by following the county lines
at the northern borders. The district remains
underpopulated by .08 percent and the
percentage of the population that
is black has increased slightly, from 72.75
percent to 75.22 percent.
f. Adoption of the Plans by the Committee
The Committee adopted these plans on May
9, 2012, as working drafts, and then
officially adopted the plans on May 17,
2012. In both meetings, Senator Dial and
Representative McClendon explained the
plans, and the Committee discussed them.
The Committee adopted the McClendon
House plan as a working draft by a recorded
vote of 16 yeas and 3 nays and the Dial
Senate plan by a voice vote. The Committee
officially adopted the plans one week later
by the same votes.
The Committee conducted a twenty-second
public
hearing
in
Montgomery
approximately an hour and a half after it
adopted the plans. At that hearing, several
legislators objected to particular splits of
counties and to the decision to split
Lauderdale and Colbert Counties into two
different Senate districts because those
counties form a community of interest
known as the “Shoals.” Under the 2001
plan, all of Lauderdale County and most of
Colbert County had been located within

District 1. Under the new plan, part of
Lauderdale County and all of Colbert
County are now located in District 6, and
District 1 now includes portions of
Lauderdale, Limestone, and Madison
Counties. Representative Merika Coleman
(D) from Jefferson County objected to what
she viewed as the “packing and stacking” of
the black vote. Representative Joe Hubbard
(D) objected to the districts for Montgomery
County, which he viewed as disrespectful of
communities of interests, and to the decision
to move his district, District 73, to Shelby
County. Two local officials from Clay
County objected to its division into two
districts because the 2001 plan had included
the county in a single House district. And
voters from several counties raised
objections to the lack of sufficient advance
notice for the hearing and to the splitting of
certain counties.
In the final week before the passage of Act
602 and Act 603, Hinaman met with
legislators at a computer in the
Reapportionment Office to make final
adjustments to the maps. Hinaman met with
several Democratic members of the
Legislature
during
this
process.
Representative McClendon and Hinaman
were able to accommodate some of the
representatives,
but
Representative
McClendon and Hinaman were not able to
accommodate requests from Representative
Merika Coleman and Representative
Juandalynn Givan, two members from the
Birmingham area, who wanted to move
3,700 people from one district to another
because that change would have violated the
guideline of an overall deviation of 2
percent. Senator Dial tried to accommodate
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a request from Senator Tammy Irons (D) to
move her law office into her district, but he
was unable to offer an amendment on the
Senate floor because another senator, Mark
Keahey (D), called for a third reading of the
bill at length and the rules of the Legislature
require an immediate vote on a bill after it
has been read three times.
Throughout the process, Senator Dial and
Representative McClendon had to balance
the requirements of the committee
guidelines against the preferences of
incumbents. And the new districts needed to
be passed by the Legislature. Senator Dial
adjusted the Senate plan repeatedly to satisfy
legislators so that the bill could be passed.
But many legislators, both Republican and
Democrat, were dissatisfied with the plans.
g. The Final Redistricting Plans: Act 602
and Act 603
The final versions of the House and Senate
bills preserved the majority-black districts
with roughly the same percentages
of black population as in the 1993 and 2001
plans. The statistics are consistent with the
agreement
between
Hinaman,
the
Republican leadership, and the co-chairs of
the Committee to preserve the majorityblack districts without retrogression. As the
following table illustrates, Act 602 increased
slightly
the
percentage
of
the black population in 14 of the original 27
majority-black House districts, decreased
slightly
the
percentage
of
the black population in the other 13
majority-black House districts, and created
one new majority-black House district in
total population.

[See page 214]
And the following table illustrates that Act
603 increased the percentage of the black
population in five of the majorityblack Senate districts and decreased the
percentage of the black population in the
other three majority-black Senate districts.
[See page 215]
The following table illustrates the
percentages
of
total black population
and black voting-age population for each
majority-black House district under Act 602
and the percentage of overall deviation in
total population from ideal population for
each majority-black House district.
[See page 216]
The following table compares the
percentages of black voting-age population
for each majority-black House district using
the 2010 Census data under Act 602 and
under the 2001 plan.
[See page 217]
The following table compares the
percentages of black voting-age population
for each majority-black Senate district using
the 2010 Census data under Act 603 and
under the 2001 plan.
[See page 218]
Most of the majority-black districts under
the new plan remain underpopulated, but
within 1 percent of the ideal population. Of
the 28 majority-black House districts, 20
remain underpopulated. Six of the eight
majority-black Senate
districts
remain
underpopulated.
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Because the Legislature used a tighter
deviation in population compared to the
Democrat-controlled Legislature in 2001,
the number of black people and the
percentage of the black population moved
into majority-black districts were higher
under the Acts than compared to those same
numbers in 2001. In 2012, the Legislature
moved
9.8
percent
of
the
total black population into the majorityblack House districts and 8.5 percent of the
total black population into the majorityblack Senate districts. If the Democratcontrolled Legislature in 2001 had drawn the
redistricting lines in accordance with an
overall deviation in population of 2 percent,
they would have needed to move 6.6 percent
of the total black population into the
majority-black House districts and 5.8
percent of the total black population into the
majority-black Senate
districts.
The
following table illustrates how the
Legislature repopulated the majorityblack House districts in 2001 and how many
additional black people would have been
required had that Legislature complied with
the guideline of 2 percent deviation used in
2012.
[See page 219]
The following table illustrates how the
Legislature repopulated the majorityblack districts in the Senate in 2001 and how
many additional black people would have
been required had that Legislature complied
with the guideline of 2 percent deviation
used in 2012.
[See page 220]

Although
the
Constitution
of Alabama prohibits the division of a
county among districts, the final plans split
some counties to comply with the overall
deviation in population of 2 percent used to
satisfy the federal requirement of one
person, one vote. The final plans split 33
counties for the Senate districts and 50
counties for the House districts. The 1993
plans split 32 counties for Senate districts
and 36 counties for the House districts, and
the 2001 plans split 31 counties for the
Senate districts and 39 counties for the
House districts. But those earlier plans used
an overall deviation in population of 10
percent.
Other counties were split to further the
interests of incumbents. For example,
Representative Alan Harper, who switched
to the Republican Party in 2012, asked to
have his district include a portion of Greene
County in which he owned property.
Representative Harper stated that he might
move to that property in the future, and the
representative whose district had previously
included that property agreed to a change in
which 12 people were moved to District 61.
The rest of Greene County is divided
between Districts 71 and 72.
The final plan also kept incumbent conflicts
to a minimum. No two incumbent Senators
were in the same district. The House plan
had only two incumbent conflicts.
Two black
incumbent
Democrats,
Representative Juandalynn Givan and
Representative Demetrius Newton, lived in
District 60. Representative Demetrius
Newton
has
since
died.
Another
black incumbent Democrat, Representative
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John Knight, and a white incumbent
Democrat, Representative Joe Hubbard,
lived in District 77, but Representative
Hubbard has since moved to District 74. The
former incumbent conflict was the result of
the decision to move District 53 to
Huntsville and use its former population to
repopulate the majority-black districts in
Jefferson County, and the latter incumbent
conflict was the result of the decision to
move District 73 to Shelby County and use
its former population to repopulate the
majority-black districts in Montgomery
County.
h. Adoption of the Acts into Law
The Alabama Legislature considered the
proposed districts in a special session that
began on May 17, 2012, and ended on May
24, 2012. The Legislature made only minor
changes to the bills during that week. The
bills
proceeded
along
the
normal legislative process
through
committees and debate on the floor of each
house of the Legislature. Democratic
legislators offered substitute plans in
committee and on the floors of both houses
of the Legislature, but none of their plans
complied with the guideline of an overall
deviation in population of 2 percent adopted
by the Committee. Senator Hank Sanders
(D) introduced HB16 and SB5 as
alternatives, both of which were drafted with
an overall deviation of 10 percent. Those
plans placed several incumbents in the same
districts, and those plans included 27
majority-black House districts. All of the
proposed substitutes were defeated.
Both houses of the Legislature approved the
Acts, and the Governor signed them into

law. The Senate approved its new districts
by a vote of 20 to 13 along party lines, with
an Independent, Harri Ann Smith, joining
the Democrats in the minority. The Senate
approved the new House districts by a vote
of 23 to 12 along party lines, with the
Independent joining the Republicans in the
majority. The House approved its new
districts by a vote of 66 to 35, with one
Democrat, Charles Newton, voting in favor
of the plan and three Democrats abstaining
from voting. The House approved the new
Senate districts by a vote of 61 to 34 along
party lines, with 4 Republicans and 5
Democrats abstaining from the vote.
Governor Bentley signed the Acts into law
on May 31, 2012.
4. Evidence Presented by the Plaintiffs at
Trial
At trial, the plaintiffs introduced the live
testimony of 13 lay witnesses and 3 expert
witnesses. The expert witnesses included
William S. Cooper, who drew alternative
maps for the Black Caucus plaintiffs; Allan
J. Lichtman, who testified about racial
polarization
in Alabama elections;
and
Theodore S. Arrington, who testified that, in
his opinion, the Acts packed black voters
into majority-black districts to isolate and
diminish their political strength.
a. Testimony of Senator Tammy Irons
Senator Tammy Irons (D) testified that, in
her opinion, the only explanation for the
changes made to her district in Act 603 is an
intent to “crack” a minority-opportunity
district in Senate District 7. She explained
that her old district included all of
Lauderdale County and part of Colbert
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County, a community of interest commonly
known as “the Shoals,” but that her new
district includes only a portion of
Lauderdale County, a strip of land in the
northern portion of Limestone County that
used to belong to District 2, and a section of
Madison County heavily populated by
minorities that used to belong to District 7.
According to the 2010 Census, Senate
District 7 had a voting-age population that
was 62.61 percent white and 30.90
percent black. Under Act 603, Senate
District 7 will have a voting-age population
that is 67.83 percent white and 26.14 percent
black. According to the 2010 Census, Senate
District 1 had a voting-age population that
was 84.93 percent white and 12.20
percent black. Under Act 603, Senate
District 1 will have a voting-age population
that is 85.56 percent white and 10.66
percent black.
We do not doubt that Senator Tammy Irons
testified truthfully about her opinions, but
we do not credit her conclusions about the
changes to her district or about the
Republican Party. The population statistics
for the districts in the northern portion of the
State reveal the overpopulation of Senate
District 7 and all of the districts surrounding
it. Senator Dial and Hinaman testified
consistently
that
the
significant
overpopulation of the northern districts, as
well as the underpopulation of the majorityblack districts in the Black Belt caused a
domino effect that required changes to
Senate District 7.
b. Testimony of Senator Marc Keahey
Senator Marc Keahey (D) also testified on
behalf of the plaintiffs. Senator Keahey

represents District 22, a sprawling district in
southwest Alabama. He testified that, after
the landslide elections for the Republicans in
2010, he was, at 17 months, the secondlongest serving white Democrat in the
Senate. District 22 was a crossover district
because its voting-age population in 2010
was only 27.50 percent black, but the district
elected
a
Democrat
preferred
by black voters. Under Act 603, District 22
has a voting-age population that is 20.70
percent black. Senator Keahey testified that,
after he saw the working draft of the new
districts, he brought several proposed
amendments to Senator Dial, all of which
Senator Dial rejected on the ground that the
changes would result in the retrogression of
Districts 23 and 24 to the north, majorityblack districts represented by Senator Hank
Sanders (D) and Senator Bobby Singleton
(D) respectively. Some of Senator Keahey's
proposed amendments would have placed all
of the MOWA Band of Choctaw Indians in
the same district. He also testified that, when
he asked for changes to the districts, other
senators asked him to switch parties, but he
declined. We credit Senator Keahey's
testimony.
c. Testimony
Smitherman

of

Senator

Rodger

Senator Rodger Smitherman (D), who
represents majority-black Senate District 18
in Birmingham, testified that the new
districts were unfair to the voters of
Jefferson County because of the structure of
the local delegation, which is composed of
every legislator who represents voters in
Jefferson County. Under both the 2001
Senate plan and Act 603, Jefferson County
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residents vote in eight Senate districts, three
of which are majority-black districts and
five of which are majority-white districts.
But Act 602 changes the House districts in
Jefferson County because it moves one
majority-black district to Huntsville and
moves an additional majority-white district
into the County. Under the previous House
plan, residents of Jefferson County had
voted in nine majority-black districts and
nine majority-white districts. Under the new
House plan, residents of Jefferson County
will vote in eight majority-black districts
and ten majority-white districts. Because the
new majority-white district that crosses into
Jefferson County includes a Democratic
incumbent as a resident, the partisan balance
of the districts remains the same.
Senator Smitherman testified that, in his
view, the balance of the Jefferson County
local delegation is unfair to black residents
of Jefferson County and dilutes their voting
power. Local delegations act as gatekeepers
for county legislation in the Legislature,
which ordinarily will not consider or pass
local legislation not approved by the local
delegation. Although black voters in
Jefferson County are ordinarily successful in
electing their preferred candidates in countywide elections, they are unable to exercise
the same control over the local delegation
because of the influence of suburban voters
on many of its members. As an example,
Senator Smitherman cited an occupational
tax supported by the senators elected by the
majority-black districts within Jefferson
County, but opposed by the senators elected
by majority-white districts that extend to
suburban counties, where many people
commute to work in Birmingham. Because a

majority of the local delegation opposed the
occupational tax, the Legislature did not
pass it. Senator Smitherman testified that, as
a result of the failed tax, Jefferson County
closed Cooper Green Mercy Hospital, a
charitable hospital for the indigent that
formerly served many of his constituents.
Senator Smitherman also testified that the
failure to pass the occupational tax had
resulted in a loss of security jobs at the state
courthouses in Jefferson County.
Senator Smitherman acknowledged that he
provided Senator Dial with a map for the
majority-black Senate districts in Jefferson
County and that Senator Dial adopted the
substantial
majority of
that
map.
Smitherman asked Senator Dial to maintain
a similar racial balance in the district, and
Senator Dial agreed that he would try to
accommodate that request, so long as doing
so would not result in retrogression in other
districts. As of 2010, Senate District 18 had
a black voting-age population of 57.31
percent, and under Act 603, District 18 has
a black voting-age population of 56.43
percent.
We credit most of Senator Smitherman's
testimony. We credit his testimony about the
makeup of the local delegation for Jefferson
County and his testimony that the
occupational tax failed because of
opposition from legislators who represent
suburban counties. And we credit Senator
Smitherman's testimony that he provided
Senator Dial a proposed map of the
majority-black Senate districts in Jefferson
County and that Senator Dial incorporated a
majority of that map into the new districts.
But we cannot credit Senator Smitherman's
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testimony that Act 603 dilutes the votes of
the black population of Jefferson County as
that testimony calls for a legal conclusion
that we must decide for ourselves.
d. Testimony of Senator Vivian Davis
Figures
Senator Vivian Davis Figures (D), who
represents District 33, a majorityblack district in Mobile County, testified on
behalf of the plaintiffs. Senator Figures
served on the Reapportionment Committee
and testified that, when the Committee met
to establish guidelines for redistricting, the
Democratic members of that Committee had
favored an overall deviation in population of
10 percent because it allowed for more
leeway, but the Republican members of the
Committee favored a lower overall deviation
in population because of the decision
in Larios. She testified that she had no input
in the creation of her district and that she
never asked for the black voting-age
population to be increased in her district, but
that
the
final
plan
increased
the black voting-age population in her
district from 61.55 percent to 68.10 percent.
She testified that, although she had not
examined the boundaries of her district, she
knew it was packed.
Senator Figures testified that she felt her
voice was silenced during the passage of the
new Senate districts, but she admitted on
cross-examination that many of the incidents
she had cited as examples occurred for raceneutral reasons. For example, she testified
that she had not seen the final version of the
bill until the day it was introduced on the
Senate floor, but she admitted that she had
seen the first plan of the new Senate districts

two weeks before the Acts were passed and
that the only changes made to the second
plan were minor alterations to put two
Democratic senators back in their districts
because Senator Dial and Hinaman had
inadvertently drawn those senators out of
their districts in the initial plan. And she
testified that debate on the Senate plan had
been cut off, but she also admitted that,
under the Senate rules, a vote had to be
immediately taken on the bill when her
Democratic colleague, Senator Keahey,
asked for the bill to be read at length a third
time. She agreed that Senator Keahey's
request to have the bill read at length for the
third time, not any action by the
Republicans, had the effect of cutting off
debate on the redistricting Acts.
We credit most of Senator Figures's
testimony. We credit her testimony that the
Democratic members of the Committee
voted in favor of a higher overall deviation
in population because it would give more
leeway to meet other priorities and that the
Republican members favored a lower
overall deviation in population because
of Larios. We credit her testimony that she
did not meet with Hinaman or otherwise
give input about her district and that she
never requested an increase in the
percentage of the black population in her
district. But we do not credit her testimony
that her district is packed because that
testimony amounts to a legal conclusion.
e. Testimony of Senator Quinton Ross
Senator Quinton Ross (D) also testified on
behalf of the plaintiffs. Senator Ross
represents Senate District 26, a majorityblack district in Montgomery. He testified
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that he had some limited conversations with
Senator Dial about the redistricting plans,
but never sat down with Hinaman to draw
his district. And he testified that the
percentage of black population in his district
is much higher than it was under the 2001
plan. He testified that Act 603 split several
precincts in his district, which will have a
major economic impact on Montgomery
County because it will require the County to
hire new personnel for the voting precincts.
We credit most of Senator Ross's testimony.
We credit his testimony that he was never
given the opportunity to work on his district
with Hinaman, but we rely on the statistics
introduced into evidence about his districts
instead of his description of those statistics.
In 2010, the total population of Senate
District 26 was 72.75 percent black, and the
voting-age
population
was
70.87
percent black. Under Act 603, the total
population of Senate District 26 is 75.22
percent black, and the voting-age population
is 72.70 percent black.
f. Testimony of Representative Laura Hall
Representative Laura Hall (D) also testified
on behalf of the Democratic Conference
plaintiffs. Representative Hall represents
House District 19 in Madison County. In
2010, the total population of House District
19 was 70.04 percent black. Under the new
plans, District 19 gained some rural
population,
and
the
percentage
of black population decreased to 61.5
percent. Representative Hall testified that
she met with Representative McClendon to
discuss possible areas in which her district
could gain additional population because it
was underpopulated, but she did not sit with

Hinaman at a computer to consider different
options.
Representative Hall also testified about the
changes to Senate District 7 because she ran
as the Democratic nominee for that district
in 2010, but she lost in the general election
to Senator Paul Sanford (R). Under the 2001
plan, District 7 included a strip of land in the
middle of Madison County from
the Alabama–Tennessee border down the
center of the County through Huntsville.
The district included most of urban
Huntsville. Representative Hall testified that
the new plan moved a portion of southwest
Huntsville, which is sometimes called
“Little Mexico” because it has a “very
viable” Hispanic community, into Senate
District 2 and moved a portion of northwest
Huntsville, which is predominantly black,
into Senate District 1. Senator Bill
Holtzclaw (R) represents District 2, and
Senator Tammy Irons (D) represents District
1. Representative Hall agreed that the
“socioeconomic community interests” of
the black population moved into Senator
Irons's
district
is
different
from
the black population formerly in Senator
Irons's district because the black population
in Huntsville “has a high population of
engineers [and] scientists” whereas the
Florence area has “a very hard-working
union type of community.”
Representative Hall testified that Act 603
provides less favorable opportunities for
minorities in Huntsville than alternative
plans advanced by the plaintiffs, but she also
acknowledged that all of the alternative
plans follow an overall deviation in
population of 10 percent. Under Act 603,
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Senate District 7 is overpopulated by just
under 1 percent and has a total population
that is 65.56 percent white, 27.34
percent black, and 2.58 percent other. The
voting-age population is 67.83 percent white
and 26.14 percent black. Under an
alternative plan proposed by Dr. Reed,
District 7 would be underpopulated by 2.81
percent, and the proposed district would
have a total population that is 47.17
percent black, 43.58 percent white, and 3.69
percent other. The plaintiffs failed to
provide the Court with voting-age statistics
for that plan. The illustrative district
introduced by the Democratic Conference
plaintiffs would be underpopulated by 4.96
percent and would have a total population
that is 42.02 percent white, 48.36
percent black, and 7.29 percent Hispanic.
The illustrative district would have a votingage population that is 45.18 percent white,
46.45 percent black, and 6.51 percent
Hispanic. Representative Hall testified that
both the plan proposed by Dr. Reed and the
Democratic Conference illustrative district
would allow black and Hispanic voters to
form a coalition to reach 50 percent, but Act
603 has a smaller minority population.
Representative Hall also testified, like
several of her other Democratic colleagues,
that she is upset about the ability of the
Republican supermajority in the Legislature
to invoke cloture. And she testified that she
felt that she had been “clotured more during
this last quadrennium than the entire 20
years [she had] been in session.” Under the
new
Republican
supermajority,
Representative Hall explained that she views
it as challenging at best to advocate on
behalf of her district. She testified that she

has not been asked to switch parties, but that
she would not be very happy as a
Republican.
We credit most of Representative Hall's
testimony. We credit her testimony that she
discussed her district with Representative
McClendon, but did not sit down with
Hinaman to discuss potential changes. We
credit her testimony that some of the
minorities who previously resided in Senate
District 7 reside in new districts under Act
603 and that those minorities will probably
be less able to elect the candidate of their
choice under Act 603 than in the illustrative
districts. And we credit her testimony that
the Republicans have invoked the rule of
cloture to end debate by the Democrats.
g. Testimony
Hubbard

of

Representative

Joe

Initially elected in 2010, Representative Joe
Hubbard (D) testified for the Democratic
Conference
plaintiffs.
Representative
Hubbard represents House District 73,
which Act 602 moved from Montgomery
County to Shelby County. He testified that,
after he had voted with Republicans on a
controversial jobs bill, the Republican
Speaker of the House, Mike Hubbard, told
him that if he “played [his] cards right, [he]
could
have
a
long
future
in
the Alabama House of Representatives.”
Representative Hubbard assumed that the
Speaker was asking him to switch parties,
given that the Speaker's chief of staff
previously had extended that invitation.
After he rejected that invitation, the
Committee introduced a new House plan, in
which District 73 had been moved to Shelby
County. Representative Hubbard testified
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that he tried to get the agreement of the
other representatives in Montgomery County
to reconstitute some of the neighborhoods he
had represented, but that Representative Jay
Love (R), who has since resigned his
position, rejected the proposed amendments
because they would have reduced the
percentage of the voting-age population in
District 74 that was white. Representative
Hubbard has purchased a new home in
District 74, the majority-white district
formerly represented by Representative
Love. We credit this testimony.
h. Testimony of Dr. Joe Reed
The Democratic Conference plaintiffs also
introduced the testimony of Dr. Joe Reed,
who appeared as a representative of
the Alabama Democratic Conference. He
testified
that
the Alabama Democratic
Conference is an organization of Democrats
founded in 1960 to advance the political
influence of blacks in Alabama. The
organization is involved in voter registration
and lobbying and, according to Reed, has
chapters in most of the counties in Alabama.
In those counties where the Conference does
not have chapters, the Conference has at
least a contact. The Conference endorses
candidates in almost every race for the
Legislature.
Reed testified that he has been involved in
redistricting in Alabama since the 1970s and
that
he
became
involved
to
elect black candidates. He testified that, for
a long time, he believed that a district
needed to be at least 65 percent black to
allow the black voters to elect the candidate
of their choice because some blacks either
are not registered to vote or are ineligible to

vote. And he testified that he now believes
that a district should be about 60
percent black to allow the voters to elect
their candidate of choice, although in some
circumstances the percentage may need to
be closer to 65 percent.
Reed testified that he drafted an alternative
plan for the Alabama Legislature, which he
showed Senator Dial at one of the public
hearings. He testified that he viewed the
plan as a “status quo plan.” He testified that
he tried only to satisfy incumbents and meet
the requirement of one person, one vote. To
accomplish the latter objective, he used an
overall deviation of 10 percent because that
is the deviation that the Legislature had used
in the 2001 plan. With this deviation, he was
able to keep District 73 in Montgomery
County, but reduce the black population in
that district. Despite his efforts to satisfy all
incumbents, his plan caused one incumbent
conflict in the House.
He testified that, as compared to his plans,
the plans adopted by the Legislature were
bad for both blacks and whites. He
explained that the adopted plans will cause
significant problems for boards of registrars
because of the county and precinct splits, but
he also acknowledged that the boards of
registrars had fulfilled their duties when the
plans adopted in 1993 and 2001 split
counties and precincts. And he testified that
the new plans would cause confusion for
voters for the same reasons, but
acknowledged that the boards of registrars
were required by law to send postcards to
voters about their polling places and that he
could challenge any failure to do so in court.
Reed asked the Court to send the issue of
143

redistricting back to the Legislature and tell
it to apply an overall deviation in population
of 10 percent.

District
22,
23,
and
34—and
the black population is predominantly in
District 23.

We credit most of Reed's testimony. We
credit Reed's testimony that redistricting is
an inherently political process and that a
drafter can draw a plan in many ways. We
credit Reed's testimony that he formerly
believed that a larger black population was
often needed to guarantee black voters the
opportunity to elect their candidate of choice
than he now believes is necessary. And we
credit Reed's testimony about his
redistricting plan and about the reaction of
registrars to the precinct splits in the 1993
and 2001 redistricting plans, but we do not
credit his testimony that the plans adopted
by the Legislature are bad for all black and
white citizens of Alabama.

We credit most of Weaver's testimony. We
credit Weaver's testimony that he has been
elected the Chief of this state-recognized
Band, and we credit Weaver's testimony
about the size and location of the Band. And
we credit Weaver's testimony that members
of the Band are divided among three
different senate districts, which will make it
more difficult for the Band to influence
elections in those districts. We do not credit
Weaver's testimony about the Band's ability
to elect its candidate of choice under any of
the plans presented because he did not offer
any factual basis to support his opinion that
the
candidate
of
choice
for
the black population would necessarily be
the same candidate of choice for the Band
population.

i. Testimony of Framon Weaver
Framon Weaver testified as a Democratic
Conference plaintiff. Weaver is the Chief of
the MOWA Band of Choctaw Indians,
which has approximately 4,000 members in
the State of Alabama. The State
of Alabama has recognized the MOWA
Band of Choctaw Indians, but the federal
government has not. The Band lives along
the border between Washington County and
Mobile County. Weaver testified that the
Band has worked closely with black groups
on political campaigns and that the Band has
predominantly
supported
Democratic
candidates. And he testified that, although
the Band was able to elect its candidate of
choice in coalition with blacks in the old
Senate District 22, it will not be able to do
so under the Acts because the Band is split
between three different Senate districts—

j. Testimony of Bernard Simelton
The president of the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People in
Alabama, Bernard Simelton, testified on
behalf of the Democratic Conference
plaintiffs. He testified that the Association
has been engaged in efforts to improve the
relationship between the black and Hispanic
communities in Alabama. He testified that
the communities have become closer
because of their shared disagreement with
bills passed by the Republican Legislature.
And he testified that the Association works
actively with the MOWA Indians in the
Baldwin and Washington County area. We
credit Simelton's testimony about the
Association's involvement with the Hispanic
population and the MOWA Indians.
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k. Testimony
Lichtman

of

Professor

Allan

J.

Professor Allan J. Lichtman provided expert
testimony that voting is racially polarized in
Alabama. Lichtman conducted ecological
regression analysis based on county-level
and precinct-level election returns to
calculate how black and white persons voted
in recent senatorial, presidential, and judicial
elections. Based on this analysis, Lichtman
concluded
that
in Alabama “African
Americans invariably prefer Democratic
candidates in general elections and [ ] whites
invariably prefer Republican candidates.” In
six general elections, Lichtman determined
that
the
mean
support
of blacks for black Democrats
was
94
percent and that the mean support
of blacks for white Democrats was 92
percent. By contrast, the mean level of
support by white voters for black Democrats
was 19 percent and the mean level of
support by white voters for white Democrats
was 29 percent. Based on this data,
Lichtman found that “polarization between
African Americans and whites in general
elections is greater when the Democratic
candidate is African American rather than
white.” Lichtman's ecological regression
analysis also suggested that 100 percent
of black voters in Jefferson County,
Madison County, and Montgomery County
vote for Democrats, regardless of whether
the
candidate
is black or
white.
Comparatively, white voters in Jefferson
County had a mean level of support
for black Democrats of 19 percent and a
mean level of support for white Democrats
of 33 percent; white voters in Madison
County had a mean level of support

for black Democrats of 24 percent and a
mean level of support for white Democrats
of 36 percent; and white voters in
Montgomery County had a mean level of
support for black Democrats of 20 percent
and a mean level of support for white
Democrats of 41 percent.
We credit Lichtman's testimony that
most black voters
in Alabama favor
Democrats and that most white voters
in Alabama favor Republicans, but we do
not credit Lichtman's opinion that race is the
motivating factor for this voting pattern
in Alabama. Lichtman did not conduct any
statistical analysis to determine whether
factors other than race were responsible for
the voting patterns. He did not consider
affluence, strength of a political campaign,
or party loyalty. Instead, he asserted
repeatedly that the resulting voter patterns
were similar, which suggests that race is the
motivating factor…
Lichtman also testified that the evidence
suggests that Native Americans and
Hispanics in Alabama are politically
cohesive. Lichtman explained that 41
percent of the registered voters who vote at
the McIntosh High School precinct in Senate
District 22 are Native Americans, and 23
percent of the registered voters who vote at
that precinct are black persons. The precinct
cast 75 percent of its votes for the
Democratic incumbent, W.J. Pat Lindsey,
during the 2006 general election for the
Legislature, and the precinct cast 87 percent
of its votes for the Democratic candidate,
Mark Keahey, during the 2010 general
election. Based on these numbers from a
single precinct, Lichtman concluded
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that blacks and Native Americans ordinarily
vote in coalition. Lichtman also reasoned
that, because, “with the exception of Cuban–
Americans, Hispanics are overwhelmingly
Democratic in their choice of candidates”
and because most of the Hispanic population
in Alabama is not Cuban American, the
Hispanic population in Alabama must be
politically cohesive.
We do not credit Lichtman's opinions about
the political cohesiveness of Native
Americans and Hispanics in Alabama.
Lichtman acknowledged that “[t]here is an
insufficient
concentration
of Native
Americans or Hispanics in the state
of Alabama for
ecological
regression
analysis.” And he relied upon data from a
single precinct to speculate about the voting
behavior of Native Americans and
generalizations about Hispanics across the
United States to speculate about Hispanic
voting patterns in Alabama…
Lichtman next testified that the illustrative
districts introduced by the Democratic
Conference plaintiffs would give minorities
a better opportunity to elect the candidates
of their choice. The Democratic Conference
plaintiffs introduced an illustrative map of
Montgomery County that includes an
additional majority-black House district; an
illustrative map that preserves nine majorityblack House districts in Jefferson County;
and an illustrative map of a minorityopportunity Senate district in Madison
County. Lichtman acknowledged that he did
not look at any statewide plans, but testified
that the data from previous elections
suggests that these districts would provide
minority voters a very good opportunity to

elect candidates of their choice. We credit
Lichtman's testimony about these illustrative
districts.
l. Testimony of William S. Cooper
William S. Cooper provided expert
testimony about alternative redistricting
plans
for
the Black Caucus plaintiffs.
Cooper testified that he has been preparing
redistricting plans for approximately 25
years and has worked with Maptitude since
the late 1980s. Cooper drew the redistricting
maps, HB16 and SB5, introduced by
Democratic members of the Legislature as
alternatives to the plans adopted by the
Committee. He used the data produced by
the 2010 Census; the block equivalency files
from the Alabama Reapportionment Office,
which were linked to the versions of the
plans produced by the Committee; and lists
of some of the addresses of the incumbents.
When
counsel
for
the Black Caucus plaintiffs hired Cooper to
draft alternative plans, counsel instructed
Cooper to preserve the same number of
majority-black districts and to avoid county
splits to the extent possible, particularly
within the Black Belt. Cooper testified that
he drew the plan without any knowledge
of Alabama politics, geography, or the
locations of incumbents, and that he spent
only 40 hours on the project. And he
explained that he intended the plans that
became HB16 and SB5 to serve as initial
drafts that he would alter based on input
from legislators, but the schedule of the
Legislature did not permit any changes to
the plans before the Democratic legislators
introduced them.
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Cooper acknowledged that the Legislature
needed to make significant changes to the
district lines because of the severe
malapportionment of the existing districts,
but he explained that the Legislature could
have split fewer counties and precincts if the
Committee had followed an overall
deviation in population of 10 percent.
Cooper testified that HB16 and SB5, which
follow an overall deviation of 10 percent,
split fewer counties and precincts than the
Acts. Cooper explained that traditional
redistricting principles protect the integrity
of precincts, but he admitted that the
districts adopted in 2001 had a similar
number of precinct splits as the Acts.
Cooper also testified that, in his opinion, the
Acts pack the majority-black districts. He
testified that the margins between the white
population and the black population in those
districts are much larger in Act 602 than in
the HB16 plan, which he referred to as
“smoking gun evidence that shows that
there's been some packing in the Act 602
house plan.” He also explained that the
margins were smaller for the Senate
districts, but that the margins again suggest
packing. But he acknowledged that most of
the majority-black districts in his plans were
underpopulated by more than an overall
deviation in population of 2 percent and that
his plan for the House did not increase the
total black population in District 84 to create
a new majority-black district.
We credit much of Cooper's testimony. We
credit Cooper's testimony that the
Legislature could have split fewer county
and precinct lines if it had adopted a higher
overall deviation in population. And we

credit Cooper's testimony that his plans
lowered the margins between the black and
white populations in majority-black districts.
But we do not credit Cooper's testimony that
the Acts packed the majority-black districts
based solely on data that compares the Acts
to Cooper's plans without any consideration
of the previous plans and the Committee's
asserted goals to maintain a lower overall
deviation in population equality and to avoid
retrogression in those districts.
m. Testimony of Theodore S. Arrington
Theodore S. Arrington provided expert
testimony on behalf of the Democratic
Conference plaintiffs that the majorityblack districts were packed to isolate and
diminish the strength of black voters.
Arrington testified that the 1993 and 2001
redistricting plans drawn by Democratic
legislators constituted a “dummymander”
because they packed majority-black districts
in a manner intended to help the Democratic
Party, but the plans in fact hurt the Party. He
testified that a 51 percent voting-age
population is enough to give minority voters
the opportunity to elect the candidate of
their choice anywhere in the State, and he
suggested that, “[c]ertainly, 54–56%
concentration is enough everywhere.” He
explained that, although experts used to
think that a minority presence of 65 percent
was necessary to ensure that the minority
group would be able to elect the candidate of
its choice, the increased registration and
mobilization of black voters has reduced that
number.
Arrington
speculated
that black leaders may have agreed to have
their districts “packed” in the last round of
redistricting because of uncertainty over the
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percentage of black voters required to have
an opportunity to elect their candidate of
choice and because black officials had a
strong voice in the governing coalition.
We do not credit Arrington's opinion that the
districts in the new plan are packed.
Arrington admitted on cross-examination
that, in 2000, he testified that a district in
which black persons made up a voting-age
population of 61 percent would offer only an
opportunity for black voters to elect the
candidate of their choice, not a guarantee
that black voters would be able to elect the
candidate of their choice…
Arrington also testified that, in his view, the
districts were enacted for a discriminatory
purpose. In his expert report, Arrington
asserted that “[t]he purpose of the enacted
plans is to perpetuate or create a kind of
‘political apartheid’ such as the Supreme
Court rejected in Shaw v. Reno and its
progeny.” He reasoned, “Since the face of
the Alabama Republican Party is white (e.g.,
all the G.O.P. legislators are white), the
Republican super-majority in the legislature
designed the districts to create a situation
where the Democratic Party in the
legislature would be all black.” As further
support for the existence of this strategy,
Arrington cited as evidence the affidavits of
several white Democratic legislators who
have been asked by Republicans to switch
parties
and
the
affidavits
of
several black Democratic legislators who
have never been asked. Arrington also
testified that, because the splitting of
precincts bears more heavily on minority
voters, the high number of precinct splits in
the Acts is evidence of discriminatory

purpose. And Arrington suggested that the
departure from normal procedures in the
passage of the legislation in a special session
evidenced discriminatory intent, as did the
greater access of Republican legislators to
see and make changes to the plans because
Democrats had only the illusion of
participation in the process.
We do not credit Arrington's opinion that the
districts were enacted for an invidious
discriminatory
purpose.
On
crossexamination, Arrington retreated from many
of the points he made in his report. For
example, he admitted on cross-examination
that a party in power typically develops its
plan by itself and that process is not,
standing alone, evidence of an intent to
discriminate on the basis of race…
5. Evidence Presented by the State
Defendants at Trial
The State defendants introduced the
testimony of four witnesses to rebut the
evidence introduced by the plaintiffs.
Senator Dial and Representative McClendon
testified at length about the goals of the
Reapportionment
Committee,
the
development of the plans, and the input they
received from legislators. Randy Hinaman
testified about his work on the plans. And
Thomas L. Brunell testified as an expert on
behalf of the State defendants.
a. Testimony of Senator Gerald Dial
Senator Dial testified on behalf of the State
defendants that the Committee had six
primary goals. First, the Committee wanted
to comply with the requirement of one
person, one vote by making the districts as
equally populated as possible. Second, the
148

Committee wanted to avoid future litigation
about compliance with the requirement of
one person, one vote. Third, the Committee
wanted to comply with the Voting Rights
Act. Fourth, the Committee wanted to
comply with section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act, which it understood to require that it
not reduce the number of majorityblack districts or the approximate levels
of black population within those districts.
Fifth, the Committee wanted to draw
districts to avoid incumbent conflicts. Sixth,
the Committee wanted to preserve
communities of interest when possible. With
the exception of the decision to adopt an
overall deviation in population of 2 percent,
the guidelines adopted by the Committee
were the same guidelines that had been used
in 2001. And he testified that the Committee
adopted the overall deviation of 2 percent
before Hinaman became involved in the
process.
Senator Dial testified that the Committee
held public hearings to obtain input from the
public about how to draw the districts. The
Committee held those hearings in 21
locations throughout Alabama before the
Committee produced any new plans, and the
Committee advertised the hearings through
various forms of media. At those hearings,
members of the public asked the Committee
not to split their counties, and Senator Dial
relayed that information to Hinaman.
Senator Dial thought that the process was
fairer than the process used in the past
because the Committee sought comments
from the public before it produced the plans,
instead of afterward. But he also knew that it
would be unable to accommodate all of the

requests of the public if the legislators were
to comply with federal law.
Senator Dial also testified that he consulted
each of his 34 colleagues in the Senate about
their preferences for their districts. He
showed each senator the statistics for his or
her district to explain how many people the
district needed to gain or lose to fall within
the guideline for population deviation. And
he asked each senator about his or her
preferences on population to gain or lose. He
promised each senator that he would not
draw districts with incumbent conflicts, but
he could not accommodate all of the
requests from his colleagues.
Senator Dial explained that the systematic
underpopulation
of
the
majorityblack districts required significant changes
to the district lines in the Senate, but that he
incorporated input from the legislators who
represented those districts as he enlarged
those districts. He often refereed disputes
among senators to try to accommodate
particular requests. And he specifically
incorporated ideas from black legislators.
In Jefferson County, all three majorityblack districts needed to gain population,
and Senator Smitherman, a Democrat who
represented one of those districts, supplied
Senator Dial with a map of proposed
districts. Under that plan, Districts 18, 19,
and 20 would gain population to fall within
the overall deviation of 2 percent and would
remain entirely within Jefferson County.
Dial adopted about 99 percent of that plan.
And Dial divided the rest of the population
of Jefferson County among five majoritywhite districts that extend outside of the
County boundaries. Although Dial could
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have used white population within Jefferson
County to repopulate the majorityblack districts, he was concerned that doing
so would have resulted in the retrogression
of
the
majority-black districts
and
potentially created a problem for
preclearance.
In Mobile County, Senator Dial sought input
from Senator Figures, who represented a
majority-black district in Mobile that needed
to gain population. Neither Senator Figures,
nor any of the other senators from Mobile
County, wanted another senator to join the
Mobile County delegation, and the new plan
accomplished that goal by changing the
shape of District 22 to absorb much of the
overpopulation from District 32 across the
Mobile Bay in Baldwin County. Senator
Sanders, who represented District 23, which
bordered District 22 to the north, wanted to
gain minority members from District 22 and
give up population in Autauga County.
Senator Dial partially accommodated those
requests by removing District 23 from
Autauga County and extending the district
partially into District 22.
Senator Dial also testified that the need to
“grow” the majority-black districts in
the Black Belt had a domino effect on the
districts along the western edge of Alabama.
District 24 moved north, District 21 moved
north, District 6 moved north, and District 1
moved west to accommodate some of the
overpopulation in the former District 2.
Senator Dial met with the senator from
District 1, Senator Tammy Irons (D), about
the proposed changes to her district and
accommodated some of her requests, but
was unable to accommodate further requests

because he had no time to introduce an
amendment during the consideration of the
Senate plan by the Legislature.
Senator Dial explained that the plans were
introduced, considered, and approved in a
special session of the Legislature. He
explained that the plans went through the
same process of committee hearings and
consideration and debate on the floor that
any other piece of legislation would undergo
in the Alabama Legislature. He testified that
a special session allows for greater
opportunity to engage in debate and
consideration because the Legislature
considers no other bills during that time. He
also testified that the Legislature in 2001
had also adopted its redistricting plans
during a special session. He testified that the
first time he saw the alternative plans
introduced at the special session, including
the Sanders plan and the Reed–Buskey plan,
was in committee or on the Senate floor and
that none of the Senators who developed
those plans ever consulted him or other
Republican legislators about those plans.
Senator Dial testified that he had no goal or
intent to discriminate against the black
population
in Alabama during
the
redistricting. He testified that no member of
the Senate who represented a majorityblack district had ever asked for a district
with a black population of only 55 percent,
and Senator Hank Sanders (D) told Senator
Dial that he thought that all of the majorityblack districts
should
have
ablack population of at least 62 percent.
Senator Dial testified that, if he had
suggested to the senators who represented
the majority-black districts that new districts
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with black populations of only 55 percent
would be better for the black population
in Alabama, those senators would not have
responded favorably to his suggestion that
he knew better than they did. A former
Democrat turned Republican, Senator Dial
testified that he had no contact with the
Republican National Committee during the
reapportionment process, was not aware of
any national strategy to make the
Republican Party the “white party” and the
Democratic Party the “black party,” and had
no private conversations about that alleged
strategy. And he testified that, although the
new districts the Legislature adopted were
not perfect or the only way to draw the
districts, they met the goals of the
Committee to maintain the number of
majority-black districts, to maintain the
approximate
percentages
of
the black population in those districts, to
avoid incumbent conflicts, and to draw
districts of approximately equal size.
b. Testimony
McClendon

of

Representative

Jim

Representative
McClendon
testified
consistently with Senator Dial about the
adoption by the Committee of the
guidelines. He explained that an overall
deviation of 2 percent just “ma[de] good
sense” to him because it makes the districts
more equal. He also testified that his
impression was that the Department of
Justice did not have a specific baseline for
retrogression, but that it looked at relative
numbers, so the Committee tried to match
the percentages of the total black population
in majority-black districts to the percentages

in the 2001 districts based on the 2010
Census numbers.
Representative McClendon testified that he
tried to accommodate requests from his
colleagues, Democratic and Republican, in
the plan for the House of Representatives.
Representative McClendon testified that he
offered to meet with all of the members of
the House of Representatives to discuss their
new districts, but that not every member of
the
House
accepted
that
offer.
Representative Thad McClammy (D)
arranged a meeting with McClendon and,
during that meeting, provided McClendon a
proposed
plan
for
the
majorityblack districts in Montgomery to which the
other legislators had agreed. McClendon
passed that map along to Hinaman, with the
instructions to incorporate that plan if
possible. And when Representative Harper
asked to gain 12 people from Greene County
and the neighboring representative agreed,
he incorporated that change into the plan.
Representative McClendon admitted that
redistricting is a political process, but denied
having any racially discriminatory motive in
his development of the redistricting plans.
McClendon acknowledged making several
statements that, under the new plans, the
number
of
Republicans
in
the Alabama House would likely increase
from 66 representatives to 68 to 70
representatives and that the number of
Republicans in the Senate would increase
from 22 senators to 23 to 25. McClendon
also admitted that, although he met with any
member of the House who wanted to meet
with him, only Republicans were given the
opportunity to meet with Hinaman to work
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on their districts. But he denied any intent to
eliminate white Democratic members from
the Legislature…
c. Testimony of Randolph L. Hinaman
Randolph L. Hinaman also testified on
behalf of the State defendants. Hinaman is a
political consultant who works primarily for
members of the Republican Party and who
has been involved in Alabama politics since
the mid–1980s, when he served as the
campaign manager and then the chief of
staff for Congressman Sonny Callahan (R–
AL–01). In 2011 and 2012, he worked on
the redistricting plans for the Alabama
congressional delegation, which included six
Republicans and one Democrat, and he drew
plans for that delegation with zero deviation
in population equality. Citizens for Fair
Representation, Inc., a 501(c)(4) nonprofit
organization located in Alabama, hired
Hinaman to redraw the districts for the
Alabama Legislature too. In accordance with
his contract, Hinaman met with the
Republican leadership to determine the
goals of the redistricting, and those leaders
instructed him to use an overall deviation in
population of 2 percent, to preserve the
majority-black districts
without
retrogression, to avoid incumbent conflicts if
at all possible, and to comply with the other
instructions included in the guidelines
approved
by
the
Reapportionment
Committee.
Hinaman explained that the effort to
preserve the majority-black districts and
bring them into compliance with the
requirement of one person, one vote drove
the development of the Acts. All of the
majority-black districts
were

underpopulated, many significantly, and he
needed to add population from contiguous
districts to increase the total population of
the districts without significantly lowering
the percentage of the population in each
district that was majority-black. He
explained that the underpopulation of the
majority-black districts in the Black Belt
caused Senate Districts 21 and 6 to move
north; Senate Districts 4, 5, and 1 to move
east; and Senate District 22 to move south.
He also explained that the underpopulation
in Senate District 33 in Mobile County
caused Senate District 34 to move and
Senate District 22 to gain population from
the overpopulated areas of Baldwin County.
And Hinaman explained that the majorityblack House districts in Jefferson County
were around 70,000 people short of the ideal
population and any attempt to repopulate all
nine of the majority-black districts with the
population in Jefferson County would cause
retrogression to the point that the plan might
not be precleared. For that reason, Hinaman
moved House District 53 to the Huntsville
area, where he was able to create another
majority-black House
district.
When
necessary to avoid retrogression, Hinaman
split precincts at the census block level.
Hinaman testified that “no one gets
everything they want in redistricting,” but he
tried to accommodate the wishes of
legislators where possible. He traveled
to Alabama to meet with Republican
legislators every couple of weeks during the
regular session of the Legislature. Where the
Republican
legislators
agreed
upon
boundaries and those particular boundaries
did not pose a problem for either the
requirement of one person, one vote or for
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the
preservation
of
the
majorityblack districts, he accommodated those
requests. Hinaman also accommodated the
suggestions from Democratic legislators that
he received from Senator Dial and
Representative
McClendon.
Hinaman
incorporated almost in its entirety a map of
the majority-black districts in Jefferson
County drawn by one of the representatives
for those districts. And Hinaman partially
incorporated a map of the majorityblack districts in Montgomery County
produced by one of the representatives for
those districts. Hinaman also spoke with
several Democratic members of the
Legislature during the final week before the
passage of the bill and accommodated
requests from those legislators when all of
the legislators affected by the requests
agreed.
Hinaman denied that he had any invidious
purpose to discriminate against blacks when
he drew the new districts. When asked on
cross-examination about particular changes
he could have made to the map, he
responded that “you can pull out any district
and draw it without taking regard to all the
things that are around it[,][b]ut unfortunately
the whole map has to fit together.” He
explained, for example, that a map that
draws an additional majority-black district
in Montgomery County, like the Democratic
Conference plaintiffs' illustrative map, does
not account for the need to bring District 69,
another
majority-black district,
into
Montgomery County. Hinaman also testified
that he tried to draw another majority-black
Senate district in Madison County, but that
he could not draw such a district within
deviation.

We credit the consistent testimony of
Senator Dial, Representative McClendon,
and Hinaman about the Committee's goals
and the creation of the new districts. And we
credit the consistent and unequivocal
testimony of Senator Dial, Representative
McClendon, and Hinaman that none of them
acted with a racially discriminatory purpose
or motive during the redistricting process.
d. Testimony of Thomas L. Brunell
The State defendants introduced the expert
testimony of Thomas L. Brunell to refute the
expert testimony offered by the plaintiffs.
Brunell testified that the adoption of the
overall deviation in population of 2 percent
is consistent with the decisions of other
states around the country after Larios and
benefits all citizens in Alabama. He
explained that, although the Acts created
many safe Republican seats, the overall
deviation of 2 percent prevented the
Legislature from creating a severe partisan
gerrymander. He testified that the statistics
from other states confirm that lower
population deviations are less closely
aligned with partisanship. And he explained
that a lower population deviation is
inherently more equal than a higher
population deviation and that equality was
the driving force behind the redistricting
revolution.
Brunell also testified that Arrington and
Lichtman drew improper inferences about
the voting behavior of the black population
in Alabama when those experts opined that
the districts were packed. Brunell explained
that Arrington relied on the voting behavior
in House District 85 to extrapolate about
behavior across the State, but that voting
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behavior is affected by a number of factors
that will vary across the State, including the
proportion of black and white voting-age
population, the degree of cohesiveness
among black and white voters, and the
typical proportion of turnout. He testified
that none of the experts in this matter has
offered any empirical evidence to
substantiate the opinion that a district with a
voting-age
population
that
is
51
percent black will provide black voters the
opportunity to elect the candidate of their
choice.

representation of a politically cohesive
district.

And Brunell testified, contrary to Cooper
and Arrington, that the bimodal distribution
of white and black populations in districts is
neither bad policy nor illegal. As he
explained, elected officials who represent
highly competitive districts will find it more
difficult to represent their districts because
the voters of those districts will be so closely
divided on controversial issues. If 50 percent
of the voters in a district support a higher
minimum wage and 50 percent want to
abolish
the
minimum
wage,
the
representative will have represented only
half of the voters in the district no matter
which policy option the representative
favors.

“A plaintiff claiming vote dilution under § 2
must initially establish that: (i) the racial
group
is
sufficiently
large
and
geographically compact to constitute a
majority in a single-member district; (ii) the
group is politically cohesive; and (iii) the
white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to
enable it ... usually to defeat the minority's
preferred candidate.” The Supreme Court
first
established
these
conditions
in Gingles, when it interpreted for the first
time the 1982 revisions to section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. “When applied to a
claim that single-member districts dilute
minority votes, the first Gingles condition
requires the possibility of creating more than
the existing number of reasonably compact
districts with a sufficiently large minority
population to elect candidates of its choice.”
When
no
showing
of
intentional
discrimination has been made, “a
sufficiently large minority population”
means greater than 50 percent of the votingage
population.
And
the
first
Gingles condition should not be read to
define dilution as a failure to maximize.

We credit Brunell's testimony that lower
population deviations constrain the partisan
desires of Legislatures, that the record
evidence is insufficient to support any
conclusion about the minimum level of
the black voting-age population necessary to
allow the black population to elect its
candidate of choice, and that representation
of competitive districts is more difficult than

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
We divide our discussion in two parts. First,
we consider the claims of vote dilution made
by
the Black Caucus and
Democratic
Conference plaintiffs. Second, we consider
the
claims
based
on
intentional
discrimination
made
by
the Black Caucus and
Democratic
Conference plaintiffs.
A. Vote Dilution
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The Supreme Court has never explicitly
recognized the ability of a minority voter to
state a claim for vote dilution in violation of
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act based on
evidence of a coalition of two different
minority groups, but the Eleventh Circuit
has held that “[t]wo minority groups (in this
case blacks and hispanics) may be a single
section 2 minority if they can establish that
they behave in a politically cohesive
manner.” Although other circuits have
disagreed with that decision, we are bound
by it. A plaintiff who proves that two
minority groups are politically cohesive may
satisfy the first Gingles factor if a
reasonably compact district could be formed
in which those two minority groups make up
a majority of the voting-age population.
After the plaintiff has established the
three Gingles elements, the plaintiff must
also establish that the totality of the
circumstances supports a finding that the
voting scheme is dilutive. Relevant factors
to this analysis include (1) the history of
voting-related discrimination in the State;
(2) the extent to which voting is racially
polarized in the State; (3) the extent to
which the State has used voting practices
that tend to enhance the opportunity of
discrimination against the minority group;
(4) if there is a candidate slating process, the
extent to which members of the minority
group have been denied access to that
process; (5) the extent to which members of
the minority “bear the effects of
discrimination in such areas as education,
employment and health, which hinder their
ability to participate effectively in the
political process”; (6) the extent to which
political campaigns have included overt or

subtle racial appeals; and (7) the extent to
which members of the minority have been
elected to public office. Proportionality of
majority-minority districts at the statewide
level is a relevant fact in the totality of the
circumstances. And, in some cases, a
“significant lack of responsiveness” by
elected officials to the needs of a minority
group or a tenuous policy underlying the
voting procedure adopted might also be
probative of vote dilution. But the
“defendant in a vote dilution case may
always attempt to rebut the plaintiff's claim
by introducing evidence of objective, nonracial factors under the totality of the
circumstances standard.”
1. The Black Caucus Plaintiffs Failed To
Prove the First Gingles Requirement for
All of Their Claims.
First, the Black Caucus plaintiffs argued that
the Acts dilute the voting strength of
blacks across the State, but they failed to
prove that the Legislature could have created
an additional reasonably compact district
with a black voting-age population of
greater than 50 percent anywhere in the
State.
The Black
Caucus plaintiffs
introduced HB16 and SB5 as evidence, but
those plans do not create any additional
majority-black districts. Instead, those plans
actually
create
fewer
opportunities
for black voters to elect the candidates of
their choice than does Act 602. Act 602
preserved
the
same
27
majorityblack districts from the 2001 plan and
increased the black percentage in District 85
to make it a majority-black district in total
population, though only a plurality district in
voting-age population. HB16 also increased
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the voting-age black population in District
85 to make it a majority-black district, but
did so at the cost of a formerly majorityblack district. Under that plan, District 84,
which was a majority-black district under
the 2001 plan, would have a voting-age
population that is only 24.73 percent black.
Because the Black Caucus plaintiffs have
failed to prove that the Legislature could
have created an additional majorityblack district and because the only plan they
offered actually creates fewer opportunities
for black voters in Alabama to elect their
candidates
of
choice,
the Black Caucus plaintiffs have failed to
satisfy their burden.
And even if the plans offered by
the Black Caucus plaintiffs contained an
additional majority-black district, we would
conclude that the Black Caucus plaintiffs
failed to satisfy the first Gingles requirement
because the plans do not comply with the
guideline of an overall deviation in
population of 2 percent. The Committee
adopted a guideline that required the
redistricting plans to comply with an overall
deviation of 2 percent, and the Committee
was entitled to adopt that guideline. Section
2 of the Voting Rights Act concerns political
processes that “are not equally open to
participation by [minority groups] ... in that
its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in
the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice.” Nothing in
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act would
require the State to adopt a higher
population deviation and a less equal system
for the election of its representatives to give
minorities a better opportunity than other

members of the electorate to participate in
the political process. Stated differently,
minority voters are not entitled to greater
voting power than non-minority voters.
The Black Caucus plaintiffs cannot satisfy
the first Gingles requirement with an
illustrative plan that fails to meet the
guideline of an overall deviation of 2
percent.
Second, the Black Caucus plaintiffs argued
that Act 603 diluted the voting strength
of black and Hispanic voters in Senate
District 7, but they again failed to prove that
the Legislature could have created a
majority-minority district in that area. Under
SB5, Senate District 7 would have a votingage population that is 40.10 percent black
and
5.46
percent
Hispanic.
The Black Caucus plaintiffs presented some
testimony that the Hispanic voters in Senate
District 7 are politically cohesive with black
voters, but we need not decide whether they
have met their burden on that point. Even if
the black and Hispanic voters in Senate
District 7 are politically cohesive, the
minority groups do not make up a simple
majority of the voting-age population in the
district
drawn
in
SB5. Because
the Black Caucus plaintiffs have not proved
that any coalition of black and Hispanic
voters in Madison County is sufficiently
large and geographically compact to make
up a simple majority of Senate District 7,
the Black Caucus plaintiffs cannot establish
the first Gingle requirement. And, in the
alternative,
we
conclude
that
the Black Caucus plaintiffs failed to meet
their
burden
to
establish
the
first Gingles requirement because their plan
for Senate District 7, like their plan for the
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State as a whole, follows an overall
deviation in population of 10 percent.
Third, the Black Caucus plaintiffs argue that
Act 602 dilutes the votes of black voters in
Jefferson County because the Act moved
one of the majority-black House districts out
of
Jefferson
County,
but
the Black Caucus plaintiffs
have
not
produced a plan that would draw an
additional
majority-black district
in
Jefferson County without eliminating a
majority-black district in another part of the
State and would comply with the allowable
overall deviation of 2 percent. HB16 draws
nine majority-black districts in Jefferson
County, but it follows an overall deviation
of 10 percent. For the reasons already
explained, the State was entitled to try to
comply with the requirement of one person,
one vote by setting an overall deviation in
population of 2 percent. And the
Black Caucus plaintiffs cannot prove vote
dilution with illustrative maps that do not
meet this requirement.
The Black Caucus plaintiffs also argue that
the new Acts dilute the voting strength
of black voters in Jefferson County because
of the change in the balance of the local
House delegation, but that claim is not
justiciable for the reasons stated in our
previous order, and even if it were, the claim
would fail on the merits. Any system of
local delegations for the next Legislature has
not been adopted and will not be adopted
until the organizational session conducted
by the newly elected members in January
2015. Because we cannot know if a system
of local delegations will be adopted by the
next Legislature or how it will be structured,

the claim is not ripe for review and
the Black Caucus plaintiffs lack standing to
raise it. But, even if we could consider the
claim, it would fail on the merits because
the Black Caucus plaintiffs failed to prove
that a plan could be drawn within the overall
deviation in population of 2 percent that
would contain the balance they seek.
2. The Democratic Conference Plaintiffs
Also Failed To Prove the First Gingles
Requirement for All of Their Claims.
First, the Democratic Conference plaintiffs
argued that Act 602 dilutes the voting
strength of black voters because it fails to
create a minority opportunity House district
in Jefferson County, but they failed to prove
that the Legislature could have created an
additional
majority-black district
in
Jefferson
County.
The
Democratic
Conference
plaintiffs
submitted
an
illustrative map that divides Jefferson
County into 15 House districts, nine of
which are majority-black districts. But the
illustrative map cannot satisfy the
first Gingles requirement because it does not
fit within a statewide plan as a whole. Act
602 includes several House districts that
cross into Jefferson County, and a new plan
for Jefferson County cannot be simply
inserted into the state plan. As Hinaman
repeatedly explained, one can always redraw
lines in a particular county, but the key is to
fit the illustrative map into a statewide plan.
The illustrative map also underpopulates
each majority-black district by almost 5
percent. As we explained, the State was
entitled to choose a lower population
deviation, and the plaintiffs cannot establish
a results claim under section 2 when
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the black population of Jefferson County is
not sufficiently large and compact to create
an additional majority-minority district
within that deviation.
The Democratic Conference plaintiffs also
argued that Act 602 dilutes the voting
strength of blacks because it fails to create
an additional majority-black House district
in Montgomery County, but the Democratic
Conference plaintiffs have again failed to
prove the first Gingles requirement. The
Democratic Conference plaintiffs introduced
an illustrative map that divides all of
Montgomery County into five House
districts. Four of those districts are majorityblack districts. And, unlike the Democratic
Conference plaintiffs' illustrative map for
Jefferson County, the illustrative map for
Montgomery County complies with the
overall deviation of 2 percent. But, again,
the illustrative map is not drawn in the
context of a statewide plan. Act 602 brought
an additional majority-black House district,
District 69, into Montgomery County. The
Democratic
Conference
plaintiffs'
illustrative map does not account for the
domino effect that its plan could have on
District 69 or the other neighboring
majority-black districts. In the absence of a
statewide plan drawn to comply with overall
deviation in population of 2 percent, we
cannot conclude that the Democratic
Conference plaintiffs have met the
first Gingles requirement.
The Democratic Conference plaintiffs also
argue that Act 603 dilutes the black voting
strength in Madison County, but the
Democratic Conference plaintiffs have again
failed
to
satisfy
the

first Gingles requirement. The Democratic
Conference
plaintiffs
introduced
an
illustrative map in which Senate District 7
would be underpopulated by 4.96 percent
and would have a voting-age population that
is 45.18 percent white, 46.45 percent black,
and 6.51 percent Hispanic. But this
illustrative map fails to satisfy the first
Gingles requirement for the same reasons
that the other illustrative maps failed: it does
not comply with the overall deviation in
population of 2 percent, and it is drawn in
isolation instead of as part of a statewide
plan. Additionally, the record is not clear
that the minority population would reach a
majority of the voting-age population in this
illustrative district, even if we concluded
that the black and Hispanic populations in
the area were politically cohesive. Both
Rubio and Toussaint testified that a
significant number of the Hispanics in the
Huntsville area are not eligible to vote
because they are not citizens.
3. The Plaintiffs' Claims of Dilution by
Packing Fail Too.
Both the Black Caucus plaintiffs and the
Democratic Conference plaintiffs also
contend that Acts 602 and 603 dilute the
strength of black voters by “packing” them
into majority-black districts, that is,
by “concentrati[ng] ... blacks into districts
where they constitute an excessive
majority,” but the record establishes
otherwise. As the previous sections explain,
neither set of plaintiffs offered any evidence
that the Legislature could have drawn
another majority-black district for either the
House or the Senate as part of a statewide
plan with an overall deviation in population
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of 2 percent. Even though the former
districts in both houses, after the 2010
Census, were systematically and, in many
cases,
severely
underpopulated,
the
Legislature chose to maintain 8 majorityblack districts in the Senate and to increase
the number of majority-black districts in the
House from 27 to 28 based on total
population. Act 602 increased slightly the
percentage of the black population in 14 of
the former majority-black House districts,
decreased slightly the population in the other
13 majority-black House districts, and
created 1 new majority-black House district
in total population. Act 603 increased
slightly
the
percentage
of
the black population in 5 of the 8 majorityblack Senate districts and decreased slightly
the percentage of the black population in the
other 3 majority-black Senate districts. The
percentages
of
the black voting-age
population in majority-black House districts
range from 47.22 percent to 74.28 percent,
and the percentages of the black votingage
population in majority-black Senate districts
range from 56.43 percent to 72.70 percent.
The percentages of black voters in 20 of the
28 majority-black House districts are below
65 percent, and the percentages of black
voters in 11 of those House districts are
below 60 percent. Only 3 of the 28 majorityblack House districts have a black votingage population in excess of 70 percent, and
two of those three districts are
underpopulated.
The
percentages
of black voters in 6 of the 8 Senate districts
are below 65 percent, and the percentages
of black voters in 4 of those Senate districts
are below 60 percent. Only 1 majorityblack Senate district has a black voting-age

population in excess of 70 percent, and that
district
is
underpopulated.
The
overwhelming majority of the majorityblack districts, under both Acts, remain
underpopulated, which is the opposite of
what we would expect in a plan that
packs black
voters
into
majorityblack districts. Of the 28 majorityblack House
districts,
21
remain
underpopulated, and 6 of the 8 majorityblack Senate
districts
remain
underpopulated. Even the 8 House districts
and 2 Senate districts that are overpopulated
are within 1 percent of the ideal population
for a district. And the majorityblack districts under the Acts are roughly
proportional
to
the black votingage
population. That is, black persons are 24.86
percent of the voting-age population
in Alabama, and under the Acts, 22.86
percent of the Senate districts and 26.67
percent of the House districts are majorityblack districts. Nothing about Acts 602 and
603 suggests that the Legislature
diluted black voting strength through
packing.
The plaintiffs complain that the Legislature
should have reduced substantially the
percentages of black voters in several of the
majority-black districts to increase the
influence of black voters in adjacent
majority-white districts, but there are, at
least, two problems with that argument.
First, the Supreme Court has held that
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not
require the creation of either influence
districts or crossover districts. These
decisions make clear that the central concern
of section 2 in redistricting is the creation of
compact, majority-black districts where
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necessary
to
allow black voters
an
opportunity to elect their preferred
candidates: “Nothing in § 2 grants special
protection to a minority group's right to form
political coalitions.” Second, the plaintiffs
utterly failed to prove how the Legislature
could have accomplished this task. The
plaintiffs again offered no evidence that the
Legislature could have drawn more
majority-black districts. Reed testified at
trial that a majority-black district ordinarily
needs to be about 60 percent black to
allow black voters to elect their candidate of
choice, and he stated that sometimes the
percentage may need to be closer to 65
percent. And black legislators told the
Committee at public hearings that majorityblack districts ordinarily needed to have
similar percentages of black voters. But the
plaintiffs failed to present any evidence of
how the Legislature could have drawn, in a
statewide plan, the same number of
majority-black districts with 60 or more
percent black voters in those districts with
an overall deviation in population of 2
percent while still increasing the number of
influence or crossover districts.
4. Even if the Plaintiffs Had Proved All
Three Gingles Requirements
or
the
Packing of Black Voters, the Totality of
the Circumstances Does Not Support a
Claim of Vote Dilution.
Even if the plaintiffs had proved all
the Gingles requirements or the packing
of black voters, they still would have been
required to prove that “the totality of the
facts, including those pointing to
proportionality, showed that the new scheme
would deny minority voters equal political

opportunity.” Relevant factors include the
history of voting-related discrimination in
the State; the racial polarization of voting in
the State; the extent to which the State has
used discriminatory voting practices to
enhance the opportunity for discrimination
against the minority group; the extent to
which minority group members bear the
effects of past discrimination in areas such
as education, employment, and health; the
extent to which political campaigns have
included overt or subtle racial appeals; the
extent to which members of the minority
have been elected to public office; the level
of responsiveness of elected officials to the
needs of a minority group; and the
proportionality
of
majority-minority
districts.
No one can deny the abhorrent history of
racial and voting-related discrimination in
Alabama. The egregious practices of the
past led to some of the landmark decisions
in this area of law. For nearly 50
years, Alabama was
subject
to
the
preclearance requirement under section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act.
But that history of discrimination alone
cannot establish that these particular Acts
would deny minority voters equal political
opportunity today. Earlier this year, the
Supreme Court declared the coverage
formula in section 4 of the Voting Rights
Act, which subjected Alabama to the
preclearance
requirement,
to
be
unconstitutional because Congress had not
made sufficient findings to support its
conclusion that the preclearance requirement
is still necessary in Alabama. As the
Supreme Court explained, “[v]oter turnout
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and registration rates now approach parity,”
“minority candidates hold office at
unprecedented levels,” and “[t]he tests and
devices that blocked access to the ballot
have been forbidden nationwide for over 40
years.”
We conclude that the totality of the
circumstances does not support the
conclusion
that
the
Acts
would
deny black voters an equal opportunity to
participate in the political process, and four
factors weigh heavily in favor of our
conclusion.
First, black voters
in
Alabama are highly politically active.
Second, black voters have successfully
elected the candidates of their choice in the
majority-black districts. Third, the majorityblack districts are roughly proportional to
the black voting-age population in Alabama.
Fourth, the record contains no evidence of
racial appeals in recent political campaigns
or of a significant lack of responsiveness to
the needs of the black population.
First, as the plaintiffs' own experts
testified, black voters
in Alabama are
politically active and registered to vote in
high numbers. Lichtman testified that
“[t]oday African American participation in
elections in Alabama is at least comparable
and likely above white participation.” And
Arrington agreed that “minority voters have
become more likely to register and better
mobilized,” which informed his opinion that
majority-black districts could be created
with smaller percentages of blacks. Reed
testified
that
the Alabama Democratic
Conference, which is an organization
dedicated to the improvement of political
opportunities for black voters, is active

across the State and endorses candidates in
almost every race. And Bernard Simelton
testified that the Alabama Chapter of the
National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People has also worked to build
coalitions around the State with Hispanics
and Native American groups like the
MOWA Band of Choctaw Indians to
increase
the
political
influence
of black voters.
Second, black voters have successfully
elected the candidates of their choice in the
majority-black districts. In the House of
Representatives, all 27 of the majority-black
House districts are represented by
Democrats, and 26 of those 27 districts are
represented by black Democrats. In the
Senate, all of the majority-black Senate
districts are represented by Democrats, and
seven of those eight districts are represented
by black Democrats. The Acts preserve and
indeed increase the number of these
majority-black districts.
Third, the majority-black districts are
roughly proportional to the black voting-age
population. Blacks constitute 24.86 percent
of the voting-age population in Alabama.
Under the Acts, 22.86 percent of the districts
in the Senate will be majority-black districts
and 26.67 percent of the districts in the
House will be majority-black districts.
Fourth, the record contains no evidence of
racial appeals in recent political campaigns
in Alabama or of a significant lack of
responsiveness to the needs of blacks. The
plaintiffs introduced some testimony about a
partisan campaign trick during the last
election in which a conservative radio host
announced that, because of staffing
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problems, Democrats should vote a day later
than Republicans, but the record establishes
that the Secretary of State immediately
countered that misinformation. There is no
evidence that any state official was involved
in the trick. And the evidence establishes
that the announcement was directed at
Democratic voters generally, not minority
voters. The plaintiffs also introduced
evidence that Jefferson County recently
closed Cooper Green, a hospital that served
the indigent population in the County, many
of whom are black, but the record
establishes that Cooper Green had recently
undergone extensive renovations before the
fiscal crisis in the County led to its closure.
And the plaintiffs introduced evidence that
the Legislature has not been sensitive to the
needs of the Hispanic population
in Alabama, but that evidence is not relevant
to the question whether the Legislature has
been responsive to the needs of black voters.
Because the overwhelming evidence in the
record suggests that black voters have an
equal opportunity to participate in the
political process the same as everyone else,
we conclude that the totality of the
circumstances would not support a claim of
vote dilution even if the plaintiffs could
establish the Gingles requirements.
B. Intentional Discrimination
The plaintiffs next argue that the State
defendants
engaged
in
intentional
discrimination on the basis of race when
they drafted and adopted the new districts in
violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
Fifteenth Amendment. The filings and
arguments made by the plaintiffs on these

claims
were
mystifying
at
best.
The Black Caucus plaintiffs routinely cited
decisions of the Supreme Court on claims of
racial gerrymandering, but never identified
which districts they alleged were racially
gerrymandered and introduced little
evidence to prove a discriminatory intent.
The Democratic Conference plaintiffs
referred to their claims as claims of racial
gerrymandering, but alternated between
discussions of specific districts and the Acts
as a whole and offered little guidance about
how we should evaluate the Acts under strict
scrutiny. We were presented with one set of
plaintiffs who argued about discriminatory
purpose and another set of plaintiffs who
argued about strict scrutiny, but no set of
plaintiffs who argued both.
We construe the filings as making three
different claims based on intentional
discrimination. First, we construe the filings
of the Black Caucus plaintiffs and the
Democratic Conference plaintiffs to argue
that the Acts were promulgated for an
invidious discriminatory purpose and have
the effect of diluting minority voting
strength. Second, we construe the filings of
the Black Caucus plaintiffs
and
the
Democratic Conference plaintiffs as arguing
that the Acts as a whole constitute racial
gerrymanders. Third, we construe the filings
of the Democratic Conference plaintiffs as
also arguing that Senate Districts 7, 11, 22,
and 26 constitute racial gerrymanders. The
Democratic Conference plaintiffs lack
standing to maintain the claims of racial
gerrymandering, and all the claims of
intentional discrimination, in any event, fail
on the merits.
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1. The Plaintiffs Failed To Prove that the
Acts Were Motivated by an Invidious
Discriminatory Purpose.
The plaintiffs argue that the Acts not only
result in the dilution of black voting strength
in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, but were motivated by an invidious
discriminatory purpose, in violation of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
Although the Supreme Court earlier
interpreted section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act to require proof of a discriminatory
purpose, Congress later amended the statute
to allow proof of only discriminatory results.
Congress created the results test by deleting
the phrase “to deny or abridge” and
replacing it with the following language: “in
a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of.” In its amendments,
Congress “dispositively reject[ed] the
position of the plurality in Mobile v. Bolden,
which required proof that the contested
electoral practice or mechanism was adopted
or maintained with the intent to discriminate
against minority voters.” But insofar as
section
2
still
forbids
purposeful
discrimination, it should be interpreted
consistently with the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, which require the
plaintiffs to prove both that the redistricting
plan was created with an invidious
discriminatory purpose and that it results in
the dilution of a minority's voting strength.
“Determining
whether
invidious
discriminatory purpose was a motivating
factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent
as may be available.” “Sometimes a clear
pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than

race, emerges from the effect of the state
action
even
when
the
governing legislation appears neutral on its
face.... But such cases are rare.” When no
such pattern emerges, we consider evidence
such as “[t]he impact of the official action,”
“[t]he historical background of the
decision,” “[t]he specific sequence of events
leading up to the challenged decision,”
“[d]epartures from the normal procedural
sequence,”
and
“[t]he legislative or
administrative history.”
Based on the application of the Arlington
Heights factors, we conclude that an
invidious discriminatory purpose was not a
motivating factor in the creation of the Acts.
First, the impact of the Acts weighs against
a finding of invidious discriminatory
purpose because the Acts draw as many
majority-black districts as possible within an
overall deviation in population of 2 percent
and leave many of the majorityblack districts underpopulated. Second, the
historical background of the decision weighs
against a finding of invidious discriminatory
purpose because the Legislature used
appropriate guidelines to fulfill its
constitutional duty to redistrict itself without
judicial intervention, contrary to the
discriminatory failures to redistrict that mar
the State's past. Third, the sequence of
events leading up to the enactment of the
Acts weighs against a finding of an
invidious discriminatory purpose because
Senator Dial and Representative McClendon
solicited and incorporated comments from
the public and from their colleagues in the
Legislature. The Acts adopted large portions
of maps provided to Senator Dial and
Representative
McClendon
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by black legislators. And the Committee
developed the Acts in compliance with
neutral districting principles including the
preservation of the core of existing districts,
the requirement of one person, one vote, and
respect for communities of interest. Fourth,
the Legislature did not depart from normal
procedures to pass the Acts, but followed
roughly the same procedures as had the
Legislature in 2001 when it enacted the last
districts. Indeed, the Legislature improved
upon those procedures: the Committee held
even more public hearings than had the
Committee in 2001; the Committee solicited
public comment before the plans were
drafted so as to enable the public to have
greater influence on the product; and the
Legislature passed the Acts in a special
session
that
complied
with
all
normal legislative procedures. Fifth, the
record contains no contemporaneous
statements made about the redistricting plan
that suggest an invidious discriminatory
purpose in the creation of the Acts;
statements by Republicans that they desired
to gain seats with the new districts speak to
partisan, not racial, motives.
The Democratic Conference plaintiffs argue
that the passage of the Acts in a special
session suggests discriminatory intent, but
we disagree. The Democratic Conference
plaintiffs identify several alleged procedural
defects including the failure of the
Legislature to redistrict itself in the first
regular session after the census as required
by the state constitution, the short notice for
the final public hearing on the proposed
districts, and the efforts of the Republicans
to draft the districts behind closed doors. But
these facts do not evidence discriminatory

intent. The Legislature has never redistricted
itself in the first regular session, and the
Legislature
followed
the
precedent
established in 2001 of drawing the districts
in a special session. Senator Dial explained
that the Committee conducted the first 21
public hearings before the initial plans were
completed to give the public a greater
opportunity to comment, in contrast with the
public hearings held in 2001 when the plans
were presented as a fait accompli. And the
final hearing was held on short notice
because of the short time left to pass the
Acts in the special session.
The Democratic Conference plaintiffs also
argue that the drawing of the district lines by
Hinaman behind closed doors suggests an
invidious racial purpose, but we disagree. As
the plaintiffs' own expert conceded, the
party in power ordinarily drafts redistricting
plans behind closed doors. If anything, the
record suggests that the Republicans were
more open to discussion with the
Democratic members of the Legislature than
would be expected, particularly in the light
of the Republican supermajority in each
house. Senator Dial and Representative
McClendon offered to meet with all of their
colleagues, and the record is clear that they
met with both Republicans and Democrats
and that they incorporated suggestions from
Democratic legislators into the plans. Even
Hinaman, who contracted to assist the
Republicans with the districts, worked on
some boundary changes with Democratic
representatives in the final week before the
passage of the Acts. No invidious racial
purpose has been proved about this process.
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The Black Caucus plaintiffs
and
the
Democratic Conference plaintiffs also
argued that the Acts were the product of a
grand Republican strategy to make the
Democratic Party the “black party” and the
Republican Party the “white party,” but the
record does not support that theory. Senator
Dial and Representative McClendon
credibly testified that they had never heard
of such a strategy, had no personal interest
in any such strategy, and did not even
discuss the reapportionment process with the
Republican National Committee. And the
documentary evidence establishes that the
Committee adopted the guidelines for
reapportionment before Hinaman arrived to
help the Republican leadership draft the new
lines and that the only paperwork that
Senator Dial and Representative McClendon
received from the national party involved
election returns and district statistics. The
record
contains
no
evidence
that
the Alabama Republican Party is engaged in
any grand strategy to eliminate white
Democrats.
2. We Reject the Plaintiffs' Claims of
Racial Gerrymandering.
A claim of racial gerrymandering is
“analytically distinct from a vote dilution
claim.” “Whereas a vote dilution claim
alleges that the State has enacted a particular
voting scheme as a purposeful device to
minimize or cancel out the voting potential
of racial or ethnic minorities, an action
disadvantaging voters of a particular race,
the essence of the equal protection claim
[for racial gerrymandering] is that the State
has used race as a basis for separating voters
into districts.” The Supreme Court first

recognized this equal protection claim
in Shaw, in which the Court explained that
the segregation of races of citizens into
different voting districts violates not only
the Fifteenth Amendment, as it had
previously determined in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, but also the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
a.
The Black Caucus Plaintiffs
Have
Standing To Maintain Claims of Racial
Gerrymandering Against the Acts as a
Whole, but the Democratic Conference
Plaintiffs Do Not.
We must decide whether the plaintiffs in
each action have standing to challenge the
Acts as racial gerrymanders, and “the
irreducible constitutional minimum of
standing contains three elements.” “First, the
plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in
fact’—an invasion of a legally protected
interest that is (a) concrete and
particularized, and (b) actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical. Second,
there must be a causal connection between
the injury and the conduct complained of.
Third, it must be likely, as opposed to
merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.”
The Supreme Court has explained that
“[d]emonstrating the individualized harm
our standing doctrine requires may not be
easy in the racial gerrymandering context, as
it will frequently be difficult to discern why
a particular citizen was put in one district or
another.” “Only those citizens able to allege
injury
as
a
direct
result
of
having personally been
denied
equal
treatment may bring a challenge [of racial
gerrymandering to a redistricting Act as a
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whole], and citizens who do so carry the
burden of proving their standing, as well as
their case on the merits.” A citizen who files
a claim of racial gerrymandering about a
particular district will meet the requirement
of personal injury when that plaintiff resides
in the district that he alleges was the product
of a racial gerrymander. But “where a
plaintiff does not live in such a district, he or
she does not suffer those special harms, and
any inference that the plaintiff has
personally been subjected to a racial
classification would not be justified absent
specific evidence tending to support that
inference.”
The Alabama Legislative Black Caucus has
organizational standing to maintain its claim
of racial gerrymandering because its
members reside in nearly every challenged
district. Ordinarily, “[a]n association has
standing to bring suit on behalf of its
members when its members would have
standing to sue in their own right, the
interests at stake are germane to the
organization's purpose, and neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires
individual members' participation in the
lawsuit.” The parties stipulated that
the Alabama Legislative Black Caucus
is
“composed of every African–American
member of the House and Senate.” The State
defendants submitted a list of each house
representative
that
includes
the
legislator's party and race. According to that
list, 26 black Democrats are currently
incumbents in House districts drawn under
the 2001 plan. All black incumbents remain
residents of their current House districts
under the new House plan because the
Legislature was mostly successful in

avoiding incumbent conflicts when drawing
the new districts. There was an incumbent
conflict in House District 60 until the recent
death of Representative Newton. All 26
incumbents are members of the Alabama
Legislative Black Caucus and, as individual
voters, would have standing to maintain a
claim of racial gerrymandering because they
are, by necessity, residents of the districts
they represent. There is not a corresponding
list of each senator that includes the
legislator's party and race, but Senator
Smitherman, Senator Ross, and Senator
Figures are black incumbents who testified
at trial about how the new senate plan
affected their senate districts. Because the
Legislature avoided all incumbent conflicts
in the new Senate districts, these senators
are residents of the new districts and would
have standing as voters to maintain a claim
of racial gerrymandering. Like the 26
representatives, all black senators are also
members of the Alabama Legislative Black
Caucus. The black legislators represent the
majority-black House and Senate districts
that are the subject of the racial
gerrymandering claim. A claim of racial
gerrymandering is germane to the purpose of
the Alabama Legislative Black Caucus, an
unincorporated political organization of
African
Americans
elected
to
the Alabama Legislature,
and
the
Alabama Legislative Black Caucus represent
s voters whose rights to equal protection of
law would be violated by redistricting plans
that constitute a racial gerrymander. And
their claim for injunctive relief does not
require the participation of individual
plaintiffs.
Because
we
hold
that
the Alabama Legislative Black Caucus has
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organizational standing, we need not decide
whether
the Alabama Association
of Black County Officials or any of its
members have standing.
The Democratic Conference plaintiffs, on
the other hand, have not met their burden to
establish standing to bring a claim of racial
gerrymandering to the Acts as a whole. The
record does not clearly identify the districts
in which the individual members of the
Alabama Democratic Conference reside
under
the
Acts…
And
the Alabama Democratic
Conference
similarly offered no specific evidence that
any of its members were subjected to a
racial classification.
b. We Dismiss the District–Specific Claims
of Racial Gerrymandering Filed by the
Democratic Conference Plaintiffs for Lack
of Standing.
We construe the filings of the Democratic
Conference plaintiffs also to present districtspecific racial gerrymandering challenges to
Senate Districts 7, 11, 22, and 26 under Act
603. But the Democratic Conference
plaintiffs have not proved that they have
standing to bring any of these claims.
The Alabama Democratic
Conference
presented insufficient evidence that it has
members who reside in these districts. And
the individual Democratic Conference
plaintiffs presented insufficient evidence
that they reside in these districts or were
otherwise personally subjected to a racial
classification during the districting process.
The Alabama Democratic Conference has
not proved that it has members who would
have standing to pursue any district-specific

claims of racial gerrymandering. At trial,
Reed testified on behalf of the Conference
that it has members in almost every county
in Alabama, but the counties in Alabama are
split into many districts. The Conference
offered no testimony or evidence that it has
members in all of the districts in Alabama or
in any of the specific districts that it
challenged in this matter. Because we
cannot conclude, based on the evidence in
the record, that the Alabama Democratic
Conference has members who would have
standing to bring the district-specific claims
of racial gerrymandering in their own right,
we must dismiss those claims for lack of
standing.
And the individual Democratic Conference
plaintiffs have failed to prove that they have
standing to bring any district-specific claims
of racial gerrymandering. None of the
individual plaintiffs testified that he or she
will reside in any of those districts under the
Acts. The parties agree that Toussaint is a
registered voter in Madison County, and the
record suggests that she voted in the former
Senate District 7. But the record contains no
evidence of her Senate district under the
new map. The parties agree that Weaver is a
registered voter in Washington County who
votes in the former Senate District 22, but
the record is silent about his assignment to a
district under the Acts. And the parties agree
that Pettway is a registered voter in
Montgomery County in the former House
District 73, but the record contains no
evidence about either the Senate district
where he currently votes or the Senate
district where he would vote under the new
Acts. None of the individual Democratic
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Conference plaintiffs reside in Senate
District 11.
c. Even if All the Plaintiffs Had Standing
To Assert Their Claims of Racial
Gerrymandering, Those Claims Would Fail
Because Race Was Not the Predominant
Motivating Factor in the Creation of the
Districts.
Even if all the plaintiffs could establish that
they have standing to bring their claims of
racial gerrymandering, the claims would
fail. Race was not the predominant
motivating factor for the Acts as a whole.
And race was not the predominant
motivating factor for drawing Senate
Districts 7, 11, 22, or 26.
“Electoral district lines are facially race
neutral, so a more searching inquiry is
necessary before strict scrutiny can be found
applicable in redistricting cases than in cases
of classification based explicitly on race.”
On its face, “[a] reapportionment statute
typically does not classify persons at all; it
classifies tracts of land, or addresses.” And
“[s]trict scrutiny does not apply merely
because redistricting is performed with
consciousness of race. Nor does it apply to
all cases of intentional creation of majorityminority districts.” But strict scrutiny will
apply when a state has subordinated
traditional, legitimate districting principles
to race, so that race was the predominant
factor motivating the decision of the
Legislature. And when strict scrutiny is
invoked, the State must establish that its
districting legislation is narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling interest.

“Federal-court
review
of
districting legislation represents a serious
intrusion on the most vital of local
functions.” “The courts, in assessing the
sufficiency of a challenge to a districting
plan, must be sensitive to the complex
interplay of forces that enter a legislature's
redistricting calculus.” Only when race is
the “predominant factor motivating the
legislature's redistricting decision” will strict
scrutiny apply. “The distinction between
being aware of racial considerations and
being motivated by them may be difficult to
make. This evidentiary difficulty, together
with the sensitive nature of redistricting and
the presumption of good faith that must be
accorded legislative enactments, requires
courts to exercise extraordinary caution in
adjudicating claims that a State has drawn
district lines on the basis of race.”
i. The Acts
When the Legislature undertook the task of
drawing the new House and Senate districts
after the 2010 Census, the main priority of
the Legislature was to comply with the
constitutional mandate of one person, one
vote. To accomplish this task, the
Reapportionment Committee selected a
guideline of an overall deviation in
population of plus or minus 1 percent, and
the Legislature applied this guideline of an
overall deviation of 2 percent to every
district before satisfying any other
redistricting principles. The guidelines
adopted by the Reapportionment Committee
and the consistent testimony of Senator Dial,
Representative McClendon, and Hinaman
establish that the Legislature also considered
race when required by federal law: the
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Legislature sought to comply with sections 2
and 5 of the Voting Rights Act by
preserving—and, in the House, increasing—
the majority-black districts and by not
substantially reducing the percentage
of black persons in those districts. But the
guidelines and the consistent testimony of
Senator Dial, Representative McClendon,
and Hinaman proved that the State followed
the guideline of an overall deviation of 2
percent, without exception, and then applied
the following neutral redistricting principles
when feasible: to preserve the core of
existing districts; to avoid incumbent
conflicts; to draw compact and contiguous
districts; and to appease incumbents by
accommodating their preferences whenever
possible. Finally, the Legislature considered
partisan data to preserve the Republican
supermajority in the Legislature. “The
record does not reflect a history
of purely race-based districting revisions.”
Although race was a factor in the creation of
the districts, we find that the Legislature did
not subordinate traditional, race-neutral
districting
principles
to
race-based
considerations. The Legislature did not
create majority-black districts for the first
time nor aim to increase or decrease the
percentage of the black populations within
the majority-black districts, most of which
remained in the same geographic areas. The
2010 Census revealed relatively modest
growth
of
the black population
in Alabama from 2000 to 2010. But the
concentrations of the black population had
declined in some areas and shifted in other
areas, leaving all majority-black districts
significantly underpopulated. And the
Legislature moved districts to correspond

with population growth and to comply with
the overall deviation in population of 2
percent. The Legislature moved House
District 53, a majority-black district, from
Jefferson County, where there were several
severely
underpopulated
majorityblack districts, to Madison County, where
the black population had increased and
where
a
new,
compact
majorityblack district could be drawn instead. The
Legislature moved House District 73, which
had never been a majority-black district,
from Montgomery County, another area
with
underpopulated
majorityblack districts, to Shelby County, an area
with severely overpopulated majority-white
districts. Above all, the Legislature followed
a lower overall deviation in population to
create more equality among districts
throughout the State.
As it corrected the malapportionment of the
districts, the Legislature avoided reducing
significantly the proportion of black persons
in each majority-black district, but it
followed no bright-line rule. The Legislature
reduced the percentage of black persons in
majority-black districts where necessary to
achieve other objectives. The Legislature
maintained the cores of existing districts,
made districts more compact where possible,
kept almost all of the incumbents within
their districts, and respected communities of
interest where possible. The new districts
are not so “bizarre on [their] face that [they
are] unexplainable on grounds other than
race,” nor were they approved after the
Department of Justice had rejected two
previous redistricting plans under a
“maxblack”
plan,
nor
is
there
“overwhelming evidence that the shape[s]
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[of the districts were] essentially dictated by
racial considerations of one form or
another.” We find that the Legislature was
not predominantly motivated by racial
considerations when it adopted the new
districts.
When the Legislature adopted a guideline
for less deviation in population equality, it
reduced, from the outset, its ability to pack
voters for any discriminatory purpose,
whether partisan or racial. After the 2000
Census, the Legislature adopted an overall
deviation of 10 percent and systematically
underpopulated majority-black districts at
the expense of majority-white districts that
the Legislature, in turn, overpopulated.
When the Legislature, after the 2010
Census, adopted a guideline that required a
smaller deviation in population equality, it
reduced the potential for this kind of
discrimination, whether in favor of or
against a racial minority. Had the
Legislature intended to pack black voters in
majority-black districts, after the 2010
Census, the Legislature could have adopted,
as before, a guideline that allowed more
population
inequality
and
then
overpopulated the majority-black districts.
But the Legislature did the opposite: it
adopted a guideline for greater population
equality and slightly underpopulated the vast
majority of the majority-black districts. And
the guideline for greater population equality
limited the ability of the drawer of the
district lines, Hinaman, to place more voters
of any kind into a particular district.
With a tighter guideline for population
equality, geography also limited the
potential for discrimination. Voters are not

fungible commodities that can be moved
anywhere in a state. Hinaman took
population concentrations, including racial
groups tied to particular geographical
locations, as fixed numbers for purposes of
drawing the new districts. Hinaman used
existing House and Senate districts to draw
the new district lines, and his choice of
which voters to add or subtract from each
district was limited by which populations
abutted the existing districts. Hinaman also
could not abandon the previous district lines
without invariably creating more incumbent
conflicts and disrupting communities of
interest.
Above all, the guideline for greater
population equality eliminated the partisan
gerrymander that existed in the former
districts. Indeed, this fact explains why both
the
Black Caucus plaintiffs
and
the
Democratic Conference plaintiffs have
challenged the use of an overall deviation in
population of 2 percent throughout this
litigation and have refused to offer into
evidence an alternative statewide plan for
redistricting that conforms to this guideline.
Although the plaintiffs have argued that this
guideline
contributed
to
a
racial
discriminatory purpose in the design of the
new districts, the plaintiffs have advanced
that losing argument precisely because they
have recognized all along that this guideline
eliminates the partisan advantage that the
plaintiffs created and enjoyed in the former
districting plan.
Hinaman balanced and satisfied five lawful
objectives with respect to the majority-black
districts. First, to comply with the guarantee
of one person, one vote and avoid litigation
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of the kind that occurred in Larios, Hinaman
repopulated the majority-black districts, all
of which were underpopulated, and brought
them within the guideline for population
equality. Second, to comply with sections 2
and 5 of the Voting Rights Act, Hinaman
maintained the same number of majorityblack districts. A decade earlier, the
plaintiffs who served as Democratic leaders
in the Legislature did the same thing when
they drew new district lines, and the
plaintiffs do not contend that Hinaman
should have done otherwise in 2012. Third,
to comply with section 5, Hinaman avoided
a significant reduction in the percentages
of black voters in the majority-black districts
that he preserved. Again, a decade earlier,
several of the plaintiffs did the same thing,
but now they contend that Hinaman was
wrong to do so. Fourth, to assist the passage
of the redistricting plan in the Legislature,
Hinaman avoided, as much as possible, the
placement of more than one incumbent
legislator in each district. And fifth, to
preserve communities of interest, Hinaman
preserved, as much as possible, the core of
each existing district. As he had done before
for both the federal judiciary and the
Legislature in earlier cycles of redistricting,
Hinaman ably balanced all these objectives
and avoided the pitfalls of racial
gerrymandering.
The trial testimony of Senator Dial,
Representative McClendon, and Hinaman,
taken on whole, establishes that the primary
reason they added population to majorityblack districts was because those districts
were severely underpopulated. What
population was added to a particular district
was then informed by other considerations,

including avoiding retrogression and
dilution of minority votes. The Committee
established the 2 percent guideline as the
nonnegotiable baseline for redistricting, and
Hinaman satisfied that guideline in every
district.
And
the
percentage
of black population in many majorityblack districts decreased, which supports the
inference that Hinaman subordinated racial
considerations to the guideline of an overall
deviation in population of 2 percent.
We agree with our dissenting colleague that
all districting principles were subordinated
to a single consideration, but our dissenting
colleague identifies the wrong one. Our
dissenting colleague asserts that race
predominated over every other districting
principle, but the consistent testimony of
Senator Dial, Representative McClendon,
and Hinaman established that the
constitutional requirement of one person,
one vote trumped every other districting
principle. Each district in both houses
satisfies the guideline of an overall deviation
in population of 2 percent. To comply with
that guideline, Hinaman had to repopulate
severely
underpopulated
majorityblack districts and depopulate severely
overpopulated majority-white districts.
While accomplishing this primary task,
Hinaman also tried to satisfy sections 2 and
5 of the Voting Rights Act. Our dissenting
colleague discounts Hinaman's paramount
commitment to population equality and
instead faults a few majority-black districts
and several precinct splits as examples that
the drafters employed a “rigid quota.”
Hinaman split many precincts to comply
with the guideline of an overall deviation in
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population of 2 percent. When asked why he
would split a voting precinct, Hinaman
replied, “I guess the categories for splitting a
voting precinct would be for the creation of
ablack [m]ajority
district,
for
not
retrogressing a black [m]ajority district, for
deviation obviously because you had to get
to plus or minus 1 percent. Those would be
the normal reasons.” This testimony
explains why precinct splitting occurred
often in counties with only majority-white
districts, and it suggests that at least some of
the precinct splits in majority-black districts
also were attributable to the 2 percent
guideline.
Hinaman honored requests from incumbents
too, even when it meant splitting precincts…
Taken as a whole, Hinaman's testimony
confirms that race was not the predominant
motivating factor in precinct splitting. And,
even where it occurred, precinct splitting
was less of an evil to be avoided in
redistricting than the subordination of other
redistricting criteria, such as compliance
with the Constitution and the Voting Rights
Act.
The Black Caucus plaintiffs argue that the
percentages of black populations in the
majority-black districts evidence that race
was the predominant factor when the
Legislature drew the new House and Senate
plans, even though these percentages closely
resemble
the
percentages
that
the Black Caucus endorsed and helped to
enact into law only a decennial census
ago. Our dissenting colleague joins their
lament and expresses frustration with the
“high percentages” of the black population
in the majority-black districts although he

acknowledges that “conditions 30 years ago
or 20 years ago or even a decade ago (in or
around 2001) may have justified” them.
These arguments beg a question: what has
changed in the last few years to support the
conclusion, from the perspective of
the Black Caucus plaintiffs, that the new
majority-black districts are unconstitutional
when the old majority-black districts were
constitutional? The answer is simple: the
Republicans now control the Legislature
instead of the Democrats.
We refuse to apply a double standard that
requires the Legislature to follow one set of
rules for redistricting when Democrats
control the Legislature and another set of
rules when Republicans control it. After the
2000 Census, nothing changed that would
have relaxed the constitutional and statutory
standards that governed redistricting. On the
contrary, in 2006, Congress amended
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to make
the standard for retrogression “more
stringent.” And in Larios, a three-judge
district court in this Circuit expressed
concern that an overall deviation in
population of 10 percent was no longer a
“safe harbor” for purposes of the one person,
one vote command of the Equal Protection
Clause, particularly in the light of
developing technology that makes it
possible to achieve substantially greater
population equality. At trial, the plaintiffs
offered no credible evidence that the
percentages of the black population in the
majority-black districts adopted only ten
years earlier were no longer warranted.
Although Arrington opined that a 51
percent black majority is now sufficient to
allow black voters to elect their preferred
172

candidates of choice, he offered no election
data for any of the majority-black districts
in Alabama to support that conclusion.
Arrington admitted that he testified in
another action in 2000 regarding a fourdistrict plan for Dallas County, Alabama,
that a district in which black persons made
up a voting-age population of 61 percent
would be considered “a swing district” that
would
offer
only
an
opportunity
for black voters to elect the candidate of
their
choice,
not
a
guarantee
that black voters would be able to elect the
candidate of their choice. And Arrington
acknowledged that “I haven't drawn any
plans for Alabama, so I don't know some of
the nitty-gritty of some of the districts.”
Reed testified, on the other hand, that a
majority-black district in Alabama ordinarily
needs to be about 60 percent black in total
population to allow black voters to elect
their candidate of choice and, in some cases,
might need to be closer to 65 percent. Reed
has, of course, been the chairman of
the Alabama Democratic Conference since
1970 and has designed several redistricting
plans in Alabama. As he testified at trial,
“I've
been
involved
in
reapportionment legislation and
litigation
[in Alabama] for many years.... I've been
actively involved in drawing district lines
and participating in the reapportionment
process, as well as drafting plans for
reapportionment, the Legislature, state board
of education, and many, many local
jurisdictions.” We credit Reed's testimony
based on his wealth of experience in
redistricting and elections in Alabama.
ii. Senate District 7

The Democratic Conference plaintiffs argue
that the Legislature subordinated traditional
redistricting principles when it drew Senate
District 7. Under the 2001 plan, Senate
District 7 is located entirely within Madison
County and runs from the Alabama–
Tennessee border down the center of the
County through Huntsville. The district
divides into two feet-like segments at the
bottom. According to the 2010 Census, the
2001 Senate District 7 had a total population
that was 60.28 percent white and 32.14
percent black. The left foot of the district
reached into a small portion of southwest
Huntsville known as “Little Mexico”
because its population is largely Hispanic.
The
majority-white
district
was
overpopulated by 9.04 percent and
surrounded by other majority-white districts
that were also overpopulated. District 2, its
western neighbor, was overpopulated by
31.12 percent. Senator Dial refereed
extensive
negotiations
between
the
Republican incumbent in District 7 and the
Republican
incumbents
from
the
neighboring districts. Under the final plan,
Act 603 brings District 7 within the target
deviation by eliminating the left foot of the
district and moving 10,151 blacks from the
western edge of the district into District 1, a
majority-white district represented by a
Democrat. Although District 1 had not
previously shared a border with District 7,
the Act brought the majority-white district
across the northern border of the State into
Madison County to gain this population.
Under the new plan, District 7 has a total
population that is 65.56 percent white and
27.34 percent black. It is more compact than
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its predecessor and is still located entirely
within Madison County.
We find that the Legislature did not
subordinate
traditional
redistricting
principles to race when it created District 7.
The Legislature maintained most of District
7 in accordance with the traditional respect
for existing districts. The Legislature
reduced the population in Senate District 7
to bring it within the allowable range of
population deviation in an effort to comply
with the requirement of one person, one
vote. After extensive negotiations among the
Republican incumbents, the Legislature took
the excess population from the western edge
and put the population, which is
largely black and votes heavily Democratic,
in the district of a Democratic incumbent.
The new district is more compact, falls
within the target population deviation, and
maintains a substantial minority population.
We find that the new district lines comply
with traditional redistricting principles and
that the movement of the black population
from the western edge of the district was
made largely for partisan, not racial,
purposes.
iii. Senate District 11
The Democratic Conference plaintiffs next
argue that the Legislature subordinated
neutral districting principles to race when it
drew Senate District 11. District 11 changed
substantially in Act 603. Under the old plan,
District 11 had a crescent shape that
included all of Talladega County, Coosa
County, and a small portion of Elmore
County. In 2010, District 11 was
underpopulated by 8.39 percent and had a
total population that was 62.59 percent

white and 33.95 percent black. Under Act
603, District 11 has moved north and now
follows the shape of a backwards C that
begins in the southern part of St. Clair
County, swoops through Talladega County,
and ends in the southwestern portion of
Shelby County. The new plan moves the
central portion of Talladega County, which
has a substantial black population, into
District 15 with a portion of Shelby County,
which is heavily white. The total population
of District 11 is 81.66 percent white and
14.96 percent black.
The Democratic Conference plaintiffs have
not proved that the Legislature subordinated
neutral districting principles to race when it
created District 11. Despite substantial shifts
of other districts, Hinaman preserved the
core of the district in Talladega County,
where the incumbent lived. Hinaman also
largely followed county lines on the western
borders. The district is also contiguous and
complies with the overall deviation in
population of 2 percent. Although the
Democratic Conference plaintiffs introduced
evidence that the maps could have been
drawn to make District 11 more compact by
swapping the population from Shelby
County in District 11 with the population
from Talladega County in District 15, that
fact does not establish that race was the
predominant factor. Partisanship could have
similarly explained the decision to place the
central portion of Talladega in District 15.
As Reed testified, a redistricting plan can be
drawn many ways, and we find that the
evidence does not support a finding that race
predominated over other factors in the
creation of this district. Even if the
Democratic Conference plaintiffs could
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prove that they have standing to bring their
claim of racial gerrymandering about Senate
District 11, the claim would fail because we
find that the Legislature did not subordinate
neutral districting principles when it drew
that district.
iv. Senate District 22
The Democratic Conference plaintiffs next
argue that the Legislature subordinated
neutral districting principles to race when it
drew Senate District 22. District 22 is a
sprawling
district
located
in
southwest Alabama. In 2010, District 22 had
a total population that was 65.96 percent
white, 28.30 percent black, and 3.44 percent
Native American. It is sandwiched between
the Black Belt to its north and the Mobile
County area to its south. Although its
population was within 1 percent of the ideal
population in 2010, it bordered several
severely malapportioned districts. The
majority-black districts to its north were
underpopulated by 42,357 people. The three
districts located within Mobile County to its
south were underpopulated by 15,656
people. And the district located in Baldwin
County to its south was overpopulated by
19,055 people. Although the drafters
considered whether they could bring one of
the districts in Mobile County across Mobile
Bay to capture some of the overpopulation
from Baldwin County, the Republican
incumbent in Baldwin County objected to
that proposal. Because of that objection, Act
603 extended District 22 into Baldwin
County and reduced its population in Mobile
County, thereby dividing the MOWA Band
of Choctaw Indians among three districts.
Act 603 also repopulates the majority-

black districts from contiguous portions of
the former District 22. Despite these
population shifts, District 22 maintains a
similar shape under the Act and crosses into
all of the same counties that it had crossed
into in 2001. The total population of the
district is 73.17 percent white, 21.52
percent black, and 2.68 percent Native
American.
We find that the Legislature did not
subordinate traditional neutral districting
principles to race when it drew District 22.
The need to bring the neighboring districts
into compliance with the requirement of one
person, one vote served as the primary
motivating factor for the changes to District
22. The protection of the interests of
incumbents also served as a motivating
factor to the changes to District 22 because
the drafters decided to bring District 22 into
the overpopulated areas of Baldwin County
in part because the incumbent rejected any
proposal in which a district from Mobile
County would cross Mobile Bay into
Baldwin County. Finally, the preservation of
existing districts served as a motivating
factor in the shape of District 22 and the
locations at which it crossed county
boundaries. Although the Legislature moved
the northern boundaries of District 22 to
repopulate
the
majority-black districts
without retrogression, that decision was
motivated as much by the effort to comply
with the requirement of one person, one vote
as by the effort to avoid retrogression.
Finally, there is a practical, geographical
feature that materially restricts redistricting
options in Mobile County: it is cabined in by
Mississippi, the Gulf of Mexico, and Mobile
Bay. And, on this record, we cannot find
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that the effort to avoid retrogression or to
preserve the majority-black district “had a
qualitatively greater influence on the
drawing of the district lines” than the other
traditional criteria.
v. Senate District 26
The Democratic Conference plaintiffs did
not plead in their complaint a claim of racial
gerrymandering about District 26, but we
heard substantial testimony about Senate
District 26 at trial. District 26 is a majorityblack district in Montgomery County
currently represented by Senator Quinton
Ross (D). Under the old plans, Senate
District 26 included most of Montgomery
County, following the county lines, except
for a boot shaped segment of Montgomery
included within District 25. In 2010, District
26 was underpopulated by 11.64 percent and
had a total population that was 22.03 percent
white and 72.75 percent black. To
repopulate District 26, Hinaman added
populous precincts in the City of
Montgomery,
which
shared
many
characteristics with the other areas of
District 26 and included both black and
white persons. Hinaman removed most of
the rural portion of Montgomery County
from District 26 to create a land bridge
between the former area of District 25 and
Crenshaw County. As Hinaman explained,
District 25 needed to gain population when
Act 603 moved District 30 entirely north of
Montgomery. Under the new plans, District
26 is still slightly underpopulated and has a
total population that is 19.51 percent white
and 75.22 percent black.
The Democratic Conference plaintiffs have
failed to prove that the Legislature

subordinated neutral districting principles to
race when it created District 26. Race was a
factor in the drawing of District 26. The
Legislature preserved the District as
majority-black and the percentage of the
population that was black. But the
Legislature also preserved the core of the
existing District. District 26 follows the
county lines at its northwestern border and
follows the existing district lines along its
northeastern border. It maintains a similar
shape around the City of Montgomery, and
it includes two protrusions into Montgomery
County that largely follow highway lines.
The inclusion of additional precincts in the
City
of
Montgomery
north
of Alabama Route 80 is a reasonable
response to the underpopulation of the
District. On this record, we cannot find that
the Legislature subordinated traditional
districting principles to race.
Because the Democratic Conference
plaintiffs failed to prove that the State
subordinated traditional districting criteria
when they drew Senate Districts 7, 11, 22,
and 26, we need not consider whether the
Districts would satisfy strict scrutiny. The
claims of racial gerrymandering fail.
3. Even if the Plaintiffs Had Proved that
the Acts Were Primarily Motivated by a
Discriminatory Purpose, the Acts Would
Satisfy Strict Scrutiny.
Even if the State defendants had
subordinated
traditional
districting
principles to racial considerations when they
drew the challenged Districts, the Districts
would satisfy strict scrutiny. Although the
Supreme Court has never decided whether
compliance with the Voting Rights Act is a
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compelling state interest, we conclude that
compliance with the Act is a compelling
state interest. And we conclude that a plan
will be narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest when the race-based action taken
was reasonably necessary under a
constitutional reading and application of the
Act.
The Alabama Legislature maintained the
number of majority-black districts and
avoided significantly decreasing the
percentages of black voters in those districts
to comply with section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act. All parties agree, and our
dissenting colleague admits, that “Senator
Dial and Representative McClendon
believed that their obligation under the
Voting Rights Act included preserving the
existing number of black majority districts.”
We find that Senator Dial and
Representative McClendon also believed
that they needed to maintain approximately
the same percentages of black voters in
those majority-black districts to avoid
retrogression of black voting strength in
violation of section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act. And we find that Senator Dial and
Representative McClendon believed that any
significant reduction of the black population
in the majority-black districts would also
likely cause a problem with preclearance of
the plans by the Department of Justice.
The Black Caucus plaintiffs argue that,
in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, the
Supreme Court nullified the interest of the
State defendants in complying with section 5
of the Voting Rights Act, but we disagree.
In Shelby County, the Supreme Court
declared the coverage formula in section 4

of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional
because it was “based on decades-old data
and
eradicated
practices.”
Shelby
County expressed no opinion about the
constitutionality of section 5 and, even if it
had, that decision would not change our
analysis. All parties agree that the State
of Alabama was
governed
by
the
preclearance requirement of section 5 when
the Committee drafted and the Legislature
approved the new districts. We evaluate the
plans in the light of the legal standard that
governed the Legislature when it acted, not
based on a later decision of the Supreme
Court that exempted Alabama from future
coverage under section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act.
But we cannot uphold the districts unless the
Acts are narrowly tailored to comply with
section 5. “Although [the Supreme Court]
ha[s] not always provided precise guidance
on how closely the means (the racial
classification) must serve the end (the
justification or compelling interest), [the
Supreme Court] ha[s] always expected that
the legislative action would substantially
address, if not achieve, the avowed
purpose.” “[T]he purpose of § 5 has always
been to insure that no voting-procedure
changes would be made that would lead to a
retrogression in the position of racial
minorities with respect to their effective
exercise of the electoral franchise.” “By
enacting section 5, Congress aimed to
guarantee that minorities' new gains in
political participation would not be undone.”
When the Legislature confronted the task of
redistricting after the 2010 Census, Congress
had recently made the standard for
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preclearance under section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act “more stringent.” In 2006,
Congress extended the operation of section 5
and amended its text “to prohibit more
conduct than before.” Congress stated in its
findings that “[t]he effectiveness of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 has been
significantly weakened by the United States
Supreme Court decisions in [Reno v. Bossier
Parish School Board and Georgia v.
Ashcroft]
which
have
misconstrued
Congress' original intent in enacting the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 and narrowed the
protections afforded by section 5 of such
Act.”
In Reno v. Bossier Parish, the Supreme
Court ruled that section 5 “does not prohibit
preclearance of a redistricting plan enacted
with a discriminatory but nonretrogressive
purpose,” but Congress overturned that
decision and amended section 5 to prohibit
any change in voting practice or procedure
with a racially discriminatory purpose.
In Bossier Parish, the plaintiffs argued that
the Bossier Parish School Board had a
racially discriminatory purpose when it
refused
to
create
any
majorityblack districts,
even
though
the black population of that jurisdiction was
approximately 20 percent of the total
population. The Supreme Court ruled that it
was irrelevant whether the Board acted with
a racially discriminatory purpose so long as
its redistricting plan was not enacted with a
retrogressive purpose. The Court explained
that “§ 5 prevents nothing but backsliding,
and preclearance under § 5 affirms nothing
but backsliding.” Congress rejected this
interpretation by adding the following

language to section 5: “[t]he term ‘purpose’
... shall include any discriminatory purpose.”
In Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court
ruled that section 5 allows states to consider
“the totality of the circumstances,” including
“the extent of the minority group's
opportunity to participate in the political
process [and] the feasibility of creating a
nonretrogressive plan,” drawing district
lines, but Congress overturned that holding
and limited consideration to the minority
voters' ability to elect their preferred
candidate. In Georgia, the Court stated that
“a court should not focus solely on the
comparative ability of a minority group to
elect a candidate of choice ... [because this
factor]
cannot
be
dispositive
or
exclusive.” The Court also explained that
section 5 “gives States flexibility to choose,”
between two options: a covered jurisdiction
may either create “safe” majorityblack districts “in which it is highly likely
that minority voters will be able to elect the
candidate of their choice,” or spread out
minority voters over a greater number of
districts where the voters “may have the
opportunity to elect a candidate of their
choice.” The Court stated that the “other
highly relevant factor in a retrogression
inquiry is the extent to which a new plan
changes the minority group's opportunity to
participate in the political process,”
including whether the new plan creates “
‘influence districts'—where minority voters
may not be able to elect a candidate of
choice but can play a substantial, if not
decisive, role in the electoral process.” The
Court reversed a denial of judicial
preclearance because the district court had
“focused too heavily on the ability of the
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minority group to elect a candidate of its
choice
in
the
majority-minority
districts.” The Court then remanded for the
district court to consider whether a
districting plan that reduced the percentages
of black voters
in
several
majorityblack districts and increased the number of
influence
districts
was
retrogressive. Congress
rejected
the
interpretation in Georgia and “sought to
make clear that it was not enough that a
redistricting plan gave minority voters
‘influence’; a plan cannot diminish their
ability to elect candidates.” “In making its
Amendments, Congress sought to restore the
‘ability to elect’ standard promulgated by
the Supreme Court in Beer [v. United
States].”
To
overturn Bossier
Parish and Georgia, Congress
added
subsections (b) through (d) to section 5 to
prohibit “[a]ny” voting change that “has the
purpose of or will have the effect of
diminishing the ability of any” voter “on
account of race or color ... to elect their
preferred candidates of choice” and stated
that the purpose of that new language was
“to protect the ability of such [voters] to
elect their preferred candidates of choice.”
“The 2006 Amendments clarified that
Congress intended a Section 5 inquiry to
focus on whether a proposed voting change
will diminish the ‘ability of minority
citizens to elect preferred candidates of
choice.’ ” The relevant question now is
“whether the candidate minorities voted for
in the general election under the benchmark
plan is equally likely to win under the new
plan. If not, then minorities' ability to elect
their preferred candidate is diminished.”

To comply with this “more stringent”
version
of
section
5,
the Alabama Legislature correctly concluded
that it could not reduce the number of
majority-black districts and that it could not
significantly reduce the percentages of black
voters in the majority-black districts because
to do so would be to diminish black voters'
ability to elect their preferred candidates.
Congress eliminated the option that a state
could choose, under Georgia, to create
“opportunity” or “influence” districts instead
of “safe” districts that guarantee the ability
of minorities to elect their preferred
candidates. The 2006 amendments created
one consideration for a state: whether
minority voters are less able to elect their
preferred candidate under the new plan, not
whether they have the opportunity to
elect their preferred candidate. Congress
limited the redistricting options of states so
that any diminishment in a minority's ability
to elect its preferred candidates violates
section 5. Contrary to the plaintiffs'
arguments, the Legislature could not
spread black voters out to other districts and
substantially reduce the percentages
of black voters
within
the
majorityblack districts because that change, by
definition, would diminish black voters'
ability to elect their preferred candidates. To
comply
with
section
5,
the Alabama Legislature chose the only
option available: to protect the voting
strength of black voters by safeguarding the
majority-black districts and not substantially
reducing the percentages of black voters
within those districts. The purpose of section
5 has always been to insure that minorities
did not lose the political gains they have
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acquired, and “plans that preserve or
actually increase minority voting strength
[are not retrogressive].”
The
Legislature
sought
to
avoid
diminishing black voters' ability to elect
their preferred candidates. The Legislature
preserved, where feasible, the existing
majority-black districts and maintained the
relative percentages of black voters in those
majority-black districts. The Acts maintain 8
majority-black districts in the Senate and
increase the number of majorityblack districts in the House from 27 to 28
based on total population. The population
levels in the existing majority-black districts
had
proven
sufficient
to
provide
the black voters in those districts the
opportunity to elect the candidates of their
choice. All of the current 27 majorityblack House districts are represented by
Democrats, and 26 of those 27 districts are
represented by black Democrats. All of the
majority-black Senate
districts
are
represented by Democrats, and 7 of those 8
districts are represented by black Democrats.
Using the 2010 Census data, the percentages
of the black voting-age populations in the
majority-black districts under the Acts
remain relatively constant when compared
to the 2001 plans. The percentages of
the black voting-age populations in 21 of the
28 majority-black House districts vary less
than plus or minus 5 percent. And 16 of the
28 majority-black House districts vary less
than plus or minus 2 percent. The largest
deviation occurs in House District 59 where
the black voting-age population increased
from 64.25 percent to 74.28 percent. But the
Legislature fairly balanced the overall
percentages
of
the black voting-age

populations in the majority-black House
districts, with 13 districts decreasing and 15
districts increasing. The deviations in
percentages
of
the black voting-age
populations in the majority-black Senate
districts are perfectly divided: 4 decreased
and 4 increased. And 4 of the 8 majorityblack Senate districts vary less than plus or
minus 2 percent. The largest deviation
occurs in Senate District 20 where the black
voting-age population decreased from 74.44
percent to 59.03 percent.
We conclude that the Acts are narrowly
tailored to comply with section 5 as
amended in 2006. The Legislature correctly
concluded that the more stringent version of
section 5 that Congress enacted in 2006
required the Legislature to maintain, where
feasible, the existing number of majorityblack districts and not substantially reduce
the relative percentages of black voters in
those districts. And our conclusion is
consistent with the decision of the
Department of Justice to preclear the Acts.
III. CONCLUSION
Redistricting has been called a “political
thicket,” where judicial decrees can “cut
deeply into the fabric of our federalism,” but
our review of a redistricting plan, once
adopted, is limited. We do not consider
whether a redistricting plan is “bad,” as
Reed described the redistricting Acts
adopted by the Legislature last year. Nor do
we consider whether a plan is good or one
that we would have drawn. We consider
only whether a plan violates the Voting
Rights Act and the Constitution. These plans
violate neither. We DISMISS the claims of
racial gerrymandering filed by the
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Democratic Conference plaintiffs for lack of
standing;
in
the
alternative,
we GRANT judgment in favor of the State
Defendants on the claims of racial
gerrymandering filed by the Democratic
Conference plaintiffs. We DISMISS as not
justiciable the claim of vote dilution based
on the local House delegation in Jefferson
County;
in
the
alternative,
we GRANT judgment in favor of the State
Defendants on the claim of vote dilution
based on the local House delegation in
Jefferson County. We GRANT judgment in
favor of the State defendants on all
remaining claims. A separate final judgment
will follow.
THOMPSON, District Judge, dissenting.
In
these
two
cases,
the Alabama Legislative Black Caucus,
various elected black officials, and others
challenge the redistricting plans for
the Alabama House
and
Senate.
Specifically, they challenge each majorityblack House and Senate District in addition
to Senate Districts 7, 11 and 22. Despite the
multiplicity of claims and responses in this
litigation, in my view the two cases are
actually quite simple. As explained below,
the drafters of these plans labored under the
false belief that § 5 of the Voting Rights Act
(“VRA”) required them to adopt for each
majority-black district
a
particular
percentage of black population, ranging as
high as 78.1% black. Therefore, the drafters
sifted residents by race across the State
of Alabama in order to achieve for each such
district, where possible, what I believe can
only be characterized as naked “racial
quotas.”

I must reject Alabama's redistricting plans
for essentially five reasons. First, Alabama's
use of such a quota for any district warrants
strict scrutiny. Second, the State's argument
that its solution was required by § 5 is not
supported by the correct interpretation of
that statute. Third, in any event,
because Alabama is no longer subject to
preclearance under § 5, that statute cannot
serve as the basis for the quotas. Fourth, the
quota for each district in which it was used
is not grounded in current political, social,
and racial conditions in that district that
would warrant its use. Fifth, the State's
redistricting plans “threaten[ ] to carry us
further from the goal of a political system in
which race no longer matters—a goal that
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
embody, and to which the Nation continues
to aspire.” “As a Nation we share both the
obligation and the aspiration of working
toward this end.” I respectfully dissent.
I. BACKGROUND
I agree with the majority that the complaints
in this matter are best construed as bringing
three sets of claims: claims of vote dilution
in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act;
claims that the plans were drafted with
invidious racial discrimination in violation
of
the
Fourteenth
and
Fifteenth
Amendments; and claims that the plans
constitute a racial gerrymander in violation
of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. As to the last, I
would read both complaints as alleging that
the plans in their entirety constitute racial
gerrymanders and, as stated, also
specifically challenging each majorityblack House and Senate District in addition
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to Senate Districts 7, 11 and 22. Because I
believe the plaintiffs are entitled to relief on
their racial-gerrymandering claims and
because that relief would require the drafting
of new plans, I do not reach the other
claims.
The majority opinion thoroughly recites the
testimony and evidence presented in these
consolidated cases. I will therefore
summarize only the facts relevant to the
racial-gerrymandering claims on which I
would strike down these plans.
The Reapportionment Committee adopted
guidelines to govern the reapportionment
process, setting forth a number of factors to
consider in drafting the new maps. One key
factor was compliance with § 5 of the VRA.
Other factors included a newly adopted rule
limiting the total population deviation
among districts to 2%, preserving of the core
of existing districts, avoiding conflicts
between incumbents, ensuring compactness,
and accommodating incumbent preferences.
Under § 5, a covered jurisdiction must seek
preclearance of new redistricting plans from
either the Attorney General of the United
States or the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia. Alabama was a
covered jurisdiction until the Supreme
Court's decision in Shelby County v.
Holder, decided after this case was filed but
before trial.
Each of the drafters shared the same very
specific (but incorrect) understanding of
what compliance with § 5 involved: they
believed they would need (1) to maintain the
same number of majority-black districts as
had existed under the 2001 redistricting

scheme; and (2), more importantly for this
case, to maintain, to the extent possible in
each such district, the same percentage
of black residents as that district was
determined to have had when the 2010
census data were applied to the 2001 district
lines. The drafters acknowledged that this
might not always be possible; but they
believed § 5 required them to match the
previous percentage of black population
insofar as it was possible to do so.
This understanding meant that for each
majority-black district, the drafters adopted
a district-specific racial quota. For example,
if the 2010 census data indicated that a
particular district as drawn in 2001 was
75% black in 2010, then the drafters
believed that § 5 required them to draw that
district's new boundaries such that it
remained 75% black.
These quotas, supposedly required by § 5,
posed a challenge for the drafters. Many of
the majority-black districts as drawn in 2001
were ‘under-populated’ once the 2010
census data were applied. ‘Underpopulation’ refers to a district which has
fewer residents than is required by the
constitutional principle of one-person-onevote. This meant that if no changes were
made to their boundaries those districts
would have less population than the
Constitution required.
In order to address the under-population of
the majority-black districts, the drafters
needed to add people, often many thousands
of people. The drafters' quotas for those
districts meant, in turn, that the large
majority of those newcomers would need to
be black. To illustrate, if 10,000 people
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needed to be added to the 75% black district
discussed above in order to address its
under-population, then per the drafters'
understanding of retrogression under § 5
they would need to add at least 7,500 black
people to maintain the same percentage
of black residents overall.
This problem was exacerbated by the rule
the committee adopted mandating that the
population of the least and most populated
districts differ by no more than 2% of the
ideal population. The “ideal population”
refers to the population each district would
have if the State's total population were
evenly divided among them. Prior to the
current
round
of
redistricting,
the Alabama legislature had consistently
used a 10% total deviation rule in drafting
its
state legislative redistricting
plans.
Because of the new 2% rule, underpopulated districts needed to add even more
population than they would have needed
with a more traditional 10% deviation rule;
often, the 2% rule required thousands of
additional residents. And adding those
thousands of additional residents meant, in
turn, that the drafters would need to find
many more black people to satisfy their
quotas.
Indeed, the challenge the drafters created for
themselves was enormous, as the sheer
numbers show. The drafters' (incorrect)
understanding of the requirements of § 5, in
combination with their adoption of the 2%
rule, meant that they needed to find over
120,000 additional black people to add to
the majority-black House Districts. This
amounted to 19.7% of the black people in
the State of Alabama who did not already

live in a majority-black House District. The
story is similar in the Senate. There, the
drafters would need over 106,000
additional black people to satisfy their twin
goals for the majority-black districts. This is
15.8%
of
the black population
of Alabama not already living in a majorityblack Senate District.
But even those percentages understate the
challenge the drafters faced. Many of the
black people not already living in majorityblack districts were likely dispersed around
the State; but the drafters sought to find
those additional 120,000 black people in
areas contiguous to the existing majorityblack House Districts. If a given majorityblack district
were
surrounded
by
overwhelmingly black areas that were not
already part of one of the majorityblack districts, then this task might prove
relatively easy. For example, if a majorityblack district needed 10,000 additional
residents, and 75% of those residents needed
to be black to comply with the drafters'
quota, then adding a nearby neighborhood
containing 10,000 people of whom 75%
were black would fit the bill. But if the
available areas near a majority-black district
were racially diverse, or even predominantly
white, then a more artful approach would be
required to add the requisite population
without
lowering
the
percentage
of black residents. Thus, for example, if the
75% black district were surrounded by areas
in which only 50% of the population was
black, then the drafters would need to find
some method of sorting the black people
from the white in order to add population
that was 75% black. They would not be able
to add population en masse, but would need
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to finely craft lines in order to include
enough black residents and exclude enough
white ones.
With this view of the challenges he faced,
Hinaman set to work drafting these plans.
Underscoring the focus on compliance with
the drafters' understanding of § 5, he began
his work by drawing the majorityblack districts. The maps Hinaman drew
contain 27 majority-black House Districts
(“HD”) and eight majority-black Senate
Districts (“SD”); this is the same number as
existed under the 2001 plan.
However, the districts are not all drawn in
the same place. Faced with under-population
in the majority-black districts, Hinaman
concluded that he could not draw the same
number of majority-black districts in
Jefferson County without lowering the
percentages of black population in those
districts. That outcome was unacceptable;
Hinaman, like the other drafters, believed
that § 5 required him to meet the quota of
the previous percentage of black population.
Hinaman never actually tried to draw nine
majority-black districts in Jefferson County,
and so could not say how much lower
the black percentages would have been; in
fact, he believed it would have been possible
to draw nine such majority-black districts.
Instead of doing so, he concluded that the
prospect of lower black percentages in the
majority-black House Districts left him no
choice: he had to eliminate one of the
districts, HD 53, from Jefferson County,
relocate
it
elsewhere,
and
use
its black population
to
maintain
the black percentages in the remaining
Jefferson County districts.

Hinaman took similar action in Montgomery
County. There, he was again confronted
with under-population in the majorityblack districts. This time, his approach was
to eliminate HD 73, a pluralityblack district,
and
use
its
substantial black voter
population
to
maintain the level of black population in the
majority-black districts. As McClendon put
it, “The minority districts in Montgomery
were underpopulated” and so “[w]e needed
to pick up minorities from somewhere.” In
other words, the previous HD 73, like the
previous HD 53, was eliminated in order to
satisfy the drafters' racial quotas for the
surrounding majority-black districts.
Eliminating two districts and redrawing
them in another part of the State created
conflicts between incumbents. Under the
new plan, the incumbents of HD 53,
Demetrius Newton, and HD 73, Joe
Hubbard,
were
left
living
in
another legislator's district. One
of
the
drafters' goals was to avoid such conflicts
among incumbents. But as the elimination of
these two districts demonstrates, the drafters'
priority of meeting the racial quotas for
majority-black districts trumped the goal of
incumbent protection. As Hinaman testified
when he was asked about separating
incumbents: “Well, it was a goal. It was a
nice goal. Didn't always work out.”
Hinaman took such dramatic steps to
achieve the racial quotas, which he believed
§ 5 required, throughout the State. One
glaring example is SD 26. That district,
represented by Senator Quinton Ross, was
under-populated by nearly 16,000 people
from the ideal population. With the 2010
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census data, his district was already
72.75% black. At trial, Ross noted that if
only white people had been added to
repopulate his district, it still would have
been about 64% black; Ross testified he
would have been comfortable with an even
lower percentage of black residents. Instead,
the Senate plan added 15,785 people to his
district, of whom only 36 were white;
14,806 were black. That is, just .2% of the
net population addition to SD 26 was white;
as the Alabama Democratic Conference
plaintiffs note, “This compares unfavorably
to the 1.00 percent of the black voters who
were left in the City of Tuskegee after the
racial
gerrymander
in Gomillion
v.
Lightfoot.” Ross testified that, given the
demographics of the area, to locate so
many black people and so few white people
near his district, “You have to make sure
you look hard to find them.”
Hinaman indeed went out of his way to
locate so many black people in the vicinity
of SD 26 and to exclude white people from
the district. Ross testified that the population
in the current SD 26 is highly segregated
and that the boundaries in the new plan track
those racial lines. Ross stated that, despite
the under-population of his district, the new
plan actually split precincts that were
already part of SD 26, moving white
portions of those precincts out of his district
while retaining only the black portions; in
other words, despite needing a huge number
of new residents, Hinaman removed white
residents already living in SD 26. This
followed the pattern of the precinct splits
between Ross' district and white-majority
SD 25, which gave the black-majority
portions of precincts to SD 26 and the white-

majority portions to SD 25. The new SD 26
wraps around and excludes a portion of
Montgomery which Ross testified is
predominantly white, and the resulting
district is not compact. By taking these
various steps to remove white residents and
add black ones, the drafters achieved and
even
exceeded
their
quota
of
72.75% black for this district; in the new
plan, SD 26 is over 75% black.
Hinaman followed a similar pattern of
‘looking hard’ for black people throughout
the State in order to achieve the quotas.
Precinct splits like those Ross described
were a major characteristic of these plans.
One of the plaintiffs' expert witnesses,
William Cooper, testified that there was
“massive precinct splitting” statewide.
Indeed, about 25% of all precincts were
split, and dozens of precincts were split
among two, three, or four different districts.
Furthermore, Hinaman split those precincts
largely along racial lines. Indeed, Hinaman
acknowledged that he used precinct splits in
hunting for black residents. He agreed that,
to avoid retrogression, he would first “reach
out to find black precincts.” But, he testified,
when adding whole precincts lowered the
percentage of black residents in the new
district, he would split precincts to achieve
the racial quotas.
In fact, the evidence establishes that
Hinaman principally relied on the race of
individuals living in split precincts in
deciding how to distribute them among
districts. As I will explain, this is clear
because in deciding how to split precincts,
Hinaman had access to the racial makeup of
mapping units smaller than precincts; but he
185

had no accurate data about the political
makeup of those sub-precinct units. Thus,
the fact that Hinaman's precinct splits track
race cannot be explained by race correlating
with party affiliation, for example. For in
choosing which residents of split precincts
would be in majority-black districts and
which would not, Hinaman knew those
residents' race but not their political
affiliation or voting history.
…
At the precinct level, there are “political”
data: for example, what candidates won and
lost in that precinct in past elections, and by
how many votes. This can show the partisan
breakdown of the population of a precinct.
But because of the secret ballot, no political
data are available at the block level. Cooper,
who has 25 years of experience drawing
redistricting maps, explained that there were
no accurate political data at that level
because “you don't really know where ...
individuals who turned out to vote for X or
Y candidate actually live” within a precinct.
By contrast, because demographic data are
collected by the Census Bureau on a houseby-house basis and aggregated at the census
block level, accurate racial data are available
for particular census blocks. Another of
plaintiffs' experts, Theodore Arrington,
noted that the census file from which
Hinaman was working was “rich in racial
data.” Hinaman acknowledged that “when I
was working on the [m]ajority black districts
I had the racial data.”
When Hinaman split precincts, as he did in
SD 26, he relied on those racial data. He
could not have done so based on political

data, because none were available at the
census block level. The only reasonable
conclusion is that he split precincts based on
the information that was available: namely,
demographic data reflecting the race of the
individuals who lived in each census block.
And the evidence establishes that the
reliance on racial data at the census block
level was common statewide: as Cooper
observed, because so many precincts were
split, “[c]learly there was a focus on census
blocks.” In other words, clearly there was a
focus on race.
The drafters' belief that § 5 required a
particular quota for each majorityblack district also meant that they would
reject suggestions from legislators when
suggested changes failed to achieve those
quotas. For example, Senator Marc Keahey
(SD 22) testified at trial that he submitted to
Dial close to ten proposed maps for his
district, to each of which the incumbents of
the neighboring black-majority SD 23 and
SD 24 had agreed. Dial had told Keahey that
he would consider such proposals with the
other senators' support as long as they did
not cause retrogression in majorityblack districts; Keahey understood his
proposals to meet that requirement.
However Dial rejected all of Keahey's
proposals as retrogressive. Eventually,
Keahey came to understand the source of the
disagreement. Keahey had sought to match
the previous percentage of black residents in
those districts using the 2000 census
data, because that is what he thought Dial
required. But Dial's understanding of § 5
meant that the new districts needed to match
the percentage of black population in the
2001 districts with the 2010 census
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data. That is, in Dial's view Keahey had
used the wrong quota; because Keahey's
proposals did not achieve the correct quota,
the drafters would not even consider them,
despite the preferences of all the affected
incumbents.
Keahey's testimony demonstrates that Dial's
adherence to particular quotas was strikingly
rigid. For example, one of the majorityblack districts that borders Keahey's district
is SD 23, represented by Senator Sanders.
Using the 2000 census data, as Keahey
originally did, SD 23 was 62.31% black. But
using Dial's actual standard, namely the
2001 districts with 2010 census data, SD 23
was 64.79% black. Thus if Keahey offered a
suggested change, to which Senator Sanders
had
agreed,
that
maintained
62.31% black population in SD 23 but did
not achieve 64.79% black population, Dial
would automatically reject such a change as
“retrogressive.” Indeed, Dial agreed that he
rejected Keahey's proposals on just this
basis. He testified that according to his
understanding of § 5, a drop of even one
percentage point would be retrogressive.
The use of a rigid quota could not be clearer.
In sum, then, the drafters believed that § 5
required them to sift through surrounding
districts for black people in order to achieve
particular racial quotas for each district. In
seeking to meet those quotas, they
eliminated existing districts, created
conflicts between incumbents, ignored
legislators' preferences, and split a huge
volume of precincts.
The drafters were quite successful in
achieving their quotas. Of the majorityblack districts, the black percentage of the

population in 13 House Districts and three
Senate Districts is within one percentage
point of the goal of maintaining the same
percentage of black residents even after
repopulating the districts, often with
thousands of new individuals. Seven House
Districts and three Senate Districts have an
even higher percentage of black population
than before.
In some districts, the rigidity of these quotas
is on full display. HD 52 needed an
additional 1,145 black people to meet the
quota; the drafters added an additional
1,143. In other words, the drafters
came within two individuals of achieving the
exact quota they set for the black population,
out of a total population of 45,083; those
two people represent .004% of the district.
In HD 55, the drafters added 6,994
additional black
residents,
just
13
individuals more than the quota required,
and in HD 56 they added 2,503 residents,
just 12 individuals more than the quota
required, both out of a total population of
45,071. In the Senate, SD 23 contains 116
more black individuals than were needed to
achieve the drafters' quota of adding an
additional 15,069 black people, out of a total
population of 135,338; in other words, the
difference between the quota and the
additional black population in the ultimate
plan represents .086% of the district.
The plans were enacted over the opposition
of every black legislator in the State, and
precleared by the Justice Department. Two
sets of plaintiffs, including the Alabama
Legislative Black Caucus,
the Alabama Democratic Conference, and a
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number of individuals, brought
lawsuits challenging their legality.

these

II. DISCUSSION
The majority rejects the plaintiffs' racialgerrymandering claims on two bases: first,
that race was not the predominant factor in
drawing these plans; and, second, that even
if strict scrutiny applies, the maps were
narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling
purpose of compliance with § 5 of the VRA.
I disagree on both points. I will first review
the standard for a racial-gerrymandering
claim, and will then address the majority's
conclusions in turn.
A. Legal Standard
The Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection clause provides that, “No State
shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” The central purpose of the clause “is
to prevent the States from purposefully
discriminating between individuals on the
basis of race.” “ ‘[A]t the heart of the
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection
lies the simple command that the
Government must treat citizens as
individuals, not as simply components of a
racial, religious, sexual or national class.’ ”
In Shaw v. Reno, the Supreme Court
recognized a claim under the equal
protection clause that was “analytically
distinct” from somewhat similar votedilution claims. Where a purposeful-dilution
claim alleges that a redistricting plan was
enacted with the purpose of “minimiz[ing]
or cancel[ing] out the voting potential of
racial or ethnic minorities,” “the essence of
the equal protection claim recognized

in Shaw is that the State has used race as a
basis for separating voters into districts.” If
race is so used, then the redistricting plan is
subject to strict scrutiny.
Redistricting legislation generally does not
explicitly refer to race; rather, it “classifies
tracts of land, precincts, or census blocks,
and is race neutral on its face.” In addition,
the Supreme Court has consistently
recognized that redistricting is a complex
process, and that legislatures will nearly
always be “aware” of racial demographics.
Such awareness of race is never enough to
trigger strict scrutiny.
Instead, the Court has required that
a Shaw plaintiff show “that race was the
predominant
factor
motivating
the
legislature's decision to place a significant
number of voters within or without a
particular district.” More specifically, a
plaintiff must establish that “the legislature
subordinated
traditional
race-neutral
districting principles, including but not
limited to compactness, contiguity, and
respect for political subdivisions or
communities defined by actual shared
interests, to racial considerations.”
The plaintiff in such a case may carry this
burden in a number of ways. In some
instances, circumstantial evidence, including
the shape of the district and the demographic
splits created by its borders, is sufficient to
establish
that
the
boundaries
are
“unexplainable on grounds other than race.”
In other cases, there is direct evidence that
race was the predominant factor in the
legislature's decision-making. But, in any
event, the rule is clear: if race was the
predominant factor, strict scrutiny applies.
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To survive strict scrutiny, a racial
classification must be narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling state interest. While
such scrutiny is not “strict in theory, but
fatal in fact,” the State is required to
establish the “most exact connection
between justification and classification.”

The direct evidence of the drafters' goals and
intentions comes straight from their lips.
Dial, for example, had the following
exchange at his deposition:
“Q. So you did not want the total
population of African–Americans to
drop in [SD 23]?

B. Race Predominated

“A. That's correct.

Race was the predominant factor in the
drafters' decisions to draw the majorityblack districts as they did. This is clear from
an examination of the racial quotas they
adopted, even standing alone. Such quotas,
under the circumstances of this case and
without any justification other than race,
require the court to strike down this plan
unless the State can satisfy strict scrutiny.
Furthermore, although no additional
evidence is necessary in this case, there is
ample circumstantial evidence that various
other districting factors were subordinated to
race in the drafting of those majority-black
districts. The majority's arguments to the
contrary are unpersuasive; strict scrutiny
must apply.

“Q. Okay. And if that population
dropped a percentage, in your opinion
that would have been retrogression?

i.
From start to finish, Hinaman, Dial and
McClendon were focused on drafting
majority-black districts that would be
precleared under § 5 of the VRA.
They believed that § 5's non-retrogression
principle required them to maintain (as
nearly as possible) the same percentage
of black residents in any given majorityblack district as that district had when the
2010 census data was applied to the 2001
district boundaries.

“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. So if—And I'm not saying these are
the numbers, but I'm just saying if
Senator Sanders' district had been 65
percent African–American, if it dropped
to 62 percent African–American in total
population, then that would have been
retrogression to you?
“A. In my opinion, yes.
“Q. And so that's what you were trying
to prevent?
“A. Yes.”
By their own candid admissions, the drafters
acknowledged that they understood § 5 to
mean that for each majority-black district
they needed to achieve a set percentage
of black population,
defined
by
the
percentage in that district as drawn in 2001
with the 2010 census data.
This kind of requirement has a name: racial
quota. “Quotas impose a fixed number or
percentage which must be attained.” The
Supreme Court's equal protection cases have
time and again treated this type of “rigid
racial quota” with the highest skepticism.
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The drafters did not deny adopting such
percentages or quotas. To the contrary, when
confronted with the suggestion that partisan
politics, rather than race, actually motivated
the how the majority-black districts were
drawn, the drafters vehemently denied it.
When asked about the use of partisan data at
his deposition, Dial explained:
“... what I did was begin with the
minority districts to ensure they were
not regressed, and each one of them had
to grow. And as we did those, then I
filled in the blanks around those with
what was left of the districts. So I didn't
look at partisan to say how many
Republicans are here or how many
Democrats are here. I began my process
by filling in the minority districts, not to
do away with any of those and not to
regress any of those. And as they grew,
we made sure that they grew in the
same proportion [of black residents]
that they had or as close to it as
possible. And what was left, we just—it
was basically fill in the blanks with
what was left.”
When asked at trial, “Weren't you aware
when you were drawing the [S]enate
[D]istricts that the Republicans' goal in this
state was to maintain your super majorities
in the Legislature?,” Dial denied that was his
goal:
“... I established my goal as maintaining
the minority districts and passing a plan
that would meet Justice Department.
That was my ultimate goal, and that's
what I worked for ... The numbers
themselves were actually to insure that
we did not regress the minority districts,
and we filled in what was left.”
In this case, time and again the drafters have
emphasized that in drawing the majority-

black districts they were motivated by a
desire to obtain preclearance. And time and
again
they
have
articulated
their
understanding that § 5 meant they needed to
achieve racial quotas.
ii.
These percentages or quotas in the
State's legislative plans must fall of their
own weight unless they can survive strict
scrutiny. Bush v. Vera, the Supreme Court's
first effort to apply the Miller predominantfactor standard to a legislative plan in which
many of the districts were being challenged,
is particularly instructive. At first blush, it
might appear that Vera is of little
precedential value because the decision is so
fractured, with a plurality opinion, three
concurrences, and two dissents. However,
the array of opinions is helpful for two
reasons: First, they offer a nuanced view of
how
the
Justices
think
the
Miller predominant-factor standard should
be applied. Second, and perhaps most
importantly here, under all of the opinions,
the
quotas
in Alabama's legislative
redistricting plans would fail unless they can
survive strict scrutiny. Or, to put it another
way, no matter how one defines
the Miller predominant-factor standard, the
quotas warrant strict scrutiny.
First, there is the Vera plurality opinion. The
opinion first acknowledged that it was
confronted with an array of factors that went
into a legislative redistricting plan. The
opinion therefore explained that, “Because it
is clear that race was not the only factor that
motivated the legislature to draw irregular
district lines, we must scrutinize each
challenged district to determine whether the
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District Court's conclusion that race
predominated over legitimate districting
considerations, including incumbency, can
be sustained.” Similarly here, because it is
contended that race was not the only factor
that motivated the Alabama Legislature to
draw the challenged district lines the way it
did, we must scrutinize each challenged
district individually to determine whether
race predominated over legitimate districting
considerations.
For each district, the critical question is
whether race was “the predominant factor
motivating the legislature's [redistricting]
decision” for that district. In this case, we
are confronted with districts in which (1) the
drafters announced a racial percentage or
quota; (2) the drafters achieved that quota;
and (3) there is no explanation for those
actions other than race. For example, it is
clear that one factor and one factor alone
explains the fact that SD 26 is over
75% black: race. Nothing else explains that
percentage. And the same is true for SD 24.
One factor and one factor alone explains the
fact that SD 24, with a quota of
62.8% black, is 63.3% black: race. And the
same is true for SD 23. One factor and one
factor alone explains the fact that SD 23,
with a quota of 64.79% black, is 64.81%
black: race.
Also, the same is true for majorityblack House Districts. One factor and one
factor alone explains the fact that HD 55,
with a quota of 73.54% black, is
73.6% black: race. One factor and one factor
alone explains the fact that HD 67, with a
quota of 69.14% black, is 69.2% black: race.
One factor and one factor alone explains the

fact that HD 57, with a quota
68.49% black, is 68.5% black: race.

of

The State has not offered, and on this record
cannot offer, any alternative explanation that
would explain away the State's apparent use
of race. In Vera, the State had argued that
incumbency protection, rather than race, had
motivated what appeared to be racial
gerrymandering. Because the State had
pointed to a race-neutral factor that might
correlate to race, the plurality found it
necessary to examine each district closely to
determine whether that race-neutral factor
explained the apparently racial lines the
State had drawn better than race did. But
here the State has offered no race-neutral
explanation for the black percentages in the
majority-black districts; no race-neutral
explanation for why SD 26, for example, is
75% black. In fact, Dial explicitly rejected
the idea that partisan politics, rather than the
racial quotas, motivated the drawing of the
majority-black districts. In the absence of
such an explanation, the plurality
in Vera would have no difficulty striking
down districts like those presented in this
case, namely districts drawn to achieve
racial quotas.
Second, there is Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion. While she wrote
separately to explain why “compliance with
the results test of § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act (VRA) is a compelling state interest”
and why “that test can coexist in principle
and in practice with Shaw,” she accepted the
plurality opinion's
understanding of
the Miller predominant-factor standard; this,
of course, is unremarkable, since she wrote
the plurality opinion as well. Therefore, for
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the same reason that Alabama's quotas
warrant strict scrutiny under the plurality
opinion, they warrant the same under Justice
O'Connor's concurrence.
Third is Justice Kennedy's concurrence.
While he joined the plurality opinion, he
expressly and unequivocally stated in his
discussion of the Miller predominant-factor
standard that, “In my view, we would no
doubt apply strict scrutiny if a State decreed
that certain districts had to be at least 50
percent white, and our analysis should be no
different if the State so favors minority
races.” Similarly, because Alabama has
decreed that SD 26 must be 72% black, no
matter what the other demographics are, and
because it drew SD 26 so as to make it 75%
black, it would be difficult, if not impossible
to explain to Justice Kennedy why SD 26
would not be subject to strict scrutiny. And
the same would apply to SD 23's 64% quota,
SD 24's 62% quota, and so forth. And the
same would apply to HD 55's 73% quota,
HD 57's 68% quota, and so forth.
Fourth, there is Justice Thomas's
concurrence, in which Justice Scalia joined.
Justice Thomas stated that “Georgia's
concession that it intentionally created
majority-minority districts was sufficient to
show
that
race
was a
predominant, motivating factor in its
redistricting.” He further stated that, “Strict
scrutiny applies to all governmental
classifications based on race, and we have
expressly held that there is no exception for
race-based redistricting.” One does not need
to think long to know what Justice Thomas's
views on Alabama's quotas would be.

Fifth
and
finally,
four
Justices
in Vera dissented and concluded that the
challenged legislative plan did not warrant
strict scrutiny. Though the majority in this
case reaches a similar result about
the Alabama plan, I do not think the
majority can take solace from the reasoning
of the Vera dissenters. Justice Stevens wrote
a dissent in which Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer joined; Justice Souter wrote a
separate dissent, but stated that he agreed
with Justice Stevens's application of
the Miller predominant-factor standard. For
this reason, I will discuss only Justice
Stevens' opinion. Justice Stevens stated that
“the typically fatal skepticism that we have
used to strike down the most pernicious
forms of state behavior” need not apply only
if three conditions are met: “the state action
(i) has neither the intent nor effect of
harming any particular group, (ii) is not
designed to give effect to irrational
prejudices held by its citizens but to break
them down, and (iii) uses race as a
classification because race is relevant to the
benign goal of the classification.” There is
absolutely nothing in the record to support
the conclusion that these conditions are
present as to Alabama's redistricting plans.
Indeed, it appears that the only racial
dynamic at play in Alabama's plans is that
white members of the Alabama legislature,
and the white ones alone, have expressly and
specifically targeted black legislators and
the members of their districts for difference
in treatment solely because of the race of
those
legislators
and
over
those black legislators' deep and vocal
objections.
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This aspect of this case, in particular, bears a
disturbing similarity to Gomillion, where the
Supreme Court condemned the redrawing of
Tuskegee, Alabama's municipal boundaries
by
white
members
of
the Alabama Legislature so as to exclude
almost all the black citizens of that
community. Admittedly, there are some
fundamental differences between this case
and Gomillion: This case is based on the
Fourteenth Amendment, and Gomillion was
based principally on the Fifteenth
Amendment, although it has also been read
as a Fourteenth Amendment case; this case
involves
a Shaw claim,
whereas
Gomillion involved
an
invidious
discrimination
claim,
although
again Shaw itself drew on Gomillion; and, in
this case, blacks are being brought into or
kept in a district solely because of their race,
and,
in Gomillion, blacks were
being
excluded from a district solely because of
their race. Nevertheless, in both cases, white
members of the Alabama legislature, and the
white ones alone, expressly and specifically
targeted black people and treated them
differently in the drawing of district lines
solely because of the race. And despite the
fact these black people object to, and are
even offended by, this racial targeting and
treatment, they are powerless to do anything
about it politically. Or, to put it another way,
a white majority has unwelcomely imposed
its will on how a black minority is to be
treated politically.
The injustice of this was poignantly brought
home in the testimony of Senator Vivian
Figures, an African–American, at the trial of
this case. Senator Figures acknowledged at
trial that the Republican Party had won a

supermajority in the 2010 elections “fair and
square.” She therefore “expected to be
outvoted” as a Democrat. But what she did
not expect was for her “voice to be
squashed.” This voicelessness, this complete
powerlessness to do anything about the fact
that
white
members
of
the
Alabama legislature
expressly
and
specifically targeted her and treated her
differently in the drawing of her district
lines solely because she is black, belies the
idea that these plans could be considered
“benign” under Justice Stevens's analysis. In
this sense, Senator Figures's plight today is
no different from that of Dr. Gomillion. Like
Dr. Gomillion, she has no means to be heard
and no avenue for relief—except through
this court. In light of these considerations, it
is clear that, under Justice Stevens' opinion
in Vera, Alabama's plans are not saved from
the court's “typically fatal skepticism.”
Thus, under any of the analyses articulated
in Vera, the racial quotas here, supposedly
required by § 5, were the predominant factor
motivating how the majority-black districts
were drawn. Under any of those analyses,
this plan is subject to strict scrutiny. For the
plurality, strict scrutiny is required because
the drafters adopted racial quotas, achieved
those quotas, and there was no other factor
to explain why they added so many black
people to the majority-black districts. For
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia, the
adoption of a racial quota is enough standing
alone. And for Justice Stevens and the other
dissenters, the factors which would allow for
an exception to the rule of strict scrutiny for
racial classifications are simply not present
in this case. Under the analyses announced
in each of the opinions in Vera, the use of
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quotas in this case cannot stand unless they
survive strict scrutiny.
iii.
This conclusion that the strictest scrutiny
should apply in this case because of the use
of racial quotas is reinforced by an
examination of United Jewish Organizations
of
Williamsburgh,
Inc.
v.
Carey
(“UJO ”).UJO was a predecessor to
the Shaw line of cases. In UJO, a “highly
fractured” majority upheld New York's
reapportionment
plan
against
a
constitutional challenge. The Court, first
in Shaw and later in Miller, read the UJO
majority to have decided the case on a votedilution theory, rather than a racialgerrymandering theory. The Court was clear
in Miller: “To the extent any of the opinions
in [UJO ] can be interpreted as suggesting
that a State's assignment of voters on the
basis of race would be subject to anything
but our strictest scrutiny, those views ought
not be deemed controlling.” Thus the
fractured UJO majority's views are not
relevant to this case, as the Court has since
read them as either inapposite or overruled.
iv.
The majority states that the drafters' need to
pursue certain racial percentages for the
majority-black districts was not a “brightline rule” and that it gave way where
“necessary to achieve other objectives.”
I am not quite sure what the majority means
by saying that there was no bright-line rule.
If the majority means that significance
should be drawn from the fact that the
drafters did not succeed in securing the
sought-after percentage of black residents in

each and every majority-black district, I
have no qualm in noting that significance.
Perhaps, for those districts where the
drafters fell short, factors other than race can
explain resulting percentages, and I am
willing to engage the majority in a
determination of whether the plaintiffs
should prevail as to those districts. With this
dissent, I am not saying that the plaintiffs
should prevail as to all the districts. What I
am saying is two things: First, there must be
an individual assessment for each district as
whether race was a predominant factor.
Second, the fact that the drafters failed to
achieve their sought-after percentage in one
district does not detract one iota from the
fact that they did achieve it in another. The
racial quota, and nothing else, explains why
SD 26 is 75% black. And the same is true
for the fact that SD 24 and SD 23 are 63%
and 64% black, respectively, and that HD 55
and HD 67 are 73% and 69% black,
respectively, and so on. If the drafters relied
on a racial quota in drawing even one
district, that decision is subject to strict
scrutiny.
In any event, what is most striking is the
extent to which the drafters did succeed in
matching the black percentage of the
majority-black districts:
the black percentage of the population in 13
House Districts and three Senate Districts is
within one percentage point of the stated
goal; in other words, the drafters effectively
hit their quotas in those districts. Seven
House
Districts and
three
Senate
Districts have an even higher percentage
of black residents than under the old
plan. Overall, the drafters either effectively
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achieved or surpassed their quotas in 75% of
the majority-black districts.
Moreover, the majority points to no
evidence that the drafters' quotas ever
actually did give way to any “other
objectives.” While the percentage was
lowered in some districts, the record
contains essentially no evidence to explain
why. In fact, the only objective Hinaman
ever
cited
to
explain
lowering
the black percentage
of
a
majorityblack district was the creation of another
majority-black district near HD 19, namely
the displaced HD 53. Maintaining the same
number of majority-minority districts was
part of the drafters' understanding of what §
5 required; thus this explanation cannot
support the conclusion that factors other
than race trumped the drafters' quotas.
Hinaman never testified that he lowered
the black percentage in any district for any
other reason.
In fact, based on this record, the most likely
explanation for the lower black percentage
in some districts is that there were simply
not enough black people nearby to maintain
the
already
high black population
percentages in some districts. It appears in
some
cases
even
extreme
racial
gerrymandering was not enough to find all
the black people the drafters sought. But the
fact that the drafters ultimately could not
find enough black people to fill their quotas
certainly does not mean that they did not try;
and sorting people by race in the process
of trying to achieve racial quotas is quite
enough to trigger strict scrutiny.
Looking to where the drafters fell short is a
distraction from the important point, which

is where they succeeded. In most of the
districts, the drafters of these plans either
surpassed their quotas or effectively
achieved them (to within a percentage
point). In some cases, the precision with
which the drafters refilled districts with the
exact number of black individuals they
sought is breathtaking. The most extreme
example is HD 52. There, the quota was an
additional 1,145 black people; the drafters
added 1,143. Out of a total population of
45,083, this represents racial sifting down to
the finest level, a racial exactitude that
would be admirable in its skill if it were not
illegal.
In any event, if, with the observation that the
drafters were not using a bright-line rule, the
majority is suggesting that the drafters were
pursuing ‘goals,’ or some synonym of that
term, then “[t]his semantic distinction is
beside the point.” “Whether this limitation is
described as a quota or a goal, it is a line
drawn on the basis of race.” In this case, the
drafters have described setting a specific
percentage of black population to achieve in
each majority-black district. Thus, semantics
aside, strict scrutiny applies.
v.
Even if the racial quotas, standing alone,
were not enough to require strict scrutiny in
this case, there is ample circumstantial
evidence to establish that such scrutiny
applies. That evidence shows that, time after
time, the drafters subordinated various other
districting factors to the goal of achieving
their racial quotas.
Filling those quotas posed an enormous
challenge to the drafters. In order to
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maintain the black percentage in the
majority-black districts while repopulating
the districts up to compliance with the 2%
rule, the drafters needed to add over 120,000
additional black people to the majorityblack House Districts. This amounted to
19.7% of total black population in the State
not already living in a majority-black House
District. When one considers that many of
the black people in Alabama but not already
living in a majority-black district were likely
dispersed around the rest of the State, the
chance of finding those 120,000 in areas
contiguous to the majority-black districts is
even smaller. The same is true in the Senate:
the drafters needed to find over 106,000
additional black people in order to achieve
their twin goals. That amounts to some
15.8% of the black population not already
living in a majority-black Senate District.
The challenge of meeting those quotas
explains why the drafters drew these plans
in the way they did; indeed, seeking to
achieve the racial quotas drove everything.
An examination of the steps the drafters
took in seeking to maintain the
previous black population percentages offers
compelling circumstantial evidence that race
predominated, further supporting the direct
evidence already discussed.
The quotas also led Hinaman to “reach [ ]
out” to find majority-black precincts to add
to majority-black districts. And, when
precincts with enough black people were not
available at hand, it led him to split
“massive” numbers of precincts, some 25%
across the State, largely along racial lines.
Hinaman's racial methodology in splitting
precincts shows how far the drafters went to

reach the target percentages of black people.
Maptitude, the computer program he
utilized, contained racial data at the census
block level, but not political data. This
means that when he split that “massive”
number of precincts, he could not have done
so based on how many Democrats or
Republicans lived in each census block.
Rather, it was racial data to which Hinaman
looked in splitting precincts. And, indeed,
Hinaman testified that he would split
precincts in order to avoid what he
considered retrogression. In addition,
splitting a precinct by blocks required extra
work, extra “clicking.” Each split was an
affirmative choice, and the data on which
Hinaman relied in making those choices
were racial.
The Supreme Court has found this kind of
evidence of racial methodology particularly
compelling. In Vera, the plurality described
a strikingly similar computer system to the
one used here:
“REDAPPL permitted redistricters to
manipulate district lines on computer
maps, on which racial and other
socioeconomic data were superimposed.
At each change in configuration of the
district lines being drafted, REDAPPL
displayed updated racial composition
statistics for the district as drawn.
REDAPPL contained racial data at the
block-by-block level, whereas other
data, such as party registration and past
voting statistics, were only available at
the level of voter tabulation districts
(which
approximate
election
precincts).”
The Vera plurality found that “the direct
evidence of racial considerations, coupled
with the fact that the computer program used
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was significantly more sophisticated with
respect to race than with respect to other
demographic data, provides substantial
evidence that it was race that led to the
neglect of traditional districting criteria
here.” In particular, since only racial data
were available at the sub-precinct level,
evidence of split precincts along racial lines
suggested
that
“racial
criteria
predominated.” The same is true here. As
in Vera, Hinaman's race-based methodology
is
powerful
evidence
that
race
predominanted, particularly in combination
with the direct evidence of racial quotas.
The majority in this case concludes that “at
least some of the precinct splits” were
attributable to the 2% rule. I agree this is
probably true; Hinaman cited population
deviation as the other reason to split
precincts, along with compliance with the
VRA. But the evidence shows that many if
not most of the splits were made based on
racial data. Cooper testified that, “If the only
concerns
were
maintaining
27
majority black districts and achieving a plus
or minus 1 percent deviation, you wouldn't
need to split anywhere near that many
precincts.” And Arrington noted that, as in
SD 26, the splits were mostly along racial
lines statewide; if Hinaman were primarily
splitting precincts to equalize population,
there is no reason he would need to
separate black residents from white ones in
this way. The plaintiffs certainly do not need
to show that every precinct split was racially
motivated to establish that the drafters went
to great lengths to achieve their racial
quotas. The circumstantial evidence that
Hinaman relied on the race of voters in
deciding how to split many precincts, along

with the other circumstantial evidence and
the direct evidence of racial quotas, amply
establishes that race was the predominant
factor.
vi.
The majority finds that race cannot have
been predominant because there is a factor,
namely the 2% rule, that was not
subordinated to race. The majority also
points out that the drafters considered other
factors as well. While I readily concede that
the drafters abided by the 2% rule, and that
they considered other factors, I must
respectfully disagree that this allows their
use of racial quotas to escape strict scrutiny.
The fact that a Shaw claim is a “mixed
motive suit” does not mean that no racial
gerrymander exists. On the contrary,
in Vera the plurality, after noting, as the
majority does here, that “The record does
not reflect a history of purely race-based
districting revisions,” went on to strike
down that plan under Shaw. The question
there, as here, was whether race
predominated over other factors as to any
individual districting decision.
But in considering that question, the
majority misapprehends the appropriate
analysis. It appears the majority believes
that race cannot predominate as long as
there is some factor which is
not
subordinated to race. But this is wrong. The
fact that the drafters pursued “multiple
objectives” does not preclude a finding of
racial gerrymandering; again, that was the
case in Vera, and the plan in that case was
struck down. The existence of some
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factor which is not subordinated to race
cannot defeat a Shaw claim.
For example, contiguity of a district is a
traditional
districting
factor;
the Miller Court cited it as a factor that, if
subordinated to race, could establish that
race predominated. Does that mean that
contiguity must always be subordinated to
race in order to prevail on a Shaw claim? On
the majority's view, it would appear so:
unless a district was non-contiguous, for
example split into two unconnected sections
on different sides of the State, then race
would not predominate. But, of course, that
is not the law; for example, in Miller the
Court struck down a district despite the fact
that every part of it was connected to every
other part.
The majority views the question of race
predominating as a sort of ranking of factors
as to the overall plan: since the 2% deviation
rule is above the racial quotas in the drafters'
hierarchy overall, no amount of sorting
people by the color of their skin can trigger
strict scrutiny. In other words, the majority
believes that once some race-neutral factor
is established as the highest priority for the
plan as a whole, that means that
no Shaw claim can succeed as to any part of
that plan. But this is not the Supreme Court's
analysis.
Instead, the Supreme Court has established
that the harm of racial gerrymandering is a
local one: the court must scrutinize each and
every individual district to see whether race
was the predominant factor. In Vera, for
example, the plaintiffs initially challenged
24 of Texas' 30 congressional districts; the
district court found Shaw violations in three

of those districts, and the Supreme Court
upheld that finding as to those districts. The
analysis was not what factors were
predominant as to the plan as a whole, or
even as to all 24 challenged districts
considered together, but whether race was
the predominant factor as to any one district
individually.
Furthermore, a plaintiff need not even show
that race was the predominant factor as to
an entire district. In Miller, the Court stated
that the plaintiff's burden in a Shaw case was
to show “that race was the predominant
factor motivating the legislature's decision to
place a significant number of voters within
or without a particular district.” The
plaintiffs have made just this showing,
establishing that racial quotas led the
drafters to place very significant numbers of
people in the majority-black districts
because they were black.
From this perspective, it is clear the 2% rule
cannot explain why all these districts were
drawn as they were. The drafters' quotas for
SD 26 called for that district to have 72.75%
black population after reapportionment; the
district is over 75% black under the new
plan. How does the 2% rule explain
why black people ended up on one side of
the district line and white people ended up
on the other? How can it explain why just 36
out of 15,785 new residents of SD 26 were
white, despite the racially mixed
demographics of the areas from which those
people were drawn? The answer is clear: it
does not.
In fact, it is clear that one factor and one
factor alone explains why SD 26 is
75% black: race. The drafters had a quota
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for that district, which they believed was
required under § 5, and they reached and
exceeded that quota. Nothing else explains
that percentage. The same is true of SD 23,
with a quota of 64.79% black and an
eventual population of 64.81% black. And
the same is true of HD 55, with a quota of
73.54% black and an eventual population of
73.6% black. And the same is true of HD 67,
with a quota of 69.14% black and an
eventual population of 69.2% black. The 2%
deviation rule simply does not explain away
this clear reliance on, and achievement of,
racial quotas.
But the Supreme Court's cases establish that,
when confronted with compelling evidence
of this sort that district lines were motivated
by race, a State seeking to avoid strict
scrutiny
must
show
that
another
factor explains away the apparent reliance
on race. That is, the Supreme Court's cases
establish that a State may seek to show that
“correlations between racial demographics
and district lines may be explicable in terms
of nonracial motivations.”
In Vera, the alternative the State offered was
incumbency protection. The State argued
that the direct and circumstantial evidence
that race predominated was rebutted because
another factor, protection of incumbents,
actually explained the apparently racial
divisions of voters. The plurality rejected
that argument on the facts, but
acknowledged that such a showing would
undermine the case for strict scrutiny.
Similarly, in Easley v. Cromartie, the Court
considered the argument that an apparent
racial gerrymander was actually better
explained as a partisan gerrymander. The

Court reversed the district court and found
the evidence in that case insufficient to
establish that the apparently racial district
boundaries were not in reality motivated by
another factor.
But the majority does not contend that the
2% deviation rather than the drafters' goal
of achieving racial quotas can explain the
racialized boundaries of the majority-black
districts. Nor could it, for there is no
evidence to support that contention. Thus,
the majority's observation that the 2% rule
never gave way to race is beside the point.
The plaintiffs have come forward with
compelling direct and circumstantial
evidence that the drafters of these plans
relied on a system of racial quotas to
determine who would be added to the
majority-black districts and who would not.
The State's adherence to the 2% rule simply
does not rebut that evidence.
Indeed, by and large the 2% rule served to
increase the impact of the drafters' racial
quotas. While most of the majorityblack districts were under-populated even
using a more traditional 10% deviation rule,
the 2% rule dramatically increased the
number of additional black residents the
drafters needed to find in order to achieve
the quotas. This led to the sorting of
individuals by race on a vast scale across the
State in order to achieve racial quotas. Far
from absolving the State of its liability
under Shaw, it appears that in this case the
2% rule further aggravated the constitutional
harm.
Thus, there is no legitimate basis for
rejecting the conclusion that race
predominated in this case. The State did
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consider other factors, but the evidence is
clear: race was the predominant factor in
drawing
the
majority-black districts.
Incumbency protection was a factor; but
when Hinaman determined that he needed
additional black residents for the underpopulated districts in Montgomery and
Jefferson Counties, he abolished HD 53 and
HD 73, leaving their incumbents in
another legislator's district. Preserving the
core of districts was a factor, but again one
that gave way to race in the cases of HD 53
and HD 73, which were abolished and
redrawn elsewhere. Respecting political
subdivisions was a factor; but, in order to
sift the black people from the white,
Hinaman split massive numbers of precincts,
depositing their black residents in the
already heavily-black districts and their
white residents in the adjoining majoritywhite districts. Compactness was a factor;
but when Hinaman made up for SD 26's
under-population with new residents that
were overwhelmingly black (and 99.8%
minority), he did so by creating a bizarre
district that wraps around the white portions
of Montgomery. Honoring the wishes of
incumbents was a factor; but, as with
Keahey's nearly ten proposed alternative
maps, those wishes were ignored if they
came into conflict with the drafters' rigid
quotas. Preserving communities of interest
was apparently a factor; but ultimately the
boundaries of the majority-black districts
were predominantly drawn in order to
achieve the racial quotas for each district.
These plans were a racial gerrymander.
C. Narrow Tailoring

Such a finding does not, of course, end the
analysis. The State may save these plans by
showing that they are narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling government interest.
The majority concludes that compliance
with the VRA is a compelling state interest,
and I agree.
The Supreme Court has made clear, though,
that to qualify as narrowly tailored, the
district as drawn must be “required by
a correct reading of § 5.” And the legislature
must have had a “strong basis in evidence”
that its action was “needed in order not to
violate” the VRA. As I will explain, these
plans must fall because they are not required
by any correct reading of § 5; because the
drafters had no strong basis in evidence to
believe they were required by § 5; and
because in any event § 5 can no longer
justify a racial gerrymander after Shelby
County.
i.
The State has made a number of arguments
about why its racial quotas were narrowly
tailored to achieve the compelling purpose
of compliance with § 5. Those arguments
are all without merit.
The drafters of the proposed plans have all
described their understanding of what was
necessary to obtain preclearance in the same
terms: they needed to maintain the same
overall number of majority-minority districts
and, within those districts, they needed to
get as close as possible to maintaining
the black percentage of the population
calculated with the 2010 census data
imposed on the 2001 redistricting plan. As I
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have explained, this amounted to imposing a
racial quota on each such district.
All of the drafters expressed concern that
doing less might expose them to denial of
preclearance by the Justice Department. The
State has argued that this understanding was
“not unreasonable.” The State argues that
erring on the side of caution is appropriate,
particularly because the Justice Department
review process is so “opaque.”
Whether the State's understanding was
unreasonable is not the appropriate question
under Miller and Shaw II. Nor is the
question whether the Justice Department
would approve or “look favorably” on the
plans, or whether the drafters could
accurately predict how the Justice
Department would proceed. In Miller, the
Court rejected the idea that narrow tailoring
is satisfied by actions taken in order to
obtain preclearance as a practical matter. In
that case, the Justice Department had
demanded that the State draw certain
districts as part of its preclearance review;
the Court found that this was not sufficient
to establish that those districts were
narrowly tailored. Rather, the only way to
survive strict scrutiny is to show the plans
were actually required by the statute.
On this point, the State argues that, “Given
the fact that the State's plans have been
precleared, the State's reading of Section 5
cannot be said to be incorrect.” This, again,
is wrong. First, under strict scrutiny it is the
State's burden to establish that its action was
required under a correct reading of the
statute, not the plaintiffs' burden to show the
drafters' understanding was demonstrably
incorrect.

Second, the fact that the Justice Department
precleared the plans does not determine one
way or the other whether the State's actions
were actually mandated by the substantive
statute. This would be so even if the drafters
had correctly interpreted the Justice
Department's commands. “Where a State
relies on the Department's determination that
race-based districting is necessary to comply
with the Act, the judiciary retains an
independent obligation in adjudicating
consequent equal protection challenges to
ensure that the State's actions are narrowly
tailored
to
achieve
a
compelling
interest.” Here, however, the Justice
Department never commanded the State to
adopt its quotas; the drafters merely
inferred, or believed, or guessed that such a
step would smooth the preclearance
process. That is insufficient to establish that
the drafters' actions were narrowly tailored.
In reality, the drafters' understanding of § 5
was woefully incorrect, and as a result their
solution is not narrowly tailored. Nothing in
§ 5, or in the cases interpreting it, required
the State to adopt and adhere to these
quotas. In Beer v. United States, the
Supreme Court noted that “the purpose of [§
] 5 has always been to insure that no votingprocedure changes would be made that
would lead to a retrogression in the position
of racial minorities with respect to their
effective exercise of the electoral franchise.”
Thus, § 5 as properly interpreted requires a
State to determine whether an action would
reduce minority voters' effective ability to
elect candidates of choice; it does not
command the State to match the pre-existing
level of minority population.
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The State relies on Texas v. United States, a
recent three-judge-court § 5 case, as
establishing that “ ‘A district with a minority
voting majority of sixty-five percent (or
more) essentially guarantees that, despite
changes in voter turnout, registration, and
other factors that affect participation at the
polls, a cohesive minority group will be able
to elect its candidate of choice.’ ” In the
State's view, Texas establishes that the
State's decision to add black people to
majority-black districts as it did was
required under § 5. The State is incorrect.
In the relevant portion of its opinion on
summary
judgment,
the Texas court
established that a majority-minority
population of 65% percent “essentially
guarantee[d]” ability to elect in that case.
Texas was a § 5 case, in which the issue was
whether certain districts the State had
drawn violated § 5 by retrogressing minority
voting power. In establishing its per-se 65%
rule, the court was making an evidentiary
ruling: when it examined whether a given
district the legislature had drawn was likely
to elect a candidate of minority voters'
choice, a 65% minority population was
sufficient evidence standing alone. This
amounts to a common-sense observation: at
some point a State may put so many
minorities in a district that ‘the numbers
speak for themselves' when it comes to the
ability of that minority group to win
elections in the district.
In this case, the question is not whether
certain districts violated § 5 (for example by
containing a minority population that is too
low), but whether § 5 required the drafters
to adopt the quotas as they did. Therefore,

the court's observation in Texas that 65%
minority populations are essentially
guaranteed to be able to elect candidates of
choice is not relevant here; the same is true,
of course, of 75%, or 85%, or 100%
minority districts. That tells one nothing
about whether § 5 requires such high
percentages. Thus, in sum, the State offers
no reason to believe that its racial quotas
were actually required by § 5.
ii.
The majority agrees with the State that these
plans were justified by § 5. But, while the
majority's interpretation of § 5 is different
from the State's, it is no less mistaken. In the
majority's view, the drafters' conduct was
narrowly tailored because the 2006
amendments to the VRA altered the standard
for assessing retrogression. In those
amendments, Congress expressly noted its
intention to overturn the Supreme Court's
decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft. The
majority concludes that the amendments
mean that “any diminishment in a minority's
ability to elect its preferred candidates
violates section 5.” The majority further
concludes that this, in turn, required the
State, “where feasible,” to “not substantially
reduce
the
relative
percentages
of black voters” in majority-black districts.
In other words, as the majority reads the
amended statute, it required the drafters to
do just what they did: adopt the
previous black percentages as racial quotas
for each district.
In order to explain why the majority's
reading is wrong, I must first explain how
the majority arrives at its conclusion, and
where we part ways. The majority first finds
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that the 2006 amendments altered the
retrogression analysis under § 5 to make it
more stringent, and I agree. The majority
also concludes that the amendment to the
language of § 5 served, in relevant part, to
overturn the Supreme Court's decision
in Georgia, and to restore the standard
articulated in Beer. Again I agree.

diminish black voters' ability to elect their
preferred candidates.” That is, the majority
believes that, after the 2006 amendments,
any reduction in a minority group's
percentage of the population in a given
majority-minority district reduces the ability
to elect, and is per-se retrogressive. I will
explain why this is incorrect.

The Georgia decision introduced a “totality
of the circumstances” approach to
determining whether a change would be
retrogressive under § 5. The Court found
that the ability of a minority group to elect a
candidate of choice was important, but was
not the only relevant factor. In addition, the
Court held, retrogression analysis must take
account of the minority group's ability to
participate in the political process. In
particular, the Court found that “influence”
districts, in which the minority group cannot
elect a candidate of choice but can “play a
substantial ... role in the electoral process,”
could compensate for a reduction in the
number of districts in which minorities
could elect candidates of choice. Also, the
Court found that representatives of the
minority group holding positions of
“legislative leadership,
influence,
and
power” was a factor suggesting that a new
plan was not retrogressive. Because the
Court determined that the district court had
focused too narrowly on ability to elect, it
remanded the case for analysis under the
totality of the circumstances test.

First, though, I pause to observe just how
implausible this reading of the statute is. On
the majority's view, if a district is
99% black, the legislature is prohibited by
federal
law
from
reducing
the black population to a mere 98%. Read in
this way, § 5 would become a one-way
ratchet: the black population of a district
could go up, either through demographic
shifts or redistricting plans (like this one)
that raise the percentage of black people in
some majority-black districts. But the
legislature
could
never
lower
the black percentage, at least so long as it
was “feasible” to avoid it. Why? Because
any reduction in the black population of a
district
would
“by
definition
...
diminish black voters' ability to elect their
preferred candidates.” With respect, this
result cannot be.

The
majority
finds
that,
in
rejecting Georgia, Congress
commanded
that Alabama could
not
reduce
“the
percentages of black voters in the majorityblack districts because to do so would be to

It is also not what Congress intended. As
amended, § 5 provides in relevant part that a
voting change is prohibited if it “will have
the effect of diminishing the ability of any
citizens of the United States on account of
race or color ... to elect their preferred
candidates of choice.” Congress specified
that the purpose of the above-quoted
language “is to protect the ability of such
citizens to elect their preferred candidates of
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choice.” It is clear from this language that “
‘ability to elect’ is the statutory watchword.”
The
congressional
findings,
and
the legislative history, make it clear that the
goal of this new language was to
overturn Georgia. In the majority's view,
this change means that now any reduction in
a minority group's proportional share of the
population in a district is retrogressive. The
better reading of Congress' intent is that, in
emphasizing “ability to elect,” Congress
sought only to overturn the aspect
of Georgia that so many found disturbing:
namely the prospect that States would trade
away districts where minority voters had
actual ability to elect in exchange for
amorphous influence districts or apparently
politically powerful jobs for minority
representatives. The House Committee
Report described the problem in this way:
“Under its ‘new’ analysis, the Supreme
Court would allow the minority
community's own choice of preferred
candidates to be trumped by political
deals struck by State legislators
purporting to give ‘influence’ to the
minority community while removing
that community's ability to elect
candidates. Permitting these trade-offs
is inconsistent with the original and
current purpose of Section 5.”
Congress rejected this idea, endorsing
instead the position of the dissent
in Georgia. Rather than the extreme
interpretation embraced by the majority in
this case, it is clear that what Congress
intended
when
it
sought
to
overturn Georgia was to legislatively adopt
the position of Justice Souter's dissent
in Georgia.

But Justice Souter's dissent did not interpret
§ 5 in the way the majority does in this case.
On the contrary, Justice Souter agreed with
the majority in Georgia that reducing the
percentage
of black population
in
a
majority-black district would not necessarily
be retrogressive. “The District Court began
with the acknowledgment (to which we
would all assent) that the simple fact of a
decrease in black voting age population
(BVAP) in some districts is not alone
dispositive about whether a proposed plan is
retrogressive.”
Justice Souter's view on this issue was
hardly lost on Congress. Most of the debate
surrounding the changes to the retrogression
standard focused on whether or not
“coalition” districts (in which a minority
group does not constitute a majority but can
routinely elect candidates of choice in
coalition with other racial groups) could
constitute “ability to elect” districts for § 5
purposes. That question is not presented in
this case. The question that is presented
here—whether a minority percentage that is
lower than the benchmark plan is always
retrogressive—was not widely debated. But
the
two
discussions
of
it
in
the legislative history firmly reject the
majority's view.
Representative Watt, a leading proponent of
the bill in the House and chair of the
Congressional Black Caucus at the time,
specifically noted and endorsed the Georgia
Court's unanimous position on this issue
during a key hearing on the effect
of Georgia on the retrogression standard:
“Nine justices agreed, as do I, that section 5
does not prohibit the reduction of super
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majority minority voting age population
percentages from that in a benchmark
plan. Where the majority in Georgia v.
Ashcroft strayed, however, losing four
justices in the process, was in its failure to
enunciate an articulable standard under
which the opportunities to elect are
preserved.”

would not lock in coalition districts, no one
ever suggested that Congress was adopting
the novel and implausible standard the
majority posits in this case. Indeed, there is
nothing in the text, nothing in
the legislative history, and nothing in the
dissent in Georgia which would support the
majority's view.

The principal sponsors of the amendments in
the Senate agreed. During floor debate,
some senators had suggested that coalition
districts would not be protected by the
retrogression standard. Senator Leahy
responded by entering into the record a
statement reflecting “my understanding of
the purpose and scope of [the relevant]
provisions as an original and lead sponsor.”
That statement provided:

That view has also been rejected by the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia,
which is entrusted with the primary
responsibility for enforcing § 5. The D.C.
District Court's most extensive application
of § 5 after the 2006 amendments came in
the Texas case. In the opinion after trial in
that case, the three-judge court rejected the
idea that lowering the minority percentage
of a supermajority district is per-se
retrogressive. In considering the changes to
Texas' House District 41, the court noted
that the Hispanic citizen voting-age
population had been reduced from 77.5% in
the benchmark plan to 72.1% in the new
plan. Under the test adopted by the majority
in this case, that information by itself would
establish retrogression. But the Texas court
rejected a claim that this change was
retrogressive, finding that even with a lower
percentage of the population, Hispanic
voters still had the ability to elect candidates
of choice.

“This change to Section 5 makes clear
that Congress rejects the Supreme
Court's Ashcroft decision
and
reestablishes that a covered state's
redistricting plan cannot eliminate
‘ability to elect’ districts and replace
them with ‘influence districts' ... The
amendment to Section 5 does not,
however, freeze into place the current
minority voter percentages in any given
district. As stated by the dissenters
in Georgia v. Ashcroft, as well as by
Professor Arrington and Professor
Persily at the Committee hearings,
reducing the number of minorities in a
district is perfectly consistent with the
pre-Ashcroft understanding of Section
5 as long as other factors demonstrate
that minorities retain their ability to
elect their preferred candidates.”
Equally striking is the fact that no one
contested this understanding. While there
was a concerted effort by some in the Senate
to establish that the retrogression standard

Instead of the majority's test, which looks
solely to whether a minority group's
percentage of the population is lower than it
had been under the benchmark plan,
the Texas court adopted a “functional”
approach. Rejecting the State's argument
that the court should look only to population
demographics, the court found that it was
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necessary to examine a number of factors to
determine whether a minority group has the
ability to elect candidates of choice. “A
single-factor inquiry, such as the test Texas
proposed relying on racial and ethnic
population statistics alone, is inconsistent
with precedent and too limited to provide an
accurate picture of the on-the-ground
realities of voting power.” Rather, the court
established at summary judgment that
“Section 5 analysis must go beyond mere
population data to include factors such as
minority voter registration, minority voter
turnout,
election
history,
and
minority/majority voting behaviors.”

behavior to make
determination.”

the

requisite

In other words, both the D.C. District Court
and the Justice Department have explicitly
rejected the majority's interpretation.
And with good cause. The majority's
interpretation of the amended § 5 would
raise serious, if not fatal, constitutional
concerns. There is an inherent tension
between the race consciousness of the VRA,
and in particular § 5, and the protections of
the Fourteenth Amendment.

This is substantially the same interpretation
of the amended § 5 as that adopted by the
Justice Department, the other primary
adjudicator of preclearance. In its updated
guidance, released in 2011, the Justice
Department, like the D.C. District Court,
applies a functional, multi-factor test. As the
Justice Department interprets § 5, the
analysis of retrogressive effect “starts with a
basic comparison of the benchmark and
proposed plans at issue, using updated
census data in each.” But it does not end
there:

Yet the majority urges an interpretation of §
5 that would require States to engage in
hugely racialized redistricting; indeed, an
interpretation that would require States to
redistrict in compliance with racial quotas.
Under the majority's rule, a State faced with
a 90% minority district has no choice: it
must find nine minority individuals for
every 10 needed to repopulate the district.
Racial gerrymandering would become
unavoidable, essentially required by a
federal statute. “When [an] interpretation of
the [VRA] compels race-based districting, it
by definition raises a serious constitutional
question.”

“In determining whether the ability to
elect exists in the benchmark plan and
whether it continues in the proposed
plan, the Attorney General does not rely
on any predetermined or fixed
demographic percentages at any point in
the
assessment. Rather,
in
the
Department's view, this determination
requires a functional analysis of the
electoral behavior within the particular
jurisdiction or election district. As noted
above, census data alone may not
provide sufficient indicia of electoral

UJO, discussed above, places these
constitutional questions in stark contrast.
Chief Justice Burger's dissent, which applied
the Shaw reasoning later adopted by the
Court, rejected the defendants' rigid
adherence to a specific minority percentage,
65%, in seeking to comply with § 5. He
observed that there was “no indication
whatever that use of this rigid figure was in
any way related much less necessary to
fulfilling the State's obligation under the
Voting
Rights
Act
as
defined
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in Beer.” Rather, he would have found this
unjustified “rigid adherence to quotas”
unconstitutional. The interpretation the
majority adopts is no less rigid; it too
equates ability to elect with a certain
predetermined percentage of the population.
It raises the same constitutional questions
that Chief Justice Burger identified.
But facing those constitutional questions is
simply unnecessary. Congress did not seek
to impose racial quotas on States, nor
permanently to freeze in place minority
supermajorities, long after minority groups'
need for those supermajorities in order to
elect candidates of choice has passed. The
purpose of the VRA is to help minority
groups achieve equality, not to lock them
into legislative ghettos. Congress intended
no such thing. The majority's interpretation
of the amended § 5 is in error.
iii.
Applying instead the functional test
articulated in Texas, I think it is clear that
even
substantial
reductions
in
the black percentage of many of the
majority-black districts
would
be
permissible under § 5. As such, in seeking
out so many black people to satisfy their
unjustified racial quotas, the drafters “went
beyond what was reasonably necessary to
avoid retrogression.”
The Texas court's
functional
analysis
requires the court to look to a variety of
factors, including the mobilization of the
minority group in question. In Texas, the
court was concerned that many of the
relevant factors meant that the minority
group at issue in that case, Latinos, would

require substantially more than 50% of the
population to effectively elect candidates of
choice. Evidence and congressional findings
of low Latino rates of registration and
turnout “underscore[d] why Texas' reliance
on a bare majority-minority district [could
not] be used to determine an ability district
under Section 5.” That is, Texas held that,
considering the particular circumstances of
Latinos in Texas, § 5 required substantially
more than 50% minority population in
majority-minority districts.
In this case, there is significant evidence
that, in light of much-improved black voter
mobilization and near-universal citizenship,
the black voting population in Alabama can
elect candidates of their choice at
significantly lower levels of population than
the Texas court deemed necessary in that
case.
The
evidence
suggests
that
in Alabama black voters need to be only
about 50% of a given district to be able to
elect representatives of choice. If that is so,
then even if the legislature substantially
reduced the percentage of black residents of,
for
example,
HD
55
(73% black), black residents would still
have the ability to elect candidates of choice
there. The point is not that the State was
required to lower the black percentage of
HD 55. Rather, it is that § 5 did
not prohibit the State from doing so. And,
that being the case, the State here cannot
claim that the VRA required it to maintain
HD 55 with 73% black people. Therefore,
the drafters' conduct was not narrowly
tailored.
The majority has found that much of the
evidence
that black voters
can
elect
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candidates of choice with little more than a
bare majority is not credible, and therefore
concluded that the record can support no
conclusion about the minimum level
of black population
necessary
to
allow black voters to elect candidates of
choice. I disagree with those factual
determinations; in particular, I can discern
no legitimate basis in the record for the
majority to find Arrington's testimony not
credible. I would credit Arrington's
testimony on this issue.

of black population would be necessary to
avoid retrogression in a given district:

But, more importantly, even if one accepts
the majority's conclusion that the record
supports no determination one way or the
other regarding the level of black population
necessary to elect candidates of choice, in
the context of racial gerrymandering that
conclusion can only harm the State's case.
The burden is on it to establish that it had a
“strong basis in evidence” for the need for
their purported solution, namely striving to
fill racial quotas. If it has not shown a strong
basis in evidence, because the record can
support no conclusion one way or the other,
then
the
racial
gerrymander
is
unconstitutional.

Had any of the drafters analyzed the
available data, they might (or might not)
have had a “strong basis in evidence” to
conclude that § 5 required them to maintain
the high percentages of black population; as
they did nothing of the sort, they had
nothing but guesses. And that is not enough
to justify the use of racial quotas in
drawing legislative districts.

The drafters' failure to take any steps to
examine what § 5 actually required in this
case underscores that these plans are not
narrowly tailored. Hinaman testified that he
did not review any studies of black voter
participation in Alabama, did not look at
variations among black communities, and
did not use the political data he had
available to examine effectiveness of
majority-black districts. Dial testified that he
did not inquire at all into what level

“Q. So your testimony is that you really
didn't look into the behavior of
individual districts. Instead, you simply
went by the black—the number
of black people, the black percentage in
the district. And what you did was try
and at least maintain that or increase it.
Is that your—fair statement of your
testimony?
“A. That's fair, yes.”

The question here is whether the State was
required by the VRA to seek out black
people
to
add
to
the
already
heavily black majority-minority districts in
order to achieve their racial quotas. And the
clear answer is no. There was an available
alternative: not to sift individuals by race at
all, or only to do so to the extent actually
required by the VRA, and instead to use
other districting principles to draw those
lines. They could have been guided by
protecting incumbents, following natural
and political boundaries, keeping districts
compact, etc. Instead, the drafters reached
out and grabbed as many black people as
possible to achieve their racial quotas even
as the total population of those districts
grew. The conclusion is as clear as day: the
drafters' action was not required under any
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correct reading of the statute, and so cannot
survive as narrowly tailored.
iv.
Even if the drafters' racial quotas were
somehow required by § 5, that would not be
enough
to
save
these
plans,
because Alabama is no longer subject to the
preclearance requirements of § 5.
The Alabama Legislative Black Caucus plai
ntiffs argue that the State cannot now rely on
§ 5 to justify its racial gerrymander because
of the Supreme Court's intervening decision
in Shelby County, which was handed down
after this case was filed but before trial. The
majority responds that Shelby County struck
down only § 4 of the VRA, the formula for
determining whether a jurisdiction is
covered by § 5, but left § 5 itself
undisturbed. However, without § 4, and
absent
further
action
by
Congress, Alabama is no longer a covered
jurisdiction subject to § 5 and need not
obtain preclearance.
The majority then concludes that, even if
compliance with § 5 is not now a compelling
interest, the State's actions should be
evaluated based on the circumstances when
the plans were enacted, not those of the time
of judgment. I disagree. These plans have
not yet gone into effect, and “changed
circumstances may ... transform a
compelling interest into a less than
compelling one.” Indeed, when it comes to
racial classifications, the solution offered
must last no longer than the compelling
interest on which the State relies. Here,
relying on the fact that § 5 was still
applicable at the time the drafters designed
the plans, the State asks us to approve a

race-based solution that has not only already
outlived its problem, but also one that will
be in effect into the next decade, through the
2020 census. But the question in strictscrutiny analysis is not whether the drafters
acted in “good faith” when they enacted
these plans, nor in strict scrutiny do we grant
the kind of deference to which States are
often entitled in other areas of law. In the
absence of an actual compelling interest at
the time of judgment, the court cannot
approve a racial gerrymander.
v.
There is perhaps one last unarticulated
premise to confront. One might think that
the
plaintiffs
here,
who
are
mostly black legislators and voters, should
lose on their Shaw claims because the
majority-black districts were drawn for their
benefit. The plaintiffs in Shaw and its
progeny were, after all, white voters who
objected to the creation of majority-minority
districts. It may be thought that there is
some incongruity to black voters bringing
the same charge against districts in which
they are the majority.
The Supreme Court's equal protection cases
teach that it is sometimes difficult to discern
when a race-conscious policy inures to the
benefit of a minority group and when it
covertly prejudices them. Indeed, as Justice
Thomas recently observed, “The worst
forms of racial discrimination in this Nation
have always been accompanied by straightfaced representations that discrimination
helped minorities.”
In this case, there is a deep dispute regarding
the legislative purpose behind these plans.
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According to the drafters, they sought
nothing more than to comply with their legal
duties and honor their colleagues' wishes as
far as that was possible. According to the
plaintiffs, these redistricting plans are part of
a scheme to eliminate all white Democrats
in the State and thereby establish the
Republican Party as the natural home for all
white Alabamians, leaving the Democratic
Party comprised of only black voters and
legislators. In furtherance of that scheme,
the plaintiffs claim, the drafters packed as
many black people as possible into the
majority-black districts, thereby eliminating
their influence anywhere else. All this, the
plaintiffs claim, was done under the pretext
of seeking to comply with § 5, while in
reality the drafters were motivated by
invidious racial discrimination. Apparently
for this reason, no black legislator voted in
favor of these plans.
In my view, we need not resolve the
question of the drafters' ultimate purpose,
nor need we reach the plaintiffs' other
claims. For, again, to me this case is simple.
In drawing the majority-black districts,
Hinaman and the others were driven by an
overriding consideration: the race of those
individuals who would be included in or
excluded from those districts. They adopted
racial quotas for each district, and they went
to extraordinary lengths to achieve those
quotas. Whether they did so in a good-faith
belief that the quotas were required by § 5,
or for some invidious purpose, is ultimately
of no consequence for the Shaw claims. But
that they did so is as clear as day. Because
the State has offered no sufficient
justification for the use of racial quotas, the

plans are unconstitutional, and I would so
hold.
***
There is a cruel irony to these cases. Earlier
this year, the State of Alabama passionately
argued to the Supreme Court that it should
be free from the VRA requirements of
preclearance. The Court agreed, effectively
removing the preclearance requirement for
covered jurisdictions nationwide. Noting
that “Our country has changed,” the Court
found that Congress's remedy for racial
discrimination in voting failed to “speak [ ]
to current conditions.”
The evidence here is overwhelming that the
State has intentionally singled out
individuals based on race and cabined them
into district after district. The drafting of
majority-black districts was driven by naked
racial quotas; that alone is enough to
condemn these plans. But Alabama argues
that these percentages were justified by, of
all things, § 5. Even as it was asking the
Supreme Court to strike down the
requirement of preclearance for failure to
speak to current conditions, the State
of Alabama was relying on racial quotas
with absolutely no evidence that they had
anything to do with current conditions, and
seeking to justify those quotas with the very
provision it was helping to render inert.
To be sure, conditions 30 years ago or 20
years ago or even a decade ago (in or around
2001) may have justified requiring high
percentages of black population in majorityblack districts.
Indeed,
as
I
now
consider Alabama's and
the
majority's
argument that the record justifies these high
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racial percentages, I feel as if I were in a
time warp carried back into the past, with
the arguments being the same but with the
parties having switched sides. But, again,
the issue here is, What are the conditions
today? Not, what they were back then.
Therefore, just as the Supreme Court, in
applying principles of federalism, found in
Shelby County that Congress's remedy for
racial discrimination in voting failed to
“speak [ ] to current conditions,” this court,
applying strict scrutiny, should likewise find
that the Alabama Legislature's racially based
redistricting plans fail to speak to current
conditions. And just as the Supreme Court
sent Congress back to the drawing board,
this
court
should
send
the Alabama Legislature back as well.
Moreover, because these plans have not
gone into effect, there is ample time for the

Alabama Legislature to come up with plans
that accede to the request made by all of
Alabama's black legislators, a request that is
not only a legitimate and laudable one but is,
in fact, the only legitimate request that can
be made absent current conditions reflecting
otherwise: to carry out its decennial
reapportionment, as required by one-personone vote, based more on traditional
districting factors (such as respect for
political subdivisions and precincts,
compactness, contiguity, and incumbency)
and based far less on race.
Therefore, because the plans before this
court rely on quotas to cabin individuals into
districts based on the race of those
individuals in an intentional, unjustified, and
thus illegal manner, I cannot give the plans
my imprimatur. I respectfully dissent.
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1993 Plan

1993 Plan

House
District

2001
Plan

Total Black
Pop. (%)

Using 2000
Census Data

Black Total
Pop. (%)

Using 1990
Data

Total Black
Pop. (%)

19
32
52
53

28,011
24,975
27,716
26,247

66.039
59.598
65.848
64.445

25,869
22,704
25,799
21,312

78.565
63.490
73.870
65.298

25,118
24,626
24,825
24,136

66.27
63.93
67.72
66.01

54
55
56
57
58
59

25,563
27,344
26,546
25,373
25,937
25,449

63.276
67.772
62.665
62.967
63.518
63.241

20,153
27,217
23,896
28,593
24,284
20,459

63.061
76.270
70.268
82.615
74,163
66.255

23,567
22,534
23,326
23,453
22,969
23,367

63.95
61.57
63.52
63.90
62.75
63.86

60
67
68
69
70
71
72

26,693
25,663
25,227
26,417
26,587
25,872
25,561

64.348
63.447
62.211
65.308
62.827
64.191
60.748

23,455
23,358
23,051
25,198
23,375
24,041
24,825

74.876
71.032
62.938
64.855
75.603
67.736
64.652

24,380
23,247
23,774
23,149
24,460
24,390
24,436

66.22
63.50
63.58
63.29
64.60
66.16
65.36

76
77
78
82
83
84

30,117
28,546
29,390
27,605
24,651
21,696

73.309
69.677
72.697
62.663
61.214
52.360

29,655
23,986
23,911
30,493
26,144
16,235

76.527
74.802
68.874
78.826
60.782
39.353

24,427
26,704
26,468
30,503
25,957
13,832

66.69
71.93
72.37
79.73
64.52
37.81

85
97
98
99
103

19,964
27,667
27,393
27,674
26,570

47.863
64.738
64.448
65.250
63.049

16,934
24,414
22,935
25,950
25,832

53.312
67.243
69.401
74.916
75.299

18,696
23,878
24,062
24,033
24,003

51.13
65.22
65.72
65.09
65.58

212

1993 Plan

1993 Plan

Senate

2001

Total Black

Using 2000

Total Black

Using 1990

Total Black

District

Plan

Pop. (%)

Data

Pop. (%)

Data

Pop. (%)

18

82,769

66.865

67,264

67.588

72,528

65.89

19

80,662

66.227

79,706

76.452

69,313

63.00

20

80,075

65.697

68,198

71.829

70,716

64.28

23

75,380

62.305

71,607

66.081

70,170

63.46

24

75,520

62.409

72,245

68.964

73,286

65.36

26

92,486

71.507

77,552

73.485

77,599

70.34

28

71,653

56.458

72,872

59.269

70,292

61.09

33

79,492

62.451

73,299

70.483

71,973

65.34
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House
District
Number
19
32
52
53
54
55

Act 2012–602
Total Black
Pop. (%)
61.5
60.3
60.1
56.2
56.9
73.6

Overpop. (+) or
Underpop. (-) of 2001
District Using 2010
Census Data (%)
–6.90
–14.76
–5.19
–22.28
–23.32
–21.86

56
57
58
59
60
67

62.3
68.5
73.0
76.8
67.9
69.2

–9.79
–20.48
–17.75
–27.86
–19.37
–16.79

62.665
62.967
63.518
63.241
64.348
63.447

63.52
63.90
62.75
63.86
66.22
63.50

68
69

64.6
64.2

–20.40
–17.46

62.211
65.308

63.58
63.29

70
71
72
76

62.2
66.9
64.5
73.9

–13.77
–16.32
–13.42
–1.38

62.827
64.191
60.748
73.309

64.60
66.16
65.36
66.69

77
78
82
83
84
85

67.0
70.2
62.2
57.7
52.4
50.5

–23.12
–32.16
–4.68
–9.85
–9.24
–6.79

69.677
72.697
62.663
61.214
52.360
47.863

71.93
72.37
79.73
64.52
37.81
51.13

97
98
99
103

60.8
60.0
65.7
65.3

–22.22
–16.89
–12.59
–10.79

64.738
64.448
65.250
63.049

65.22
65.72
65.09
65.58

2001 House
Total Black
Pop. (%)
66.039
59.598
65.848
64.445
63.276
67.772

1993 House
Total Black
Pop. (%)
66.27
63.93
67.72
66.01
63.95
61.57
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Senate
District
Number
18

Act 2012–603
Total Black
Pop. (%)
59.12

Overpop. (+) or Underpop.
(-) of 2001 District Using
2010 Census Data (%)
–17.64

2001 Senate
Total Black
Pop. (%)
66.685

1993 Senate
Total Black
Pop. (%)
65.89

19
20

65.39
63.38

–20.06
–21.37

66.227
65.697

63.00
64.28

23
24

64.81
63.30

–18.03
–12.98

62.305
62.409

63.46
65.36

26
28

75.22
59.96

–11.64
–3.80

71.507
56.458

70.34
61.09

33

71.71

–18.05

62.451

65.34
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House District

Act 2012–602 Total

Act 2012–602 Voting– Deviation from Ideal

Number
19
32
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
67
68
69
70
71
72
76
77
78
82
83
84
85
97
98
20
23
24
26
28
33

Black Pop. (%)
61.5
60.3
60.1
56.2
56.9
73.6
62.3
68.5
73.0
76.8
67.9
69.2
64.6
64.2
62.2
66.9
64.5
73.9
67.0
70.2
62.2
57.7
52.4
50.5
60.8
60.0
63.38
64.81
63.30
75.22
59.96
71.71

Age Black Pop. (%)
60.15
57.68
57.21
52.98
52.50
70.60
59.71
65.96
67.99
74.28
65.68
65.73
61.82
61.83
57.13
64.42
61.88
71.24
64.20
67.43
60.48
55.53
50.99
47.22
56.73
57.96
59.03
61.67
59.74
72.70
58.03
68.10

Total Pop. (%)
-.97
-.04
-.96
-.91
-.99
-.99
-.99
-.99
-.95
-.67
-.96
-.97
-.99
-.10
.99
-.38
-.38
.99
.95
.96
.74
.99
.98
-.64
-.99
-.99
-.99
-.90
.85
-.08
.98
-.26
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Act 2012–602 Voting–Age
Black Pop. (%) Using
House District Number 2010 Census Data
19
60.15
32
57.68
52
57.21
53
52.98
54
52.50
55
70.60
56
59.71
57
65.96
58
67.99
59
74.28
60
65.68
67
65.73
68
61.82
69
61.83
70
57.13
71
64.42
72
61.88
76
71.24
77
64.20
78
67.43
82
60.48
83
55.53
84
50.99
85
47.22
97
56.73
98
57.96
99
62.07
103
60.18

2001 house Plan Voting–Age
Black Pop. (%) Using
2010 Census Data
67.70
56.62
58.52
52.49
53.37
71.22
59.42
66.52
74.02
64.25
65.15
65.59
59.97
61.99
56.31
62.04
57.52
67.48
71.48
72.57
54.19
55.51
49.23
45.64
57.35
62.23
70.09
64.83
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Senate District
Number
18
19
20
23
24
26
28
33

Act 2012–603 Voting–
Age
Black Pop. (%) Using
2010 Census Data

Act 2001 Senate Plan Voting–
Age
Black Pop. (%) Using
2010 Census Data

56.43
62.68
59.03
61.67
59.74
72.70
58.03
68.10

57.31
69.31
74.44
61.79
59.38
70.87
49.82
61.55
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Total
Black
Pop.
in
2001
HD # Plan

19
32
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
67
68
69
70
71
72
76
77
78
82
83
84
85
97
98
99
103

28,011
24,975
27,716
26,247
25,563
27,344
26,546
25,373
25,937
25,449
26,693
25,663
25,227
26,417
26,587
25,872
25,561
30,117
28,546
29,390
27,605
24,651
21,696
19,964
27,667
27,393
27,674
26,570

Total
Black

Black
Black People
Pop. of Moved
To
Plan
Create

Deviation Pop.
(%)
in 2001
in 2001 Using

2001

Black
People Moved
To Create 2001
Act 602
Plan Using
Deviation Act 602
from
Deviations
Ideal

(Redistribution

Total

/ Total

Plan (%) Plan

Census Plan

Pop. (%) Black Pop.)

0.149
–1.055
–0.619
–3.837
–4.614
–4.736
0.021
–4.857
–3.587
–4.987
–2.057
–4.498
–4.255
–4.493
–0.083
–4.836
–0.652
–3.001
–3.268
–4.545
4.014
–4.918
–2.165
–1.516
.907
.357
.139
–.498

25,869
22,704
25,799
21,312
20,153
27,217
23,896
28,593
24,284
20,459
23,455
23,358
23,051
25,198
23,375
24,041
24,825
29,655
23,986
23,911
30,493
26,144
16,235
16,934
24,414
22,935
25,950
25,832

–0.97
–0.04
–0.96
–0.91
–0.99
–0.99
–0.99
–0.99
–0.95
–0.67
–0.96
–0.97
–0.99
–0.10
0.99
–0.38
–0.38
0.99
0.95
0.96
0.74
0.99
0.98
–0.64
–0.99
–0.99
–0.99
–0.98

66.039
59.598
65.848
64.445
63.276
67.772
62.665
62.967
63.518
63.241
64.348
63.447
62.211
65.308
62.827
64.191
60.748
73.309
69.677
72.697
62.663
61.214
52.360
47.863
64.738
64.448
65.250
63.049

2,142
2,271
1,917
4,935
5,410
127
2,650
–3,220
1,653
4,990
3,238
2,305
2,176
1,219
3,212
1,831
736
462
4,560
5,479
–2,888
–1,493
5,461
3,030
3,253
4,458
1,724
738

1,947 / 27,816
1,631 / 24,335
1,088 / 26,887
5,848 / 27,161
6,494 / 26,647
1,323 / 28,540
2,493 / 26,389
–2,076 / 26,517
2,475 / 26,759
6,259 / 26,718
3,651 / 27,106
3,366 / 26,724
3,147 / 26,198
2,552 / 27,750
3,612 / 26,987
3,158 / 27,199
914 / 25,740
1,834 / 31,489
5,931 / 29,917
7,306 / 31,217
–3,643 / 26,850
161 / 26,305
6,254 / 22,489
3,293 / 20,227
2,848 / 27,262
4,205 / 27,140
1,528 / 27,478
722 / 26,554
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Total
Black
Pop.
in
2001
SD # Plan
18
82,769
19
80,662
20
80,075
23
75,380
24
75,520
26
92,486
28
71,653
33
79,492

Total
Black

Black
Pop. of Black
1993
People
Plan
Moved
To
Using Create

Deviation Pop.
(%)
in 2001
In 2001 2000
Plan (%)
–2.577
–4.142
–4.072
–4.781
–4.762
1.794
–0.116
.179

Plan
66.865
66.227
65.697
62.305
62.409
71.507
56.458
62.451

Census
67,264
79,706
68,198
71,607
72,245
77,552
72,872
73,299

Black
People Moved
Act 603 To Create 2001
Deviation Plan USing Act
from
603 Deviations
Ideal

(Redistribution

2001

Total

/ Total

Plan
15,505
956
11,877
3,773
3,275
14,934
–1,219
6,193

Pop. (%)
–0.96
–0.99
–0.99
–0.90
0.85
–0.08
0.98
–0.26

Black Pop.)
16,879 / 84,143
3,609 / 83,315
14,450 / 82,648
6,845 / 78,452
7,726 / 79,971
13,250 / 90,802
–433 / 72,439
5,845 / 79,144
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“Court to Review Alabama’s ‘Race-Based’ Reapportionment”
The Washington Post
Robert Barnes
June 2, 2014
The Supreme Court said Monday that it will
review
Alabama’s
legislative
reapportionment plan, accepting a challenge
from the state’s Democrats and African
American legislators that the new plan was
an attempt to limit minority effectiveness.
The challengers said the state’s ruling
Republicans packed too many minority
voters into too few districts — ensuring
minority representation in those districts but
harming the chances for influence
elsewhere.
A three-judge federal panel had rejected the
challenges filed by the Alabama Legislative
Black Caucus and the Alabama Democratic
Conference. That court agreed with
Alabama, ruling 2 to 1 that the legislature
had successfully navigated a “political
thicket” by obeying federal laws and the
Constitution regarding redistricting while at
the
same
time
ensuring minority
representation.
Alabama has one of the nation’s highest
percentages of African Americans serving in
the state legislature.
But the challengers said Republicans who
control the state’s political leadership in
effect supplied too much of a good thing.
Districts with a minority population that
would ensure the election of an African
American were packed with even more
black voters, raising the proportions to more
than 70 percent.

The new voters often came from districts
where they might help elect a Democrat, the
challenges say. In effect, it means virtually
no districts are conducive to the election of a
white Democrat, and the legislature’s blacks
find themselves without partners to
influence public policy, the challengers say.
That has created an unusual situation in
which it is minority groups that are saying
the state paid too much attention to race
when drawing districts.
“When
considering
whether
it
is
constitutional to take account of race in
redistricting, the law is — and always has
been — sensible enough to recognize a
distinction between what is reasonably
necessary to make voting fair, and what is
not,” said the petition from the Alabama
Democratic Caucus.
Joe Reed, chairman of the conference, told
the Associated Press that the Republicandesigned districts were drawn to reduce the
number of black voters in majority-white
districts.
“They were doing their level best to wipe
out white Democrats,” Reed said. “They
were trying their best to have a legislature of
white Republicans and black Democrats,
and then they could ignore the black
Democrats.”
Such arguments have sometimes created
tensions between minority groups and the
Democrats they most often favor, said
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Nathaniel Persily, a redistricting expert and
Stanford University law professor.

have confronted the question of how race
may be considered in redistricting decisions.

Black incumbents especially want to make
sure that districts remain safe for reelection,
while other Democrats want minority voters
more dispersed to increase the party’s
chances of winning more races, he said. In
Alabama, the two sides seem to be in
agreement.

Alabama Attorney General Luther Strange
(R) said the state had complied with
constitutional concerns and with the Voting
Rights Act. The state’s plan has eight of the
35 Senate districts and 28 of the 105 House
districts with a majority of black residents,
just as it was when Democrats controlled
redistricting.

But the three-judge panel said Alabama
proved that the changes it made to the
redistricting map were to make sure the
districts
complied
with
another
constitutional mandate — that they be equal
in size.
At the time the plan was finalized, Alabama
was required by the Voting Rights Act to get
the Justice Department’s approval before the
new maps could be implemented, and the
department complied. Last June, the
Supreme Court tossed the part of the Voting
Rights Act that required “preclearance” in
some states with a history of discrimination,
most of them in the South.
Persily said the Alabama case will be the
first time Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.
and Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., both of
whom are skeptical of racial classifications,

“My office has been defending the
constitutionality of these districts since they
were enacted by the legislature and
precleared by the Department of Justice, and
we will continue to do so in the U.S.
Supreme Court,” Strange said in a statement
after the justices announced they would
review the case in the term starting in
October.
Alabama voters go to the polls Tuesday for
primaries in the redrawn districts. It seems
likely the November elections also will take
place under the new map.
The
combined
cases
are Alabama
Legislative
Black
Caucus
v.
Alabama and Alabama
Democratic
Conference
v.
Alabama.
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“Black Groups Tell Supreme Court Ala. Districts Biased”
Montgomery Advertiser
Mary Troyan
August 17, 2014
The Alabama Legislature will be further
racially polarized by new district boundaries
that pack more black voters into certain
districts than the law requires, state black
political groups told the Supreme Court last
week.
The justices agreed in June to hear the
complaint from Alabama that the
Republican majority went too far in using
race to redistrict itself in 2012. The result,
according to black Democratic legislators, is
unusually high black majorities in districts
surrounded by districts that are even more
white.
"The Constitution does not permit states to
stumble into such excessively segregated
election districts, whether through good faith
or bad," wrote lawyers for the Alabama
Democratic Conference, one of the groups
involved in the case.
The ADC and the Alabama Legislative
Black Caucus filed their briefs with the
justices on Wednesday. The Alabama
Attorney General's office, which is
defending the new map, is scheduled to
respond in October.
The case could be a significant test of how
the Supreme Court, which recently struck
down a piece of the Voting Rights Act,
views the use of race in redistricting.
The black Alabama lawmakers, all of whom
voted against the new map, argue that the
state's first GOP majority in 136 years

wrongly focused solely on race in deciding
where to draw new district lines. They also
complain that the Republicans were
unnecessarily strict in making sure each
district had almost exactly equal population.
The combination, they say, resulted in
unconstitutional racial gerrymandering.
For example, the Montgomery County
Senate District seat held by Sen. Quinton
Ross would have been 72.75 percent
African-American using the 2010 Census
data. But the district, which lost population
over the last decade, needed 16,000 people
added to it.
Republicans added 15,785 people to Ross'
district: 14,806 were black, 36 were white
and 943 were other minorities, according to
their brief. The result was Ross' district grew
to more than 75 percent black.
The new district "creatively curls around to
exclude a majority-white portion of
Montgomery County," the lawyers wrote.
Statewide, 16 to 20 percent of black
residents were moved from white-majority
districts into what the lawyers called "superconcentrated" black districts. And districts
that once had racially diverse voting age
populations were eliminated, they argued.
"The
result
is
election
districts
extraordinarily segregated by race, but for
which no level of government claims
decision-making responsibility," wrote
lawyers for the ADC.
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Under the supervision of the U.S. Justice
Department for the past half-century, it was
standard for lawmakers to intentionally draw
some districts in a way that increased the
likelihood that black voters could elect the
candidate of their choice. That policy is
credited with helping elect black officials at
every level of local, state and federal
government after decades of racism and
segregation.
But now, under the new GOP majority,
black Democrats in Alabama allege the
policy is being twisted to diminish the
power of black voters by packing them into
a limited number of districts.
Now, 27 of 105 House districts and eight of
35 Senate districts have black majorities.
Republican lawmakers have testified they
intended to even out the population among

the districts without lowering the percentage
of blacks in the majority-black districts; to
avoid putting incumbents into the same
district; and to keep counties whole.
Alabama Attorney General Luther Strange, a
Republican, has argued in previous court
filings that the lower court decision, a
divided 2-1 ruling by a three-judge panel,
rejected the argument that the new map was
based solely on race and upheld the map as
constitutional.
"And black legislators themselves proposed
some of the changes that the plaintiffs cite as
evidence of packing," the attorney general's
office wrote earlier this year.
The justices are expected to hear the case
during the court session that begins in
October.
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“Federal Judges Rule That State Legislative District Lines Don’t Violate
Voting Rights Act”
North Jefferson News
Robert Carter
December 20, 2013
A special panel of three federal judges has
ruled that Alabama's legislative district
boundaries do not run afoul of the Voting
Rights Act.
The judges ruled 2-1 in favor of the
boundaries, which were redrawn in 2011 to
reflect population changes that resulted from
the 2010 U.S. Census. The boundaries were
pre-cleared by the U.S. Department of
Justice at Attorney General Luther Strange's
behest shortly after the legislature approved
them.
Lawsuits were filed by the Alabama
Legislative Black Caucus and the Alabama
Democratic Conference, in which they
claimed the new boundaries unfairly
discriminated against minorities. The panel
of judges held a seven-day trial in August,
and handed down a voluminous opinion on
Friday.

Strange hailed the decision in a statement. "I
have believed from the beginning of this
process that Alabama complied with all
legal and constitutional requirements in
adopting the new district lines, and I am
pleased that the court agreed with our
position that the new legislative districts are
consistent with federal law," he said.
The latest redistricting process was the first
since the Alabama State Legislature
switched to a Republican majority. The
process, which occurs after each census, has
been subject to federal scrutiny under the
Voting Rights Act since the law was enacted
in 1965. The pre-clearance process that
Strange requested has been largely done
away with, after the U.S. Supreme Court
declared it unconstitutional earlier this year
in Shelby County v. Holder, in which the
court said that the data used for preclearance was useless because it was more
than
40
years
old.
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“The League of Dangerous Mapmakers”
The Atlantic
Robert Draper
September 19, 2012
Every 10 years, after U.S. census workers
have fanned out across the nation, a snowyhaired gentleman by the name of Tom
Hofeller takes up anew his quest to destroy
Democrats. He packs his bag and his laptop
with its special Maptitude software, kisses
his wife of 46 years, pats his West Highland
white terrier, Kara, and departs his home in
Alexandria, Virginia, for a United States that
he will help carve into a jigsaw of disunity.
Where Hofeller travels depends to some
degree on the migratory patterns of his
fellow Americans over the previous decade.
As the census shows, some states will have
swelled in population, while others will have
dwindled. The states that gained the most
people are entitled, under the Constitution,
to additional representation in the form of
new congressional districts, which (since the
law allows only 435 such districts) are
wrenched from the states that lost the most
people. After the 2010 census, eight states
(all in the South and the West) gained
congressional districts, which were stripped
from 10 others (in the Midwest and the East
Coast, as well as Katrina-ravaged
Louisiana).
The creation of a new congressional district,
or the loss of an old one, affects every
district around it, necessitating new maps.
Even states not adding or losing
congressional representatives need new
district maps that reflect the population
shifts within their borders, so that residents

are equally represented no matter where they
live. This ritual carving and paring of the
United States into 435 sovereign units,
known as redistricting, was intended by the
Framers solely to keep democracy’s
electoral
scales
balanced.
Instead,
redistricting today has become the most
insidious practice in American politics—a
way, as the opportunistic machinations
following the 2010 census make evident, for
our elected leaders to entrench themselves in
435 impregnable garrisons from which they
can maintain political power while avoiding
demographic realities.
For the past four decades, it is what Tom
Hofeller has done for a living.
Hofeller maintains an office at the
Republican National Committee on Capitol
Hill, though he is now the RNC’s paid
consultant rather than, as in years past, its
official redistricting director. At 69, he is a
professorial if somewhat impish fellow (in
his early days, a California House speaker
dubbed him “the kid with the shit-eating
grin”) who is more than content not to be a
household name. His after-hours life
includes singing tenor in his church choir
and reading multitudes of books that seldom
have anything to do with politics. Hofeller’s
earliest clients included Democrats, and
today he describes himself as a moderate
Republican. The adjective is irrelevant,
however. His chosen field is, according to
Georgia
Congressman
and
House
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Republican redistricting vice chair Lynn
Westmoreland, “the nastiest form of politics
that there is”: Tom Hofeller’s objective is to
design wombs for his team and tombs for
the other guys.
And so his cyclical travels take him mainly
to states where the Republicans are likely to
be drawing the new maps. (In most states, an
appointed
committee
consisting
of
legislators from the majority party produces
the map, which is then brought to the
legislative body for a vote. Other states
relegate the duties to an appointed
commission.) At meetings, Hofeller gives a
PowerPoint presentation titled “What I’ve
Learned About Redistricting—The Hard
Way!” Like its author, the presentation is
both learned and a bit hokey, with
admonitions like “Expect the unexpected”
and “Don’t get ‘cute.’ Remember, this IS
legislation!” He warns legislators to resist
the urge to overindulge, to snatch up every
desirable precinct within reach, when
drawing their own districts.
But Hofeller’s helpful tips give way to the
sinister warnings of a gimlet-eyed, semi-clandestine political operative: “Make sure
your security is real.” “Make sure your
computer is in a PRIVATE location.”
“ ‘Emails are the tool of the devil.’ Use
personal contact or a safe phone!” “Don’t
reveal more than necessary.” “BEWARE of
non-partisan, or bi-partisan, staff bearing
gifts. They probably are not your friends.”
Be discreet. Plan ahead. Follow the law.
Don’t overreach. Tom Hofeller relishes the
blood sport of redistricting, but there is a
responsible way—as Hofeller himself
demonstrated this past cycle in the artful (if

baldly partisan) redrawing of North
Carolina’s maps—and also a reckless way.
So that his message will penetrate, he tells
audiences horror stories about states that
ignored his warnings and went with maps
that either were tossed out by the federal
courts or created more political problems
than they solved.
Already Hofeller has picked out which
cautionary tale he will relay during the next
decennial tour. The new horror story, he’s
decided, will be Texas, which stood, this
past cycle, as a powerful example of how
reckless a redistricting process can become.
That mangled effort also provides a stark
contrast to the maps Hofeller helped create
in
North
Carolina—drawings
that
demonstrate how in the blood sport of
redistricting, the most cravenly political
results are won with calculating prudence.
As the election returns rolled in on the
evening of November 2, 2010, Hofeller had
already started gearing up for the next round
of redistricting. “I’m sitting and watching,
less interested than many in the congressional races,” he recalled. “I’m the one
saying ‘Okay, so we won Congress. The
question is, are we going to keep it?’ And
then what I see is that we gained 700 state
legislative seats. The night just kept getting
better and better. Things happened in some
states”—in terms of controlling whole
legislative bodies—“that we never expected.
Alabama! North Carolina!”
It seemed like Reconstruction all over again
for the GOP. Because the Republican
tsunami coincided with the 2010 census,
Tom Hofeller’s party was suddenly able to
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redraw many of the 435 congressional maps
to its own partisan advantage.
Without asking for guidance from Hofeller
or other veterans of the trade, delirious party
officials predicted that after all the
connivances were set in motion, the GOP
would be able to reward itself with an
additional 15 safe House seats before a
single vote was cast in the 2012 elections.
It hasn’t quite turned out that way. Partly
this is because Democrats understood the
stakes and went to extraordinary lengths to
blunt the assault. In California, the
Democrats (according to e-mails obtained
by ProPublica) successfully swayed a newly
formed independent citizens’ redistricting
commission,
through
an
intricately
coordinated guerrilla operation that will
likely accrue them six or seven new seats. In
Republican-controlled
Florida,
Nancy
Pelosi—in relentless pursuit of the House
speakership she lost after the 2010
midterms—helped fund the successful “Fair
Districts” referendum to ban partisan
redistricting. The measure seems to have
persuaded Florida map-drawers to exhibit
some self-restraint, and thus a number of
surefire Republican seats were wiped from
the boards. Of course, Pelosi has not
suggested that the Fair Districts concept be
applied to states where her party wields
legislative control, such as Maryland and
Illinois, where the Democrats further cut
into the GOP’s gains by drawing nakedly
partisan maps that simply vaporized
Republican-held districts.
Tom Hofeller certainly did his part to
maximize the returns on the GOP’s 2010
electoral bounty. Hired by North Carolina’s

top GOP legislators just after the midterms
to advise in the drawing of their state’s new
maps, the political cartographer spent many
hours on the phone with the state
legislature’s
redistricting
chairmen.
(Hofeller is careful to avoid leaving an email trail. As his PowerPoint presentation
cautions, “A journey to legal HELL starts
with but a single misstatement! …
Remember recent e-mail disasters!!!”)
While talking, Hofeller would expertly
manipulate his computer’s Maptitude
software, a lightning-fast graphics system
that processes neighborhood population
data, including racial composition, so that a
user can draw and redraw hypothetical
district lines.
By July 2011, Hofeller had helped produce
what a Democratic operative ruefully terms
“exceptionally smart” maps—ones that,
assuming they survive a lingering court
challenge, may very well install a 10–3 GOP
stronghold in place of the present 7–6
Democratic congressional majority.
Hofeller already knew North Carolina, the
focal point of several landmark redistricting
cases in which he’d testified, well. The Tar
Heel State has a history of election
discrimination and is therefore one of the
jurisdictions covered by Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, which requires that
electoral maps be approved by either a
federal court or the Justice Department.
(Like all other states, North Carolina is also
covered by Section 2, which forbids
discriminatory practices more broadly.)
Hofeller and the other Republican
mapmakers therefore took particular care
not to “retrogress” the racial makeup of the
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districts represented by the AfricanAmerican Democrats G. K. Butterfield and
Mel Watt—since doing so would have
meant running afoul of the Voting Rights
Act.
Instead, he reserved his chief mischief for
the remaining districts. Hofeller and his
cohort hoarded several of Raleigh’s white
precincts and moved them into the 2nd
District, which had been held by Democrats
for 108 of the previous 110 years, until a
former intensive-care nurse named Renee
Ellmers rode the Tea Party wave to an upset
victory in 2010. The new drawings would
give the neophyte Ellmers a safe Republican
district to last at least at decade.
Recognizing that North Carolina’s many
Democratic voters had to be put somewhere,
the mapmakers shoveled as many as
possible into the Democratic districts of
Watt and of David Price, a former Duke
professor who represented the liberal bastion
of Chapel Hill. Most of those Democrats,
however, were stripped from the districts of
the moderate Democratic incumbents Mike
McIntyre, Larry Kissell, and Brad Miller. In
the Democrat Heath Shuler’s 11th District,
the mapmakers simply gouged out the
progressive core, Asheville, and affixed it to
the 10th, the state’s most Republican district
over the previous 60 years. The new maps
have made quite an impact. Shuler and
Miller have announced that they will not
seek another term. McIntyre (whose house
has now been drawn out of his own district)
and Kissell are widely viewed as among the
most imperiled Democrats facing reelection
in November.

Progressive groups immediately filed suit
challenging the North Carolina maps,
contending that the state deliberately diluted
minority voting power. Hofeller happens to
be an old hand at redistricting litigation, and
the maps will probably survive into the next
decade. (Meanwhile, in a dazzling show of
circular logic, Phil Berger, the top
Republican state senator, recently refused to
allow consideration of a redistricting-reform
bill that he had supported back when his
party was in the minority, citing the fact that
North Carolina is “engaged in litigation on
that issue.”)
Still, legal battles have been the other major
factor in diminishing the Republican Party’s
success. Given that blacks and Latinos tend
to vote overwhelmingly Democratic,
Republicans have often taken pains to
maximize their control of the districts in a
way that does not violate the terms of the
Voting Rights Act. But the new census
results have presented the GOP with a
particularly confounding puzzle—one that
lies at the center of this cycle’s redistricting
controversies. On the one hand, the biggest
gains in U.S. population over the past
decade have been in two Republicancontrolled states: Florida, which thereby
received two new congressional districts,
and Texas, which was granted a whopping
four.
But on the other hand, most of each state’s
new residents are African Americans and
(especially) Hispanics. In Texas, the
population has swelled by 4.3 million over
the past decade. Of those new residents,
2.8 million are Hispanic and more than half
a million are African American. While those
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groups grew at a rate of 42 percent and
22 percent, respectively, the growth in white
Texans was a meager 4.2 percent. In other
words: without the minority growth,
Texas—now officially a majority-minority
state—would not have received a single new
district. The possibility that a GOP mapdrawer would use all those historically
Democratic-leaning transplants as a means
of gaining Republican seats might strike a
redistricting naïf as undemocratic.
And yet that’s exactly what the Texas
redistricting bosses did last year. Shrugging
off the warnings of Tom Hofeller and other
Washington Republicans, the Texans
produced lavishly brazen maps that resulted
in a net gain of four districts for Republicans
and none for minority populations. The
entirely predictable consequence is that the
Texas maps have spent more than a year
bouncing between three federal courts,
including the Supreme Court. The legal
uncertainty has had national ramifications. It
meant, for example, postponing the Texas
primary from March 6 until May 29, which
cost Texas its role as a prominent player in
the
Super
Tuesday
presidential
sweepstakes—a very lucky break for the
eventual nominee, Mitt Romney, who likely
would have lost the state to Newt Gingrich
or Rick Santorum.
But the chaos produced by the overreach in
Texas isn’t anomalous. Rather, it is very
much in keeping with the new winner-takeall culture of redistricting, an endeavor that
has somehow managed to grow in both
sophistication and crassness, like an ageless
strain of cancer that inhabits a host body for
so long that the two seem inseparable, even

as the former quietly destroys the latter from
the inside out.
How ingrained is the practice of politically
motivated redistricting in America? So
ingrained that it existed even before
Congress did. Late in 1788, just after
Virginia voted to ratify the Constitution and
thereby join the Union, Patrick Henry
persuaded his state’s legislature to fashion
the nascent 5th Congressional District in
such a way as to force Henry’s political
enemy James Madison, of Montpelier, to run
against the formidable James Monroe, of
Highland. Madison prevailed and later went
on to become America’s principal author of
the Bill of Rights as well as its fourth
president. Serving as his second vice
president was Elbridge Gerry, who as the
governor of Massachusetts in 1812 had
presided over a redrawing of the state map
so blatant in its partisan manipulations that
the curiously tailored shape of one Bostonarea district resembled a salamander. The
term gerrymander has been used ever since
to describe the contorting of districts beyond
all reason save political gain.
Though the constitutionally intended
purpose of redistricting is to maintain proper
apportionment of elected representatives,
several states, for much of the 20th century,
didn’t bother to adjust their district
boundaries at all. The result, in Texas for
instance, was that a powerful rural legislator
like House Speaker Sam Rayburn could
represent some 200,000 voters, while in the
adjacent Dallas district, Bruce Alger
represented roughly 900,000. In 1962, the
Supreme
Court
ruled
that
such
malapportionment violated the Fourteenth
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Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection
under the law. One of the dissenters, Justice
Felix Frankfurter, warned against judges’
entering a “political thicket.” The high court
subsequently ignored him. In the 1980s, the
Court took umbrage at the redistricting
orchestrated by Georgia Democrats and their
leader, state Representative Joe Mack
Wilson, who flatly declared, “I don’t want to
draw nigger districts.” A decade later, the
Court argued that efforts to boost minority
representation could also go too far, citing
Mel Watt’s North Carolina district, a wormy
creature of such narrowness that, so it was
said, a person driving down Interstate 85
with doors open on both sides could kill
people in two districts. Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor tsk-tsked that “appearances do
matter,” and the Supreme Court decreed in
1996 that even districts drawn so as to
maximize minority representation should
retain “compactness, contiguity and respect
for political subdivisions."
O’Connor’s admonition notwithstanding, as
works of art, redistricting maps continue to
evoke a crazed but symbolically rich
dreamscape of yearnings, sentimentality,
vendettas, and hyper-realism in American
political life. Districts weave this way and
that to include a Congress member’s
childhood school, a mother-in-law’s
residence, a wealthy donor’s office, or, out
of spite, an adversary’s pet project. When
touring Republican strongholds, Tom
Hofeller enjoys showing audiences the
contours of Georgia’s 13th District, as
proposed after the 2010 census, which he
likens to “flat-cat roadkill.” (The map that
was ultimately approved is shaped more like
a squirrel that hasn’t yet been hit by a car.)

This redistricting cycle’s focus of
wonderment, in Hofeller’s view, is
Maryland’s splatter-art 3rd District, which
reminds him of an “amoeba convention.” He
tends not to mention the gimpy-legged
facsimile that is his own rendition of North
Carolina’s 4th District.
The byzantine trade of redistricting was long
dominated by brainy eccentrics like Hofeller
and his Democratic counterparts Mark
Gersh and Michael Berman. But that began
to change in the 1990s, when the availability
of mapping software (such as Maptitude,
RedAppl, and autoBound) and block-byblock census data for the whole country
opened up the field to a waiting world of
political geeks. The democratization of
redistricting—made manifest last year in
Virginia, which held a student competition,
complete with cash prizes, to draw the best
maps—is a lovely thing, perhaps. But as one
redistricting veteran told me, “There’s an
old saying: Give a child a hammer, and the
world becomes a nail. Give the chairman of
a state redistricting committee a powerful
enough computer and block-level census
data, so that he suddenly discovers he can
draw really weird and aggressive districts—
and he will.”
This amateur-hour dynamic presaged the
Texas redistricting fiasco. My native state
has a long heritage of bellicose
gerrymandering,
which
began
with
pronouncedly racist maps drawn by
Democrats more than half a century ago and
continued with Tom DeLay’s knee-capping
of Democratic incumbents in his notorious
mid-census redistricting in 2003. But no one
ever accused the DeLay machine of being
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out of its depth. In 2011, by contrast, the
individual principally responsible for
drawing the state’s congressional district
maps, Ryan Downton, was a lawyer and coowner of a medical-imaging firm. The
seemingly random hiring of a relative novice
like Downton (who was defeated in
May 2012 as a Republican candidate for the
state legislature) was in keeping with a
willful ignorance embraced by the state
legislature’s two appointed redistricting
chiefs, neither of whom had the slightest
experience in this arcane field. (Downton
says he was hired because of his litigation
expertise, since so many redistricting cases
end up in court.) As the veteran Texas
Democratic redistricting strategist Matt
Angle told me, “People who actually have
an understanding of the Voting Rights Act—
like Hofeller, who’s 10 times more
competent than the people who drew these
maps—they wouldn’t have been part of
this.”
According to one of the Texas Republicans
intimately involved in the map-drawing
project, “Tom [Hofeller] and [Republican
National Committee counsel] Dale Oldham
created an adversarial relationship with the
leadership here in Texas. Incredibly brilliant
people who tend to think they’re right, and if
you don’t agree with them, they don’t put
much effort towards convincing you. And
that rubbed raw with the leadership here in
Texas."
Whether through personality conflicts or out
of hubris, the Texas Republicans decided to
do things their own way, with no guidance
from Hofeller or other Washingtonians.
When I asked Lynn Westmoreland, the

House redistricting vice chair, to describe
his role in the state’s redistricting process,
he replied in a weary voice, “Well, the
Texas legislature basically told me, ‘We’re
Texas, and we’re gonna handle our maps.’
You know, I’m just saying that when you
have a population increase of 4 million, and
the majority of that is minority, you’d better
take that into consideration."
These
statistical
realities
left
the
Republican-controlled state legislature and
Governor Rick Perry with three choices
when it came to redistricting. They could
bow to the demographics, draw three or four
new “minority-opportunity districts”—in
which Latino and/or African American
voters would have the opportunity to elect
the candidate of their choice—and then set
themselves to the task, as Governor George
W. Bush once did, of appealing to the state’s
fastest-growing population. Or they could
opt for the middle ground and create one or
two such districts. Or, says Gerry Hebert, a
lawyer who has handled numerous election
and redistricting cases for Democrats, “they
could use the redistricting process to cling to
what power they have and hang on for as
long as they can."
Earlier this year, I had a breakfast of waffles
and fried chicken wings at the Poly Grill, a
Fort Worth diner in the heart of a formerly
Anglo east-side neighborhood named
Polytechnic Heights, which, as a testament
to the region’s fluid demographics, is now
thoroughly black and Hispanic. With me
was Marc Veasey, a 41-year-old AfricanAmerican Democrat and lifelong Fort Worth
resident. Veasey is the community’s
representative in the state legislature and
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would like to be its U.S. congressman.
Specifically, Veasey has been expecting one
of Texas’ four new districts to be placed
here, because of the explosive population
growth of blacks and Latinos in the area.
Many House Republicans, like the Texan
and House Judiciary Committee Chairman
Lamar Smith, reportedly agreed with Veasey
that a new minority-opportunity district
belonged here—though for different
reasons. Failing to create such a district
would mean that each of the half dozen–plus
Republican members of Congress in the
Metroplex would have to absorb increasing
numbers of minority voters. Several oncesafe GOP districts might thereby become
swing districts by the end of the decade.
Better, as Smith and others saw it, to
preserve the existing seats by funneling the
minority population into a new district.
But the Texas map-drawers refused to create
such a district in the area. Over breakfast,
Veasey explained to me what that lack of
minority representation meant. Presently,
Polytechnic Heights—one of many minority
enclaves in the Metroplex that DeLay’s
redistricters spread across five Republican
districts, thereby “cracking” a potent voting
bloc—falls in the district of Michael
Burgess, a white Republican who last year
told a local Tea Party group that he favors
impeaching President Obama. “[Burgess]
goes around saying ‘I represent more
African Americans than any other
Republican in the entire U.S. Congress.
Look at me, look at my outreach,’ ” Veasey
said. “There’s no way African Americans
would ever have any influence in this

district at all. His votes prove it. His rhetoric
proves it.”
In February, after court testimony in San
Antonio and Washington, D.C., Veasey and
his fellow Democrats prevailed in a suit
charging the state of Texas with producing
maps that discriminated against blacks and
Hispanics. A three-judge panel ordered that
the new 33rd District be drawn into
Veasey’s stomping grounds—and Veasey
promptly entered the race. He won the
primary, and in November he’ll likely
capture what will presumably be a safe
Democratic seat.
While the San Antonio court awarded the
33rd District to the Democrats, it also left
largely intact the state’s drastic redrawing of
the 27th District, a territory that includes
Corpus Christi, the home of Congressman
Blake Farenthold. In the 2010 election,
despite being an Anglo Republican who
does not speak Spanish in a district that’s
74 percent Hispanic, Farenthold upset the
longtime Democratic incumbent, Solomon
Ortiz, by a margin of about 800 votes. “I
won, which disproves the fact that all
Hispanics vote Democrat,” Farenthold told
me. “I go back to my premise that most
Hispanics, especially in south Texas, if
given a test on the issues that would place
you as Democrat or Republican, would fall
into the Republican category.”
In fact, Farenthold’s opponent, Ortiz,
received 86.6 percent of the Latino votes
cast. But Hispanic turnout in the 27th was
abysmal that year. The Tea Party–backed
Farenthold garnered more than 80 percent of
the non-Latino vote, which put him over the
top.
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Over freshly shucked oysters at a Corpus
Christi restaurant one afternoon, I relayed to
Farenthold the testimony of the state GOP’s
map-drawers:
basically,
they
all
acknowledged that Farenthold would have
had a hard time being reelected in 2012 if
they hadn’t drawn him a friendlier map.
District 27,
which
they
obligingly
constructed for him last year, sheds the
border city of Brownsville, climbs up the
coast and swallows portions of Ron Paul’s
existing district, then abruptly hooks
westward into the deeply conservative
Bastrop County. The new configuration
resembles a Glock pistol held at a 45-degree
angle. If Farenthold was so sure he had a
Hispanic following, I asked him, then why
hadn’t he insisted on keeping his district as
it was?
Farenthold, whom I find to be one of the
more charmingly plainspoken members of
Congress, laughed. “Listen,” he said of the
new map, “I’ll take a 60-plus [percent]
Republican district over a swing district any
day. Duh!”
Given Congress’s low standing, I wondered
aloud to Farenthold whether allowing
incumbents like him to escape the wrath of
his constituents by installing him in a safer
district wasn’t thwarting democracy.
“I’m willing to run on my record in any
district I live in,” the freshman maintained.
He pointed out that “at least 50 percent” of
his new district would be composed of his
present constituents. He added, “On a
metaphysical level, sure, there’s gonna be
some politics in it. But elections have
consequences. You elect a Republican

legislature, you’ll get more Republicandrawn districts. It works both ways.”
I asked Farenthold if being in the new
district would in any way change how he
conducted himself. “The district I’m in now
is a swing district,” he said. “This [new]
district is a much stronger Republican
district. You say the same thing, but you use
different words. Immigration would be an
issue—you’re probably not going to change
your mind on your core immigration issues,
but you’ll be a little softer about how you
talk about it in a swing district than in a
harder-core Republican district.”
During his last few years in the House, John
Tanner of Tennessee pursued a lonely quest
to interest his colleagues in a redistrictingreform bill. Tanner was a co-founder of the
fiscally conservative Blue Dog Democrats,
who were all but wiped out in 2010, the year
Tanner himself decided to head for the
sidelines. He had introduced his bill first in
2005, when the Republicans controlled the
House, then in 2007 and again in 2009,
when Democrats were in charge and Nancy
Pelosi was the speaker. “She and Steny
[Hoyer, then the majority leader,] said,
‘That’s a good idea, we’ll take a look at it,’ ”
he recalled with a smirk. “But the hard left
and the hard right don’t want it.”
Tanner says that redistricting’s impact has
evolved over time, from simply creating safe
seats for incumbents to creating rigid
conservative and liberal districts, wherein
the primary contests are a race to the
extremes and the general elections are
preordained. “When the [final] election
[outcome] is [determined] in the party
primary—which now it is, in all but less
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than 100 of the 435 seats—then a member
comes [to Washington] politically crippled,”
the retired congressman told me. “Look,
everyone knows we have a structural deficit,
and the only way out of it is to raise
revenues and cut entitlements. No one who’s
reasonable thinks otherwise. But what
happens? The Democrats look over their left
shoulder, and if someone suggests cutting a
single clerk out of the Department of
Agriculture, they go crazy. Republicans look
over their right shoulder, and if someone
proposes raising taxes on Donald Trump’s
income by $10, they say it’ll be the end of
the world. So these poor members come to
Washington paralyzed, unable to do what
they all know must be done to keep the
country from going adrift, for fear that
they’ll get primaried.
“It’s imposed a parliamentary model on a
representative system,” Tanner went on. “It
makes sense for Democrats to vote one way
and Republicans to vote another in a
parliamentary system. It’s irrational in a
representative form of government. So what
that’s done is two things. First, it’s made it
virtually impossible to compromise. And
second, as we’ve seen in this past decade,
it’s damn near abolished the ability and
responsibility of Congress to hold the
executive branch of the same party
accountable. The Bush years, we were
appropriating $100 billion at a time for the
Iraq War with no hearings, for fear that
[those would] embarrass the administration.
Hell yeah, that’s due to redistricting! The
Republicans in Congress and the Bush
administration became part of the same
team. We’re totally abdicating our
responsibility of checks and balances.

”Tanner’s bill (which fellow Blue Dogs
Heath Shuler and Jim Cooper reintroduced
last year, to similar non-effect) would have
established
national
standards
for
redistricting and shifted the map-drawing
duties from state legislatures to bipartisan
commissions. Such commissions already
exist in a handful of states, while Iowa relies
on nonpartisan map-drawers whose end
product is then voted on by the state
legislature. Tom Hofeller points to the
California citizens’ commission as evidence
that politics will inevitably find its way back
into the process. “There’s no such thing as
nonpartisan,” he told me.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Hofeller insists that
the dire consequences of his vocation are
overblown. “We’ve had gerrymandering all
along, so there’s no proof that that’s the
cause of all the polarization,” he told me.
“I’m here to tell you that there are two other
major factors that are much, much more
prevalent than redistricting. One is the 24hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week news media,
where you only get noticed if you’re
extreme. And the other is McCain-Feingold,
which pushed a great deal of money to the
extremes.” In limiting the size of financial
contributions to national parties, the
campaign finance–reform law encouraged
donors to funnel their cash to opaque outside
groups.
“That’s part of the problem,” Tanner
conceded when I asked him about the superPAC ads flooding the airwaves. “But you
can trace how the members got here back to
gerrymandering. I don’t give a damn how
much money you spend. These guys are
gonna be responsive to the people that
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elected them, to avoid a party primary. And
so they come here to represent their political
party, not their district or their country. That
attitude has infected the Senate, too. Look at
Orrin Hatch,” he said, referring to the
veteran Utah senator who fought off a
primary challenge from an ultraconservative. “Now you’d think he was an
original member of the Tea Party. It makes
you sick to see him grovel.”
Some redistricting experts argue that
Americans have polarized themselves, by
gravitating
toward
homogenous
communities, a demographic trend observed
in Bill Bishop and Robert Cushing’s 2008
book, The Big Sort. But, says one Texas
Republican map-drawer, “redistricting has
amplified the Big Sort by creating safe
Republican and safe Democratic districts.
Look at Texas. If you count [Blake Farenthold’s] 27th as the result of a fluke election,
the [racially polarized West Texas] 23rd is
the only swing district in the state.” In this
sense, the only difference that the new maps
will make is that instead of one swing
district out of 32, there will now be one out
of 36. As to what this portends, former
Texas Congressman Martin Frost, a
Democrat, told me, “I won’t mention anyone
by name, but I know certain Republicans in
the Texas delegation who would be inclined
to be more moderate, if they didn’t have to
fear a primary challenge.”
One Texas Republican who dipped his toe in
the moderate waters, by voting for last
summer’s
debt-ceiling
deal,
was
Congressman Michael Burgess. Tea Partiers

lambasted him to his face, saying, “You
caved.” An analysis by National Journal
found that politicians like Burgess were the
exception—that most House members who
voted to raise the debt ceiling were from
swing districts, while “the further a
member’s district is from the political
center, the more likely it is that he or she
opposed the compromise.”
We know what happened after that whole
debacle: the Dow Jones plummeted,
Standard & Poor’s downgraded America’s
credit rating, and Congress’s approval rating
sank to an unprecedented low of 9 percent.
That intensity of public disgust has hardly
abated, and it is felt across the political
spectrum: according to an NBC/Wall Street
Journal poll released this past January, at
least 56 percent of all liberals, moderates,
and conservatives would like to see
everyone in the legislative branch fired this
November.
If this is so, then perhaps Tom Hofeller is
right. Perhaps redistricting reform is
unnecessary. Perhaps instead the system is
self-correcting: the extremists whom the
map-drawers have helped to create will be
judged as obstructionists unworthy of their
safe seats and, by means of electoral
laxative, flushed out of the body politic.
Thus cleansed, America can then slowly
return to what James Madison called “this
propensity of mankind to fall into mutual
animosities.” When that happens, we know
who will be there to draw the battle lines.
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NEW TOPIC: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AFTER FISHER V. TEXAS
“Fisher vs. Texas Dismissed Again; is it Headed Back to Supreme Court?”
Forbes
Daniel Fisher
July 15, 2014
An appeals court dismissed the affirmativeaction lawsuit of frustrated University of
Texas applicant Abigail Fisher after
reconsidering it in light of last year’s U.S.
Supreme Court decision tightening the
standards for race-conscious college
admissions. The appeals-court ruling drew a
strong dissent that suggested the majority
got it wrong, however, and if Fisher follows
up on her vow to appeal the question may
wind up in front of the Supreme Court
again.
In a decision released today, two of the three
judges on a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals in New Orleans held that Fisher
failed to make her case that UT had engaged
in unconstitutional discrimination by using
race as a factor in some of its admissions
decisions.
“We find force in the argument that race
here is a necessary part, albeit one of many
parts, of the decisional matrix,” Judge
Patrick Higgenbotham wrote, in an opinion
joined by Judge Carolyn Dineen King.
Fisher, who is white, was rejected by UT in
2004 and subsequently graduated from
another university, but her case has lived on
as a key challenge to the constitutionality of
affirmative action. In a strong dissent, Judge
Emilio M. Garza said the majority allowed
the school to escape the strict scrutiny

required under the Supreme Court’s decision
in Fisher vs. University of Texas.
“Simply put, the Constitution does not treat
race -conscious admissions programs
differently because their stated aim is to
help, not to harm,” Garza wrote. By
allowing UT to set a vague goal of “critical
mass” for certain minorities — primarily
black and Latino students — Garza said, the
majority failed to give Fisher the
opportunity to prove that the UT program
wasn’t narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling state goal. “Critical mass” was
never defined in the pleadings and the
majority also failed to address the question
of how anybody could determine when it
has been achieved, he said.
“Accordingly, it is impossible to determine
whether the University’s use of racial
classifications in its admissions process is
narrowly tailored to its stated goal —
essentially, its ends remain unknown,” he
said.
Fisher’s lawyer Edward Blum told the Los
Angeles Times his client would appeal this
latest decision.
“We are disappointed,” Blum said. “But this
court was proven wrong by the Supreme
Court in 2013 and we believe they will be
proven wrong again.”
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The Fifth Circuit majority opinion examined
the recent history of UT admissions and
concluded that the university had achieved
substantial diversity by admitting the
majority of students under the so-called Top
Ten Percent plan, which requires UT to
accept any students in the top 10% of their
high school classes. That plan, required by
state law, is designed to make a virtue out of
the severe racial and ethnic segregation in
Texas public schools by forcing the
university to accept applicants from diverse
backgrounds.
This race-neutral policy, which supplies
more than 80% of students, works against
black and Latino students who find
themselves in majority-white schools and
other well-rounded applicants outside the
top 10% of their classes.
“With its blindness to all but the single
dimension of class rank, the Top Ten
Percent Plan came with significant costs to
diversity and academic integrity, passing
over large numbers of highly qualified
minority and non -minority applicants,”
Higgenbotham wrote.
To address the “nearly intractable problem”
of racial and ethnic diversity, the school
adopted a “holistic review” process that the
Supreme Court approved in Grutter v.
Bollinger, a 2003 decision upholding a
University of Michigan Law School
affirmative action program. That program
considered race as one of a number of
qualifications for admission; in UT’s case,
race was among a bundle of factors that had
a slightly higher weighting than essays.

Only a minority of students are accepted
through the holistic review process and the
majority of those are white. In the year
Fisher applied, 17,000 applicants who
applied outside the Top Ten Percent
program competed for 1,200 remaining seats
at the 38,000-student school.
Fisher argued the minimal impact of the
holistic review process argued against it
being an essential tool for achieving a policy
goal, and Garza agreed. The university
failed to explain, and the majority failed to
require to it to explain, how the program
advanced the goal of diversity, he said.
Garza also criticized the “alarming
conclusion” of the majority that the Top Ten
Percent plan didn’t accept enough minority
students, or not the right type of candidates.
The court assumes, he said, “that minority
students from majority-minority Texas high
schools are inherently limited in their ability
to contribute to the University’s vision of a
diverse student body.”
The proper analysis would allow the
university to determine that racial and ethnic
diversity are important goals, he said, but
leave to courts the decision of whether the
tools the university uses are narrowly
tailored to achieve them.
“Because the role played by race in the
admissions
decision
is
essentially
unknowable, I cannot find that these racial
classifications are necessary or narrowly
tailored to achieving the University’s
interest in diversity,” said Garza, a George
H.W. Bush appointee.
The decision and dissent illustrate the almost
intractable conflict between opponents and
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supporters of affirmative action as the
Supreme Court continues to chip away at the
allowable uses of race in government
decisions. The majority, relying on earlier
Supreme Court decisions, says UT can
continue to pursue the goal of diversity,
which it defines as some unspecified, higher
number of black and Latino students. Garza
hews to the absolutist line of Chief
Justice John Roberts, who once famously
declared: “The way to stop discrimination
on the basis of race is to stop discriminating

on

the

basis

of

race.”

Garza, citing the landmark 1967 decision
in Loving v. Virginia, striking down that
state’s law against interracial marriages,
said: “Any official action that treats a person
differently on account of his race or ethnic
origin is inherently suspect.”
It remains to be seen if the Supreme Court
will find enough material in the majority’s
decision to accept yet another appeal of this
long-running
case.
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“Finally! The Fisher Decision in Plain English”
SCOTUSblog
Amy Howe
June 24, 2013
Today the Court finally issued its decision
in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,
the challenge to that school’s use of race in
its undergraduate admissions process. Since
the Court announced last year that it would
review the case, the university and
supporters of affirmative action had feared
the worst: that the Court would strike down
not only the university’s policy, but
affirmative action more generally. This
morning the university learned that its
admissions policy will at least live to fight
another day, but it will face a tough test
when the case goes back to the lower courts
for further proceedings. Let’s take a look in
Plain English.
As I explained in an earlier post, the case
was filed by Abigail Fisher, a young woman
from Texas who applied to the university
but was rejected. Fisher, who is white, then
filed a lawsuit, arguing that she had been a
victim of racial discrimination because
minority students with less impressive
credentials
than
hers
had
been
admitted. The university prevailed in the
lower courts, but found a skeptical audience
among the conservative Justices at oral
argument at the Supreme Court. Although
Fisher and her lawyers made clear that they
were not asking the Court to overrule its
2003 decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, ruling
that the University of Michigan Law School
could consider race in its admissions process
as part of its efforts to achieve a diverse
student body, the Court nonetheless seemed

ready to put real restrictions on when and
how universities can consider race.
Today a broad majority of the Court
reinforced that affirmative action must be
strictly reviewed, but it did not outlaw those
programs. In an opinion that required only
thirteen pages, the Court explained that a
university’s use of race must meet a test
known as “strict scrutiny.” Under this test, a
university’s use of affirmative action will be
constitutional only if it is “narrowly
tailored.” The Court in Fisher took pains to
make clear exactly what this means: courts
can no longer simply rubber-stamp a
university’s determination that it needs to
use affirmative action to have a diverse
student body. Instead, courts themselves
will need to confirm that the use of race is
“necessary” – that is, that there is no other
realistic alternative that does not use race
that would also create a diverse student
body. Because the lower court had not done
so, the Court sent the case back for it to
determine whether the university could
make this showing.
Justice Antonin Scalia joined the Court’s
opinion, but he also wrote a separate, oneparagraph concurring opinion in which he
made clear that, if Fisher and her lawyers
had asked the Court to do so, he would have
voted to overrule the 2003 decision
in Grutter and eliminate the use of
affirmative action altogether.
Justice
Clarence Thomas – who in his
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autobiography blamed affirmative action for
his problems finding a job after he graduated
from Yale Law School in the 1970s – shared
that view, but he opted to discuss his
reasoning at length, in a twenty-page
concurring opinion in which he suggested
(among other things) that “the arguments
advanced by the University in defense of
discrimination are the same as those
advanced by the segregationists.”
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was the lone
dissenter, but she still managed to produce a
few zingers of her own in her sparse fourpage opinion. Most notably, she poohpoohed the idea that the two alternatives to
affirmative action suggested by Fisher and
her lawyers – the school’s Top Ten Percent
Plan, which offers automatic admission to
any Texas high school student in the top ten
percent of her class, and the review of
applications without regard to race – are in
fact “race-blind.” Because race was actually
at the heart of the Top Ten Percent Plan, she
suggests, and because universities will still
consider race even if they need to do so
covertly, “only an ostrich could regard the
supposedly race neutral alternatives as race
unconscious.”
How will the university’s policy fare in the
lower courts? Given the Top Ten Percent
Plan’s success in achieving a diverse student

body, the school could face an uphill battle
in convincing the lower court that it needs to
be able to consider race to fill the remaining
slots. And it may soon have lots of
company in court, if today’s ruling leads to
new lawsuits by spurned applicants at other
schools.
Given how long it took the Court to decide
this case (nearly nine months), the seven-toone vote came as somewhat of a
surprise. Although it may be many years
before we know for sure, it seems very
possible that the end result was a
compromise
brokered
to
break
a
stalemate: affirmative action survives at
least in theory (which would gain the
support of Justices Breyer and Sotomayor),
but will be far more difficult to implement in
practice (which would gain the support of
the
Court’s
more
conservative
Justices). But for now, and probably much
to their relief, affirmative action is off the
Justices’ plate – at least until fall, when they
will hear oral arguments in a case
challenging an amendment to the Michigan
constitution that prohibits the use of
affirmative
action
by
public
universities. Stay tuned . . . we’ll be back to
cover that one in Plain English too.
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“Affirmative Action Fading From College Scene”
USA Today
Greg Toppo
February 12, 2014
After more than 60 years, is the end of the
road near for affirmative action in college
admissions?
The idea of using race to help determine
who gets a seat in public colleges has been
under fire for decades. Eight states have
essentially banned the practice, and a
Michigan case pending before the U.S.
Supreme Court could prompt others to do
the same.
College officials nationwide got a wake-up
call last June from the high court, which set
a high bar for using race as part of a
complex admissions program in Texas.
Many observers say the combined weight of
the two cases could finally push state
universities to find another way to promote
diversity.
"All the trends are pointing against the
continued use of race in admissions," says
Richard Kahlenberg of the Washington,
D.C.-based Century Foundation, a liberal
think tank. Kahlenberg has for years
advocated using family income,not race, as a
way to ensure that public K-12 schools and
colleges have a diverse student body.
While the Supreme Court majority stopped
short of outlawing race-based preferences in
its landmark ruling in Fisher v. University of
Texas in June, they said that colleges' use of
preferences must be "narrowly tailored" and
that colleges must prove that considering
race is absolutely necessary to maintaining

diversity. They sent the case back to a lower
court, which recently heard new arguments.
Observers say Fisher probably will end up
back at the high court, bringing with it what
could be the most definitive ruling so far on
race in higher education.
"Colleges are going to have to think about
what to do to comply with Fisher
standards," says Gary Orfield, co-founder of
the Civil Rights Project at UCLA.
Fisher is the latest in a string of affirmative
action cases dating as far back as 1950,
when the Supreme Court backed an effort by
Heman Sweatt, an African-American
student, to enroll at the University of Texas
School of Law. The current originated in
2008 when Abigail Fisher, a white high
school student, sued Texas' flagship
university in Austin after she was denied
admission. She said the university's practice
of using race as a factor violated the U.S.
Constitution's 14th Amendment, as well as
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, two measures
long used to protect the rights of minorities.
For years, Texas' public university system
has automatically admitted all students in
the top 10% of their high school graduating
class, but Fisher just missed the cutoff. She
demanded that the university admit her
anyway and asked a judge to stop the state
from using race as a factor in admissions
when considering those who don't earn
automatic admission. The court heard
arguments in October 2012 and sent the case
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back to the lower court last June. In the
meantime, Fisher attended and graduated
from Louisiana State University. The
University of Texas says its "holistic"
admissions process considers students' race
as well as test scores, community service,
work experience and leadership skills,
adding that the 10% rule drives most of its
admissions. In 2010, the university reported
that for the first time, white students
represented a minority of incoming firsttime freshmen.
A year after hearing Fisher, the justices last
October heard arguments in a case from
Michigan, where a 2006 state constitutional
amendment banned racial preferences in
public university admissions. Seven other
states — California, Florida, Washington,
Arizona, Nebraska, Oklahoma and New
Hampshire — do the same, and about 29%
of students live in states where affirmative
action is banned, Kahlenberg estimates.
Michigan Attorney General Bill Schuette
says the state's position was summed up well
by Chief Justice John Roberts, who said the
best way to stop racial discrimination "is to
stop discriminating on the basis of race."
"Our constitution requires equal treatment in
college admissions, which is an expression
by 58% of Michigan voters in 2006 that says
it is fundamentally wrong to treat people
differently based on race or the color of their
skin," Schuette says. "It's just wrong."
A July 2013 study by Georgetown
University scholars Anthony Carnevale and
Jeff Strohl found that in 2009, white
students were more "over-represented"
among the USA's 468 most selective

colleges than they had been in 1995. From
1995 to 2009, the nationwide share of young
people ages 18-24 who were white dropped
6 percentage points, from 68% to 62%. But
whites' share of freshman slots at the USA's
most elite colleges dropped just 2 points
during that same period, from 77% to 75%.
Another study, by Orfield's Civil Rights
Project, found that 15 years after California's
ban on racial preferences went into effect,
increased competition has dropped the share
of black in-state high school graduates
admitted to UCLA from 47.6% of applicants
to 13.7%; the percentage of Latino students
admitted dropped from 54.9% of applicants
to 14.8%. The percentage of white students
admitted also dropped, but not as sharply.
Kahlenberg says the string of affirmative
action cases has pushed universities to find
alternative ways to create diverse freshman
classes. He notes that Texas' 10% rule has
resulted in higher levels of black and Latino
representation. Other state systems have
gotten similar results by eliminating
preferences for children of alumni and
bolstering financial aid, among other
measures. These strategies have led to more
racially and economically diverse classes "in
a way the Supreme Court can't touch," he
says. "I think that's the future of affirmative
action."
Recent surveys have found that Americans
don't like using race in admissions,
Kahlenberg says, "but on the other hand,
Americans don't want to see universities and
American higher education re-segregated."
A decision in the Michigan case, Schuette v.
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, is
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expected this spring. If a majority of eight
justices rule in Michigan's favor (Elena
Kagan, a former solicitor general, recused
herself), it could prompt opponents of
affirmative action in other states to push for
similar bans.
But if the ban is overturned, states such as
California again could weigh race in college

admissions — and not a moment too soon,
Orfield says. Admissions pressures there
have become "very intense." He notes that
UCLA alone last year received nearly
100,000 applications. "It's a big state, it's
growing … and we haven't been growing the
higher education system."
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NEW TOPIC: ADMITTING PRIVILEGES AND THE FUTURE OF
ABORTION REGULATION
“Admitting-Privileges Laws have Created High Hurdle for Abortion
Providers to Clear”
The Washington Post
Sandhya Somashekhar
August 10, 2014

Among the raft of abortion restrictions
passed by states in the past few years, one
did not initially gain much notice — a
requirement that doctors performing
abortions obtain admitting privileges at a
local hospital.
But the measure, which 11 states have
passed in some form, has proved an
especially high hurdle for abortion providers
to clear and a potent tool for antiabortion
activists seeking to shut down abortion
clinics.
Already, more than a dozen clinics have
been shuttered in Texas as a result of that
state’s admitting-privileges law, and at least
one closed in Tennessee. Groups say clinics
in Oklahoma, Louisiana and Wisconsin face
the same fate if new laws there are permitted
to take effect. Three of Alabama’s five
clinics, and the last remaining clinic in
Mississippi, would have shuttered if not for
court decisions this month that stopped an
admitting-privileges law from going into
effect.
The state laws, on the surface, seem like a
paperwork matter. They require physicians
who perform abortions to forge relationships
with hospitals so that they may treat patients
there — a common-sense measure that will

protect women’s health in case of a botched
abortion, foes of the procedure say.
In practice, many clinics have found getting
these privileges very difficult. Their doctors
often live too far away from the hospitals or
cannot commit to admitting the minimum
number of patients required for such a
relationship. In other cases, hospitals have
religious objections or have been reluctant to
become embroiled in such a politically
charged issue.
A doctor at the sole clinic in Mississippi, for
instance, said his staff reached out to
13 hospitals to try to comply with the law.
Six did not respond to their inquiries, and
the rest informed them he would not qualify,
he said.
Courts have differed in their opinions of
such laws, and the matter may be taken up
by the Supreme Court. If they are ultimately
upheld, the impact could be “huge”
compared with other abortion restrictions
that have been passed recently, said
Elizabeth Nash, state-issues manager for the
Guttmacher
Institute,
a
research
organization that supports abortion rights.
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“It has just really taken over, in a sense,
because it has such the potential for shutting
down clinics,” she said.
Tough rules to meet
Antiabortion groups contend that if clinics
are shutting down, that is only because they
cannot meet basic safety standards.
Requiring admitting privileges ensures that
abortion doctors are vetted by their peers
and prevents abortion doctors from simply
abandoning their patients in trouble at the
emergency room. “The need for admitting
privileges requirements is clear,” Denise
Burke, vice president of legal affairs at
Americans United for Life, said in an email.
Abortion rights proponents, however, argue
that admitting privileges are medically
unnecessary because anyone can be
admitted to an emergency room. They
regard the bills as a back-door attempt to
shut down clinics in the wake of the
antiabortion movement’s inability to
overturn Roe v. Wade, the 1973 decision
legalizing abortion nationwide.
The admitting-privileges rule has proved so
hard to meet in part because abortion
doctors often live out of state, flying in to
places such as Mobile and Birmingham to
practice. One doctor in Alabama
periodically travels to Montgomery from
Nigeria, according to court papers. And
large numbers of abortion clinic patients
typically do not end up needing
hospitalization, the providers and abortion
advocates say.

Federal law prohibits hospitals from
discriminating against doctors who provide
abortions. But doctors say the hospitals have
nevertheless been hesitant to extend
privileges because of a reluctance to involve
themselves in the abortion debate, the
advocates argue.
For example, one Dallas hospital revoked
the admitting privileges of two abortion
doctors after it became a target of
antiabortion protests. The hospital reinstated
their privileges after the doctors filed suit.
In his opinion last week striking down the
Alabama law, District Judge Myron H.
Thompson related testimony from one
Birmingham abortion doctor who had
privileges at two teaching hospitals in
Atlanta, where she lived. Her residency in
Georgia barred her from getting privileges at
five Alabama hospitals, Thompson wrote.
Three others were affiliated with the
Catholic Church, which strictly opposes
abortion.
The doctor finally approached the
University of Alabama at Birmingham,
where she had previously been on the
faculty. But the chairman of the obstetrics
and gynecology department “explained to
her that he would not hire her because of her
work providing abortions and serving as
medical director for Planned Parenthood,”
Thompson wrote. “Because the university
hospital is a state-funded institution, the
chair did not want to involve his department
with what he considered to be a politically
contentious organization and procedure, that
is, abortions.”

Hospitals wary of debate
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Willie J. Parker, the doctor at the Jackson
Women’s
Health
Organization,
Mississippi’s only abortion clinic, said in an
interview that he was not surprised that so
many hospitals did not respond to his staff’s
requests or rejected him outright. He has
admitting privileges at an out-of-state
hospital and previously had privileges at
Northwestern Memorial Hospital in
Chicago, where he lived until recently.
“In fairness to the hospitals, they were thrust
in the middle of a very political situation,”
Parker said. “For a hospital to do that, it
would be making a conscious decision to
take on the state legislature.”
Abortion foes’ tactical shift
The laws are part of a wave of state bills
passed by state legislatures in recent years,
driven by a conservative shift in those
bodies as well as a change in strategy on the
part of antiabortion activists, who have
turned their focus away from Roe v. Wade in
favor of laws that reduce access to the
procedure.
Clinic regulations have been part of that
push, and the efforts gained momentum last
year when a Philadelphia abortion doctor

who operated in filthy conditions was
convicted of murder for killing babies born
alive during abortion procedures. A suit
being litigated in Texas is challenging a law
there scheduled to go into effect in
September that would require abortion
clinics to have the amenities of an
emergency room rather than a doctor’s
office. Abortion rights advocates say it
would lead to the closure of more Texas
clinics if enacted.
That law, similar versions of which are in
place in other states, may require clinics to
buy or renovate property.
Some antiabortion activists acknowledge
they are not sorry to see clinics close shop.
But they say they also want to see more
safeguards to protect women who make the
decision to end a pregnancy.
“Many of us have realized Roe v. Wade is
here. Now what can we do in light of it?”
said Bob Foust, a longtime antiabortion
activist in Birmingham. “To be honest, we’d
like to see clinics close, but if they’re going
to be open, they need to provide the best of
care and have a physician with admitting
privileges.”
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“MS Admitting Privilege Law Struck Down by 5th Circuit”
Harvard Law Blog
Jonathan F. Will
July 30, 2014

On July 29, 2014 a panel of the 5th Circuit
struck down a Mississippi statute that would
have effectively closed the only remaining
abortion clinic in the state. Just four months
ago a different panel of the 5th Circuit
upheld a nearly identical statute enacted in
Texas. Both statutes require physicians
performing abortions to have admitting
privileges in local hospitals.
The differing results are unremarkable
because both the purpose and effects prongs
of Casey’s undue burden analysis are
necessarily fact driven. But there are some
open questions worth highlighting from the
decisions. The Mississippi law raises a
matter of first impression. Namely, of what
relevance is it, if any, that Mississippi
women would have to cross state lines to
obtain an abortion if the law was upheld?
After all, even if the last abortion clinic
closed, Mississippi women would have a
shorter distance to travel to obtain such
services than some Texas women now have
because of the other 5th Circuit decision.
In striking down the Mississippi law, the 5th
Circuit cited an Equal Protection case from
the 1930s involving racial discrimination,
and suggested (at least in part) that
Mississippi cannot “lean on its sovereign
neighbors to provide protection of its
citizens’ federal constitutional rights.” The
idea being that if a state cannot rely on a
sister state to provide education for
minorities, a state likewise should not be
permitted to rely on a sister state to provide

abortion services. Regardless of my feelings
about the outcome of the case, I have to
agree with the dissenting opinion of Judge
Garza that this analogy doesn’t work very
well.
As the 5th Circuit majority itself points out,
states have an affirmative obligation under
the Equal Protection Clause to distribute
services equally. But they do not have an
affirmative obligation to provide abortion
services; rather, they are prohibited
(pursuant to a different clause in the
Constitution) from enacting laws that have
the purpose or effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice to
have an abortion. The difference is not
merely semantic. Imagine a State X where
no abortion clinic exists only because no
physicians are willing to perform them.
State X would not be obligated to open a
clinic for its citizens, and any woman
desiring an abortion would have to cross
state lines to obtain it. Now imagine that
State X decided to join the trend and enact a
statute requiring any physician who might
want to perform abortions to have admitting
privileges. If a doctor wanted to open a
clinic in State X, but then couldn’t get
admitting privileges, it would be hard to
claim that the statute imposed any burden at
all on women, since their ability to obtain
abortions would remain exactly the same. So
crossing state lines alone does not seem to
answer the question.
Judge Garza also points out that the
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majority’s rationale seems to suggest that
any law that would close the last abortion
clinic in a state would per se impose an
undue burden (though the majority
attempted to sidestep this by limiting its
decision to the facts before it). For instance,
what if the only existing clinic was terribly
unsterile and had unacceptably high
mortality rates. Certainly the state would
have an interest in closing it regardless of
the fact that women would then have to
cross state lines to obtain an abortion.
But there does seem to be something
intuitively problematic (regardless of travel
time) about a state intentionally forcing its
citizens to navigate a foreign state’s body of
often complex abortion laws; laws that such
citizens would have no ability to change
through the democratic process. And that
brings me to perhaps the more troubling
aspect of these 5th Circuit decisions.
Priscilla Smith, Caitlin Borgmann, and
others have written recently about courts deemphasizing the purpose prong of Casey’s
undue burden analysis. Put simply, even if a
given statute fails to impose an undue
burden on a woman’s ability to choose to
have an abortion, the law should fail if its
purpose was to do so. This suggests that
some level of inquiry should be performed
into the intent behind the law.
But here the 5th Circuit utilized an
interesting move when evaluating the Texas
statute. Rather than begin with Casey’s
undue burden analysis (as the Supreme
Court did in Gonzales v. Carhart), the court
started with rational basis review. It
reasoned that because all laws must survive
rational basis review, it makes sense to start

there. If the law fails, you never have to get
into the more cumbersome undue burden
analysis.
This trick allowed the 5th Circuit to perform
a very deferential rational basis review,
which simply asked whether the statute was
rationally related to a legitimate government
interest. There is no requirement that the law
actually succeed in serving that interest. And
on their face, admitting privilege laws are
related to women’s health – continuity of
care and all that – which is a legitimate
interest. A very deferential rational basis
review would end there.
At this point the 5th Circuit proclaimed that
because the Texas law survived rational
basis, it necessarily had a proper
purpose. Hence the sleight of hand; by
starting with rational basis, the court
avoided the more rigorous purpose inquiry
that Casey would seem to demand. The
majority of the panel deciding the
Mississippi case avoided the inquiry
altogether because no arguments were made
regarding Casey’s purpose prong, and it felt
bound by precedent on the rational basis
inquiry. The dissent went a step further and
suggested that Carhart served to eliminate
the purpose prong of Casey altogether!
That really is a shame. Recent cases in the
7th Circuit and out of the Middle District of
Alabama suggest (without having the
opportunity to perform the analysis) that
courts ought to take the purpose prong of
Casey more seriously. A more searching
analysis might smoke out statutes that really
are intended to infringe on women’s rights
(regardless of whether they are successful).
That would go a long way to justify laws
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that might shut down the sole, unsterile
clinic operating in a state.
Then again, as Judge Posner notes,
determining the purpose behind these types
of statutes will not be an easy task. Even if
some public officials openly discuss their
desire to outlaw abortion within a given

state, members of the legislature may vote to
approve the law out of true concern for
women’s health. How many votes based on
an illicit purpose would be necessary to
strike down the law?
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“Fifth Circuit Upholds Controversial Texas Abortion Law”
The Washington Post
Jonathan H. Adler
March 28, 2014
Yesterday, a three-judge panel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld
Texas’ controversial abortion law, known as
H.B. 2. The challenged provisions of the law
required doctors performing abortions to
have admitting privileges at a local hospital
and mandated that abortion-inducing drugs
be prescribed only in accordance with those
protocols approved by the U.S. Food &
Drug
Administration.
In Planned
Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical
Health Services v. Abbott, the Court found
that neither requirement imposed an undue
burden on exercise of the abortion right. The
opinion was written by Judge Edith Jones,
and joined by Judges Jennifer Elrod and
Catharina Haynes.
Could this case bring abortion back to the
High Court? Perhaps. Although HB2 was
quite controversial — and prompted a noted

filibuster by State Sen. Wendy Davis —
equivalent laws have been enacted in other
states and upheld against constitutional
challenge. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for
the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, for instance,
both upheld similar admitting privilege
requirements. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit also upheld a similar
restriction on the use of abortion-inducing
drugs. On the other hand, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld a
preliminary injunction against an admittingprivilege requirement passed in Wisconsin.
Although the procedural posture was
different, the Fifth Circuit expressly rejected
some of the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning,
creating an opening to argue there’s a circuit
split. In addition, the Court recently
expressed interest in considering the
permissibility of restrictions on the use of
abortion-inducing drugs.
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“The Fight to Criminalize Early-Term Abortions:
New Rulings in Texas and Oklahoma Could Challenge the Last Remnant of
Roe v. Wade”
Slate
Dahlia Lithwick
November 1, 2013

In 2011, Oklahoma passed a law making it
harder for doctors to prescribe abortioninducing drugs. Oklahoma’s Supreme Court
struck down the law as unconstitutional.
Then the Supreme Court agreed to review
the case, but asked the Oklahoma court
(which had written only a few paragraphs)
to clarify why they struck down the law in
the first place. This week, the Oklahoma
Court explained itself: The state’s effort to
regulate abortion-inducing drugs amounted
to a total ban on medication abortions. And
so it was unconstitutional.
One day earlier, a lower court in Texas,
looking at a substantially similar (but not
identical) effort to regulate medication
abortions, upheld the provision, albeit with
an exception. If a woman need a nonsurgical
abortion to protect her health or life, she can
still get it. The raft of new efforts to regulate
medication abortions are confusing, and the
legal questions surrounding them are even
more so. How can we square what happened
in Texas with what happened in Oklahoma,
and what does it all mean for the future of
this type of abortion at the Supreme Court,
where the Oklahoma case may be heard in
the near future?
The constitutional questions around
medication abortions are new and
complicated and different from the usual
fights we’ve witnessed over surgical

abortion and TRAP laws (Targeted
Regulation
of
Abortion
Providers).
Medication abortions mainly involve the
drug mifepristone, or RU-486. They take
place in the first trimester—and that means
the state-erected limits are often thinly
disguised state efforts to challenge what
remains of Roe v Wade. Oklahoma Gov.
Mary Fallin, signing her state’s bill in May
2011, called it “a critical part of our effort to
promote the cause of life.” Gov. Rick Perry
has expressly stated that his goal is to make
abortion at any stage “a thing of the past.” In
effect, these challenges force questions that
have been unanswered for years at the court:
Is Roe still on safe ground? Are state efforts
to force the question back before the high
court going to pay off? And what does it
mean when courts seem to find it easier to
write about the rights of doctors to practice
good medicine than the rights of women to
receive it?
Twelve states, including Oklahoma, have
some
form
of
medication-abortion
regulations on the books. The Oklahoma ban
was incredibly poorly drafted, essentially
sweeping in any “abortion inducing
medication,” which made it easy for the
state Supreme Court to see it as a total ban.
The other states have been sneakier.
As Linda Greenhouse explained in
September, the issue here is not the
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abortions themselves. The statues revolve
around how doctors may prescribe the series
of pills that induce them. Only one drug—
mifepristone—has been approved by the
FDA for inducing abortions, and only for the
first nine weeks of pregnancy. But the way
doctors use this drug and others related to it
has changed in the intervening years. At this
point, the most common medicationabortion protocol requires that women take
two pills: mifepristone, which terminates the
pregnancy, and misoprostol, two days later,
which causes the uterus to expel the
pregnancy. In most states, women can take
the first pill at her doctor’s office and the
second pill at home, which helps improve
access for poor or rural women who live far
from abortion clinics, can’t take off several
days from work, and want to terminate as
early as possible.
Under the 2011 Oklahoma law, the state
required physicians to follow the dosage and
procedures only as written on the F.D.A.
label. The prohibition on allowing doctors to
prescribe the pill in a manner considered
"off-label" effectively means that although
research and best practices have evolved (as
they have for medications approved for
cancer and migraines and most other things),
physicians must continue to prescribe
dosages that are medically outdated. As
Amanda Marcotte explained in Slate, since
the FDA label was approved, further
research has shown that the second pill in
the series can safely be taken at home, and
that the 600 milligrams of Mifeprex required
by the label is too high. Most doctors agree
that only 200 milligrams are needed. Finally,
as Greenhouse clarified, “While the original
F.D.A. label specified that the drugs should

be used only up to 49 days of pregnancy,
doctors have found the regimen safe and
effective for up to 63 days—nine weeks of
pregnancy.”
To sum up, the FDA label mandates a
protocol that is more cumbersome,
expensive, and dangerous for most women.
Emily Bazelon explained why FDA
reauthorization has not been sought, even
though, at this point “96 percent of all
medication abortions now involve an
evidence-based regimen that departs from
the FDA protocol that’s on the label.” That’s
why a district court judge in Oklahoma,
looking at the restriction, found that limiting
physicians to the label requirements was “so
completely at odds with the standard that
governs the practice of medicine that it can
serve no purpose other than to prevent
women from obtaining abortions and to
punish and discriminate against those
women who do.” In other words, he got it.
And then he stopped Oklahoma’s law from
going into effect.
The issue in Oklahoma, though, was that the
law as drafted was ambiguous. It either had
the effect of banning all medication
abortions, or—as the state contended—
merely provided that medication abortions
induced with Mifeprex had to follow the
FDA protocol. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court decision from 2012, which struck
down the law, merely found that the law as
written was unconstitutional under Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, the 1992 case that
reaffirmed Roe but permitted abortion
regulations that are "reasonable" and do not
impose an "undue burden" on women.
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So what happened this week in Oklahoma?
Having been told by the Supreme Court to
unpack its earlier decision striking down the
medication abortion law, the state Supreme
Court took 22 pages to explain that yes, in
its view, the Oklahoma statute barred
physicians from using misoprostol (the
second drug in the protocol) and
methotrexate (a third drug sometimes used
in the abortion-inducing protocol). By
focusing on outdated FDA regulations, the
state’s intention was to outlaw medication
abortion.
Last April, a district court judge in North
Dakota struck down a similar ban on offlabel uses of abortion inducing drugs. But
last year a federal appeals court upheld a
related Ohio law, largely on the theory that
the restriction was not unconstitutional if a
majority of women could still access
abortion in some other manner. The split
increases the chance that the Supreme Court
will have to decide the issue.
Meanwhile, in Texas this week, U.S. District
Judge Lee Yeakel upheld a provision of the
Texas law that limited doctors to FDA
labeling requirements for medication
abortions. The Texas law differs from the
Oklahoma statute HOW? Judge Yeakel
didn’t seem to buy the state’s proffered
safety reason for forcing doctors to stick to
the labelling requirements: “This court finds
that, when performed in accordance with the
off-label protocol, medication abortion is a
safe and effective procedure, as is
medication abortion with the FDA
protocol.” He also found that “taken as a
whole, the FDA protocol is clearly more
burdensome to a woman than the off-label

protocol.” But then he deemed the burden
insufficient to strike the law down. The
restriction wasn’t an unconstitutional ban, he
reasoned, since women have other options.
And to make sure that women’s health isn’t
compromised, he wrote a do-it-yourself
health exception into his opinion: “The
medication abortion provision may not be
enforced against any physician who
determines,
in
appropriate
medical
judgment, to perform the medicationabortion using off-label protocol for the
preservation of the life or health of the
mother.”
As a result of this ruling, in Texas, some
doctors must prescribe heavier doses of
abortion-inducing drugs (unless they see a
threat to the health or life of the woman) and
can only offer medication abortions up to
seven weeks into a pregnancy, as opposed to
nine.
How to reconcile the Oklahoma Supreme
Court’s decision to strike down the law with
the Texas court’s determination that it could
stand? Partly the bad drafting in Oklahoma.
But it feels like something else is going on.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court struck down
the statute by focusing a great deal of
attention on the professional imperative
requiring that licensed physicians adhere to
best practices. Indeed the whole concluding
section revolves around the professional
obligations of doctors and the Hippocratic
oath. The court’s path here is very different
path than the one taken by Yeakel, who
focused on a woman’s right to medical care
(and then said that a woman’s right was not
compromised as long as alternative
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procedures exist). This semi-solicitude for a
woman’s health is the result of a years-long
campaign by opponents of choice, to suggest
that protecting women’s health is so
critically important, that every other concern
falls away.
If the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruling had
been a full-throated discussion of women’s
rights, and all the ways regulating
medication abortions drastically restrict
them, it would have been close to perfect.
But the court was thinking about physicians.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s attention to
the rights (and statutory responsibilities) of
physicians is reminiscent of Justice Harry
Blackmun’s original reasoning in Roe,
which as Jeffrey Toobin recently reminded
us, had a lot less to do with a woman’s
rights than those of her physician. As
Toobin wryly observed, the word
“physician” appears in Roe 48 times, the

word “woman” 44 times. Later cases made
clear that the rights of the physician and
woman were in fact aligned; that this is the
relationship on which the state must not
intrude.
It just shouldn’t be the case, 40 years after
Roe, that courts still don’t see the rights of
women and those of their doctors as equally
compelling; that such opinions still just
don’t seem to “write” (as the lawyers say).
The Oklahoma Supreme Court decision was
correct, but it still pinches that the outcome
is rooted in the harms to doctors who can't
practice medicine as they see fit, as opposed
to the needs of women to get the care they
are due. Efforts to legislate first-trimester,
constitutionally permissible abortion right
out of existence, are subversive and
paternalistic. And the cure for legislative
paternalism
shouldn’t
be
judicial
paternalism.
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